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Abstract
In the last decades, fear conditioning has been established as one of the most
successful paradigms for studying the neural substrates of emotional learning.
Experimental research has revealed a complex circuitry of brain regions—most
prominently the amygdala—underlying the acquisition, extinction and general-
ization of conditioned fear. As the wealth of experimental data grows, theoretical
models that help interpret results and generate new hyoptheses play an increas-
ingly important role. In this thesis, two computational models of the neural
substrates of fear conditioning are presented.
The first model is a biologically realistic spiking neural network model of the
central amygdala, the main output structure of the amygdala. Based on a recent
experimental study that demonstrated the importance of tonic extrasynaptic
inhibition for fear generalization, the effects of changes in neuronal membrane
conductance on input processing are analyzed in the model. Consistent with
experimental results, it is shown that subpopulation-specific changes in tonic
inhibitory conductance increase the responsiveness of the network to phasic
inputs, presumably causing the increase in fear generalization. On the basis of
this result, the model is analyzed from a functional perspective. It is argued that
tonic inhibition in the central amygdala acts as a controller by which network
sensitivity is flexibly adjusted to relevant features of the environment, such as
predictability of threat, and concrete predictions that follow from this proposition
as well as possible adjustment mechanisms are discussed.
In addition, a systems level model is presented that is based on a recent
high-level approach to conditioning and proposes a specific physiological imple-
mentation in the basolateral amygdala, prefrontal cortex and the intercalated
cell clusters of the amygdala. It is a central hypothesis of the model that the
interaction between fear and extinction neurons in the basal amygdala, which
has been described experimentally, is a neural substrate of the switching between
socalled latent states, which allow the animal to organize its experience and infer
structure in the environment. Important behavioral phenomena are reproduced
in the model and the effect of de-activation of model structures is shown to be
in good agreement with results from lesion studies. Finally, predictions and
questions that follow from the main hypothesis are considered.
Taken together, the two models provide a coherent theoretical account of
the neural basis of acquisition and extinction of conditioned fear, as well as the
control of fear generalization. Importantly, this account combines different levels
of analysis. By virtue of this combination, the scope of predictions that can be
derived is expanded and the models become more amenable to experimental
testing.
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Zusammenfassung
Angstkonditionierung hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten als eine der erfolgreich-
sten Methoden zur Untersuchung der neuronalen Substrate von Emotionslernen
etabliert. Experimentelle Forschung hat ein komplexes Netzwerk verschiedener
Hirnstrukturen, das dem Erwerb, der Extinktion und der Generalisierung kon-
ditionierter Angst zugrunde liegt und in dem die Amygdala eine Schlu¨sselrolle
einnimmt, aufgedeckt. Da die Menge an experimentellen Daten immer sta¨rker
zunimmt, kommt theoretischen Modellen, die der Einordnung experimenteller
Ergebnisse und dem Aufstellen neuer Hypothesen dienen, eine immer gewichtigere
Rolle zu. In dieser Dissertation werden zwei theoretische Modelle zu den neu-
ronalen Substraten von Angstlernen vorgestellt.
Bei dem ersten Modell handelt es sich um ein biologisch realistisches Netz-
werkmodell mit spikenden Neuronen, das der zentralen Amygdala nachempfunden
ist. Auf Grundlage einer experimentellen Studie, die einen Zusammenhand
zwischen extrasynaptischer Inhibition und Angstgeneralisierung demonstriert
hat, werden die Folgen von A¨nderung der neuronalen Membranleitfa¨higkeit auf
die Informationsverarbeitung im Gesamtnetzwerk analysiert. Dabei wird gezeigt,
dass—im Einklang mit experimentellen Ergebnissen—populationsspezifische
A¨nderungen die Ansprechempfindlichkeit des Netzwerks maßgeblich erho¨hen.
Ausgehend von diesem Ergebnis wird das Modell einer funktionalen Analyse
unterzogen. Es wird vorgeschlagen, dass extrasynaptische Inhibition in der
zentralen Amygdala als Regler fungiert, mit Hilfe dessen Netzwerksensitivita¨t
flexibel den Begebenheiten der Umwelt, wie z.B. Vorhersagbarkeit von Gefahr,
angepasst werden kann, und konkrete Vorhersagen, die aus dieser Hypothese
folgen, sowie mo¨gliche Mechanismen, werden ero¨rtert.
Des weiteren wird ein Modell auf Systemebene pra¨sentiert, das auf einem
ku¨rzlich vorgeschlagenen Konditionierungsmodell aus den Kognitionswissen-
schaften aufbaut und eine physiologische Implementierung in der basolateralen
Amygdala und dem pra¨frontalen Kortex untersucht. Die Grundannahme des
Modells ist, dass die Wechselwirkung zwischen Angst- und Extinktionsneuronen
in der basalen Amygdala, die experimentell beschrieben wurde, ein neuronales
Substrat des Umschaltens zwischen latenten Zusta¨nden ist, die es dem Tier
ermo¨glichen seine Wahrnehmungen zu organisieren und Strukturen in der Umwelt
zu erkennen. Das Modell reproduziert wichtige Verhaltenspha¨nomene und die
Folgen von Manipulationen im Modell sind in gutem Einklang mit den Folgen
von La¨sionen der entsprechenden Hirnregionen. Daru¨berhinaus werden die
Vorhersagen und offenen Fragen, die sich aus der Grundhypothese ergeben,
diskutiert.
Zusammen bilden die beiden Modelle eine koha¨rente Beschreibung von Erwerb
und Extinktion konditionierter Angst und der Regelung von Angstgeneralisierung.
v
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Diese Beschreibung kombiniert verschiedene Analysebenen. Durch diese Kombi-
nation erweitert sich die Mo¨glichkeit Vorhersagen abzuleiten betra¨chtlich und
die Modelle werden experimenteller Untersuchung zuga¨nglich.
Re´sume´
Au cours des dernie`res de´cennies, le conditionnement a` la peur a e´te´ e´tabli comme
un des paradigmes les plus re´ussis pour comprendre les substrats neuronaux
de l’apprentissage et de l’e´motion. La recherche expe´rimentale a re´ve´le´ les
structures du cerveau, plus importante l’amygdale, qui sous-tendent l’acquisition,
l’extinction et la ge´ne´ralisation de la peur conditionne´e. Comme la richesse des
donne´es expe´rimentales ne cesse de croˆıtre, des mode`les informatiques peuvent
aider a` interpre´ter les re´sultats et contribuer a` notre compre´hension du circuit
neural du conditionnement a` la peur. Dans cette the`se, je pre´sente deux mode`les
informatiques a` cet effet.
Le premier mode`le est un mode`le biologiquement re´aliste de l’amygdale
centrale simulant un re´seau de neurones en activite´. Sur la base des e´tudes
re´centes reliant l’inhibition tonique et la ge´ne´ralisation de la peur, le mode`le
est utilise´ pour enqueˆter sur l’effet des changements de l’inhibition tonique
sur le traitement des informations rec¸ues. L’analyse confirme que la diminu-
tion de l’inhibition tonique d’une population augmente la re´activite´ du re´seau
aux informations phasiques rec¸ues. Ce re´sultat est cohe´rent avec les re´sultats
expe´rimentaux et corrobore le lien entre l’inhibition tonique et la ge´ne´ralisation
de la peur pre´ce´demment de´crite. Ensuite, le mode`le est analyse´ d’une perspec-
tive fonctionelle. On propose que l’inhibition tonique agit comme un re´gulateur
pour ajuster la re´activite´ a` un certain nombre de facteurs, principalement la
pre´visibilite´ du stimulus inconditionnel. Des pre´dictions qui de´coulent de cette
proposition ainsi que des me´canismes d’ajustement possibles sont discute´s.
En outre, je pre´senterai un mode`le syste´matique, centre´ sur l’amygdale baso-
late´rale contenant le cortex pre´frontal et les cellules intercale´es de l’amygdale.
Ce mode`le est base´ sur un type de mode`le de conditionnement re´cemment
introduit dans les sciences cognitives utilisant des variables latentes pour re-
connaˆıtre la structure de l’environnement et pre´dire le stimulus inconditionnel.
C’est une hypothe`se centrale du mode`le que l’interaction entre les neurones
de la peur et les neurones d’extinction dans l’amygdale basale, qui ont e´te´
de´crits expe´rimentalement, code pour l’interface entre les variables latentes.
Sur la base de cette hypothe`se, il est de´montre´ que le mode`le couvre une large
gamme d’effets, commenc¸ant par des effets purement comportementaux jusqu’aux
re´sultats d’e´tudes le´sionnelles. De plus, l’analyse du mode`le produit un certain
nombre de pre´dictions ve´rifiables qui seront discute´es en de´tail.
Pris ensemble, les deux mode`les offrent une perspective the´orique cohe´rente
de la base neurale de l’acquisition et de l’extinction de la peur conditionne´e,
ainsi que le controˆle de la ge´ne´ralisation de la peur. Cette approche combine des
niveaux d’analyse diffe´rents. De cette fac¸on, plus de pre´dictions peuvent eˆtre
de´rive´es et les mode`les se preˆtent mieux a` des tests expe´rimentaux .
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IL infralimbic cortex
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PAG periaqueductal grey
Neurochemicals
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Throughout their lives, all animals, including humans, navigate a delicate trade-
off: On the one hand, predicting potential threat and reacting appropriately is
obviously crucial for survival. On the other hand, excessive fear and anxiety
are clearly detrimental to other behaviors critical for evolutionary fitness, and,
in the case of humans, severely impair quality of life. To keep this balance in
an ever-changing environment, animals rely on learning mechanisms that allow
them to adapt to novel threats.
In recent decades, neurobiological research has begun to reveal the neural
substrates of such behavioral adaptations in rodents. A quickly expanding
catalog of experimental studies maps the neural circuitry of fear learning in
ever greater detail and an intricate arrangement of a number of brain structures
emerges, with the amygdala taking center stage. As the complexity of this
circuitry becomes increasingly apparent, the need for theoretical interpretation
only becomes more urgent.
1.1 Aim of the Thesis
With this work, I endeavour to contribute to this ongoing research effort by
proposing a theoretical account of the neural circuitry of fear learning. In
particular, two computational models are presented in this thesis.
The first model is a biologically realistic spiking neural network model of the
central amygdala, which is closely based on experimental data and examines the
role of tonic inhibition in controlling fear generalization from both a mechanistical
and functional perspective. It corroborates recent experimental findings on the
relation of tonic inhibition and fear generalization and expands on the role of
the central amygdala in fear expression, or, more generally, action selection.
The second model, is based on a recent high-level approach to conditioning
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using latent variables, itself grounded in the theory of Bayesian inference. With
this as a starting point, a physiologically constrained implementation is developed
and analyzed. The resulting model yields an explanatory framework for a wide
number of experimental results and makes hypotheses on the roles of many
structures which have been found to be implicated in fear. Both of these models
allow for a number of testable predictions that are discussed in detail.
Furthermore, as a tool to help implement and interprete spiking neural
network simulations, an analytical approximation to the mean firing rates of the
conductance-based integrate-and-fire neuron model has been derived, using the
Fokker-Planck formalism for diffusion problems. This approximation is used for
analyzing the dynamics of inhibitory networks.
In this thesis, I try to bring together different approaches to studying fear
conditioning theoretically. It is my hope, that it contributes towards bridging
the gap between high-level models of conditioning, solely based on behavior, and
biologically realistic neural network models, based on neurophysiological data.
As a consequence, many of the predictions and hypotheses derived from this
work argue for increasingly combining setups used in behavioral studies with
more recently available neurophysiological measurements and manipulations.
1.2 Classical Fear Conditioning
Classical conditioning was first described by Ivan Pavlov (Pavlov, 1927) and
has since become one of the most important experimental paradigms to study
learning in animals. In classical conditioning, an initially neutral stimulus is
paired repeatedly with an appetitive or aversive stimulus. As a result, the neutral
stimulus comes to evoke a response as well.
1.2.1 Experimental Procedure
Before the main phase of the experiment, the animal is allowed time to get
used to the location in which the conditioning will occur, a phase referred to
as habituation. Then, in the actual training phase, an initially neutral stimulus,
usually a tone or light, is paired repeatedly with the unconditioned stimulus
(US). The US is a stimulus with clear motivational valence, i.e., clearly appetitive
or aversive. As a consequence of this pairing, the animal acquires responses to
the initially neutral stimulus. These responses are termed conditioned responses
(CR), since their appearance is conditional on the previous acquisition, and,
correspondingly, the stimulus evoking them is called conditioned stimulus (CS).
In the case of fear conditioning, the US is most often a painful electric shock,
either to the paws or eyelids; and the conditioned response is typically freezing, a
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brief period of immobility but may also comprise changes in heart rate, analgesia,
and release of stress hormones (LeDoux, 2000).
Timing of CS and US
What is meant exactly with pairing in the previous paragraph merits further
clarification. If the CS and US overlap entirely, i.e., they start and end at the
same time, we speak of simultaneous conditioning. More commonly, however,
the US presentation begins after the CS onset. Depending on the relative
timing of CS-ending and US-beginning, two cases can be distinguished. In delay
conditioning, the US begins before or immediately when the CS ends. In trace
conditioning, on the other hand, the US onset is after the ending of the CS, and
the temporal gap between the two stimuli is referred to as trace interval (Bouton,
2007). The different temporal arrangements can lead to different results. The
longer the gap between CS and US, the harder it is to learn the association
and with more than a few seconds of trace interval, no learning is achieved at
all (Smith, 1969). Another important example for the criticality of timing is
the difference between second-order conditioning and conditioned inhibition,
which will be explained later. It is outside the scope of this work to elaborate
on these effects in detail; all the results should be understood as pertaining to
delay conditioning with the US directly following the CS. This is the procedure
most commonly used in the experiments the work is based on.
Discriminative Conditioning
For many purposes, it is useful to introduce an additional control stimulus, e.g.,
a tone of a different frequency, which is also presented during training, but not
paired with the US. To indicate it was not paired, the superscript “-” will be
used, as opposed to the CS+, the conditioned stimulus that was actually paired.
Whenever more than one CS+ or CS− is used, we use subscripts to denote
stimulus idendity. For instance, stimuli CS+1 and CS
+
2 would be two different
stimuli that were both paired with the US.
After the training phase, the persistence of acquired responses is verified in
the next phase. This phase is often performed in a different context, e.g., a
markedly different cage, to confirm the response is CS- and not context-specific.
In the testing phase, the CS is typically not paired with the US. If the study
involves extinction learning, the CS is presented repeatedly without the US in
this phase, leading to a slow decline in conditioned responding. In this case, a
separate testing phase is executed after extinction learning, often back in the
original conditioning context.
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1.2.2 Extinction Learning and Fear Generalization
A pertinent observation about extinction learning is the instability of the extinc-
tion memory, meaning that conditioned responses reappear occasionally. This
can be triggered by a number of manipulations and the effect is termed accord-
ingly: Renewal describes the renewed emergence of conditioned responses when
switching to a novel or the training context (Bouton, 2004). This effect points
towards the high context-specificity of extinction memory. Another way to renew
conditioned responding is to present the US alone, this is termed reinstatement
(Rescorla, 1975). In addition to these two, conditioned responding could also
reappear spontaneously, in which case it is termed spontaneous recovery (see
figure 1.1).
The multitude of extinction effects already points towards an important
advantage of classical conditioning: simple as the paradigm might be, there is a
wealth of experimental variations that are possible within its boundaries and
lead to effects that can shed light on a wide range of learning mechanisms. Many
of the variations used in neurobiological settings focus on the study of fear gen-
eralization and fear extinction, two aspects of learning that are of high relevance
to pathological behavior. More precisely, the exact readout for quantifying fear
extinction is the exhibition of the conditioned response, i.e., freezing rates, in the
testing phase. Fear generalization is typically quantified by the ratio of CS− to
CS+ response rates. A high ratio indicates that the animal does not discriminate
between CS− and CS+. More generally, in studying stimulus generalization in
conditioning, it is found that conditioned responding to the CS− depends on
similarity. When plotted along a sensory continuum, e.g., tone frequency in
the case of auditory conditioning, conditioned responding is maximal at CS+
and decreases as similarity decreases, yielding a bell-shaped generalization curve
(Pavlov, 1927). Remarkably, these generalization curves stretch over perceptual
boundaries, e.g., between colors (Guttman, 1956). This indicates that stimulus
generalization is more than a mere failure at sensory discrimination; it includes
an active cognitive component (Shepard, 1987; Dunsmoor, 2015).
1.2.3 Variations of the Paradigm and Notable Effects
Complementing the standard paradigm is a number of experimental variations
that allow for investigation of a wide range of effects. These have so far mostly
been employed in animal psychology studies—some in appetitive conditioning—
and contributed greatly to the development of behavioral models of conditioning.
While they have so far mostly been restricted to setups without recordings of
neural activity, it is to be expected that, as recording techniques improve, they
can be used in conjunction with recording of neural activity in the near future
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Figure 1.1: Classical fear conditioning. During training, the animal ac-
quires a conditioned response (freezing) due to the repeated pairing of the CS
(tone) and US (footshock). Afterwards, during extinction learning, the freezing
response diminishes as the CS is presented without the US. Here, a discrimina-
tive paradigm in which a second tone (CS−) is presented during training but
not paired with the US is depicted. On the right side, different modes of CR
re-occurence are sketched: renewal, which is caused by change of context; rein-
statement, in which the CR returns after a single unpaired US; and spontaneous
recovery, where the CR re-occurs after some time.
to add to our understanding of the neural circuitry.
Second-Order Conditioning and Sensory Preconditioning
There are two noteworthy variations demonstrating that a CS can elicit a response
even though it has never been paired with the US itself. Firstly, in second-order
conditioning, a CS (CSA) is directly followed by the US in the first phase of
the experiment. In a second phase, this CSA is presented right after a different
CS (CSB). Remarkably, CSB also acquires a response (e.g. Gewirtz, 2000),
demonstrating that a conditioned stimulus can itself act as a reinforcement
signal after learning.
This can be taken even further in sensory preconditioning (Bouton, 2007):
CSA and CSB are paired in the first phase of the experiment. In the second
phase, stimulus CSA is paired with a US. Consequently, CSB also elicits a
conditioned response in the testing phase. Again, CSB has never been paired
with US. Notably, though, in sensory preconditioning—unlike second-order
conditioning—it also never co-occured with the conditioned response before
testing. This strongly implies that associations are formed between stimuli
rather than stimulus and response and that already motivationally irrelevant
stimuli, such as the two CSs before learning, do form these associations.
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Latent and Conditioned Inhibition
More evidence for learning processes in the absence of an US comes from a
phenomenon termed latent inhibition (Lubow, 1965). Here, stimulus CSA is
presented repeatedly without the US in the first phase. When it is then paired
with the US in the second phase, the acquisition of a conditioned response is
significantly delayed. This indicates stimulus-specific learning in the first phase
of the experiment without US presentations.
Similarly, a stimulus can be trained to inhibit conditioned responding to
other stimuli (Rescorla, 1969). If a previously conditioned stimulus CSA is
paired with stimulus CSB in the absence of the US, CSB reduces conditioned
responding when presented together with other previously conditioned stimuli,
an effect referred to as conditioned inhibition. Note the strong similarity of
this paradigm with second-order conditioning. This example highlights how
critical exact timing between the stimuli is: A subtle difference in relative timing
can lead to diametrically opposite effects. Nonetheless, usually both learning
processes—second-order conditioning and acquisition of conditioned inhibition—
develop simultaneously, with a tendency for second-order conditioning to be
acquired a bit faster. This leads to an overall non-monotonic learning curve and
greatly complicates the interpretation of results (see Gewirtz, 2000; Yin, 1994).
Cue Competition Effects
The previous examples already included schedules with more than one CS and
demonstrated that these stimuli mutually interact in forming US associations.
Cue competition effects are a specific class of phenomena with multiple CSs in
which the CSs compete for association with the US. The most prominent of these
is Kamin blocking (Kamin, 1969). In Kamin blocking, a previously conditioned
CS (CSA) is paired with CSB and the US in the second phase of the experiment.
As a consequence of the pairing with CSA, CSB acquires no, or a much weaker,
response than a suitable control. Importantly, Kamin blocking was a key insight
and motivation behind the formulation of the Rescorla-Wagner model described
later.
Other cue competition effects include overshadowing, in which two CSs
are paired with the US, and depending on factors like salience, one of them
acquires a much stronger response than the other, and relative validity (Wagner,
1968). Here, three distinct stimuli, CSA, CSB and CSX , are involved and during
conditioning both CSA and CSB are always paired with CSX , i.e., compounds
CSAX and CSBX are used. In one group of subjects, CSAX is always presented
together with the US, while CSBX is always presented without the US. In the
other group, CSAX and CSBX are both presented with the US half of the time.
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Interestingly, even though CSX is paired equally often with the US in both
groups, it elicits a significantly stronger response in the latter group. This
finding highlights the importance of US prediction (Rescorla, 1988): In the first
group, CSA is a much better predictor of the US than CSX and accordingly
acquires a strong response at the expense of CSX . In the second group, however,
all three stimuli are equally predictive of the US, since all of them were paired
with the US half of the time.
Occasion Setting and Configural Conditioning
So far, only the linear interaction of stimuli was considered, i.e., each CS was
either a conditioned excitor (increasing the response probability) or inhibitor
(decreasing it) and the response to the presentation of both of them together
could be considered the sum of their individual effects. There are, however, many
cases in which the interaction between stimuli is nonlinear. One specific case is
called occasion setting (Holland, 1989; Bouton, 2007), in which a third stimulus
merely modulates the association between a given CS and the US. Consider
the example of feature-positive discrimination: stimulus B always precedes CSA
whenever CSA is paired with the US, but not when it is presented alone. The
animal can learn that CSA is predicting the US only when B was also presented.
Importantly, B does not act as an excitor; when presented with a third stimulus it
has no effect, i.e., it very specifically modulates the association between CSA and
the US. Conversely, in feature-negative discrimination, the occasion setter signals
the absence of the US. These findings point towards hierarchical organization
of learning processes, where learning the role of stimulus B is specific to the
CSA-US association.
Partial Reinforcement
Finally, another often used variation is conditioning with partial reinforcement,
i.e., not every presentation of the CS is accompanied by the US. There is a variety
of schedules, some deterministic (e.g., only every other CS is paired with the US),
and some random (e.g., CS and US are paired with 50% probability). Usually,
either the length of the acquisition phase is adjusted or unpaired US presentations
are added, such that the overall reinforcement during training is the same as in
the fully conditioned control group (Haselgrove, 2004). Irrespective of the exact
schedule, a very salient and robust finding is the partial reinforcement extinction
effect, the observation that extinction learning after partial conditioning is delayed
as compared to the fully conditioned control animals (Haselgrove, 2004; Gallistel,
2000). Importantly, this contradicts the traditional associative account that
conditioned responding reflects the strength of the association between the CS
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and US.
Taken together, this wide range of effects illustrates the wealth and informa-
tive value of this seemingly simple paradigm. Many of the described phenomena
demonstrate that the mere temporal co-occurence of CS and US is neither
sufficient nor necessary for the acquisition of a CR. Evidence has accumulated
that a computational framework that conceptualizes conditioning as the attempt
at predicting US occurence based on previous experience provides a better fit
to empirical data compared to mere associative learning between coinciding
stimuli (Rescorla, 1988). Accordingly, throughout the last decades, theoretical
models and interpretations of conditioning have been developed based on these
observations. These will be discussed in chapter three.
1.3 Fear and Anxiety
The prior discussion focussed on conditioning per se, and was not specific to fear
or anxiety. Here, these terms are introduced in more detail. Importantly, while
the two terms are often used almost interchangeably in colloquial discourse, a
clear distinction is made in technical language. Fear refers to an acute defensive
reaction against a specific perceived threat, whereas anxiety is a sustained and
general mood of vigilance and unease linked to the vague anticipation of future
negative events (see e.g. Davis, 1992). For animal research, the notions of fear
and anxiety are linked to observable behaviors in standard paradigms.
1.3.1 Fear in Animals
The gold standard for studying fear is the previously described paradigm of
classical fear conditioning. As it is not possible to make meaningful claims
about the emotional experiences of animals, fear is simply a theoretical construst
underlying the observed responses (Davis, 1992). In the school of operational
behaviorism, it can be conceived as an intervening variable, a variable that might
not be directly observable variable, and that combines a possibly diverse list of
stimuli and responses into a coherent explanation of behavior (see Figure 1.2
and Bouton (2007); LeDoux (2014)). Note that in this scheme, the intervening
variable is linked to both stimuli and responses, and these links make the system
in principle falsifiable. For all practical purposes, however, the observable
responses themselves, like freezing and startle, are more commonly taken to
define fear in a specific experimental setting. Nevertheless, when viewed as an
intervening variable, fear could be given a definition that goes beyond freezing
and that still lives up to the standards of scientific rigor. This subtle difference
underlies some theoretical considerations that are discussed later. For now, it
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Figure 1.2: Fear and anxiety. a) Fear as an intervening variable creates
a conceptual link between a number of observables. b) Important behavioral
assays for testing anxiety: The open field test (left) in which the relative time
spent in the center (red square) is used as an inverse measure of anxiety, and
the elevated plus maze (right) in which the relative time spent in the open arms
is used to quantify anxiety.
suffices that the notion of fear is inextricably linked to observable behavior.
1.3.2 Animal Models of Anxiety
Similarly, the notion of anxiety also relies on observable behaviors in experimental
tests. The two tests most commonly used are the elevated plus maze (Pellow ,
1985) and the open field test (Hall, 1932; Denenberg, 1969; Carola, 2002). Both
tests exploit the balance between two opposing natural urges rodents display:
exploration and defensive avoidance (Blanchard, 2008; Tovote, 2015). On the
one hand, rodents have a natural tendency to explore their environment, but
on the other hand, they tend to avoid open spaces and possible exposure to
predators. In a big open field, as well as in a plus maze in which only two arms
are sheltered (see figure 1.2), these two tendencies conflict with each other. As
a consequence, behavior is very sensitive to the sustained mood of the animal.
A pertinent observation is that animals that have undergone fear conditioning
or other putatively traumatic experiences are more likely to avoid open spaces.
Hence, they tend to stay close to the walls in the open field test, or within
the sheltered arms in the elevated plus maze. The relative time spent in the
open spaces can be used as an inverse quantifier of anxiety: The more time
spent in the open, the less anxious the animal. Notably, this quantifier has also
been shown to be sensitive to the application of anxiolytic drugs (Pellow, 1986;
Handley, 1984; Menard, 1999).
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.3.3 Relation between Fear and Anxiety
From early on, theoretical accounts of anxiety have implicated conditioning
in the emergence of anxiety disorders (Watson, 2002; Pavlov, 1927). Some
disorders, like post-traumatic stress disorder, are often conceptualized within the
conditioning framework as deficits in extinction learning and overgeneralization of
fear. Accordingly, anxiety disorders are much more prevalent among combat and
trauma survivors (Dohrenwend, 1981; Lissek, 2005). On the other hand, one of the
main criticisms of this conditioning model of anxiety in humans is that very often
there is no relevant history indicating conditioning-like mechanisms in people
with phobias (Rachman, 1990). Still, as more complex conditioning phenomena
were discovered, it was argued that many observations on the emergence of
anxiety disorders, which seemed to be at odds with the idea of a direct link
between fear learning and anxiety, can be explained in terms of these phenomena
(Mineka, 2006). For instance, latent inhibition can account for between-individual
differences in reactions towards traumatic events, depending on their previous
experience with the stressor; second-order conditioning or vicarious conditioning1
can explain how phobias can form without explicit pairing with an aversive
event. Finally, the conditioning model of anxiety is also validated by the sucess
of exposure therapy for the treatment of pathological anxiety (Barlow, 2002).
This is, of course, not to understate the importance of other individual
factors, like genetic predisposition. Still, there is broad consensus that the study
of conditioning phenomena can inform our understanding of the emergence
of anxiety and anxiety disorders. Here, some theoretical considerations and
empirical evidence on the link between fear and anxiety are presented.
Deficits in Extinction Learning
The conditioning model of anxiety proposes that pathological anxiety rests
on a failure to extinguish previously acquired conditioned responses (Eysenck,
1979; VanElzakker, 2014). Overall, the empirical evidence supports that anxiety
disorders are associated with heightened conditioned responding during extinction
learning (Lissek, 2005; Blechert, 2007; Peri , 1999) and also during extinction
recall (Milad, 2008, 2009). Importantly, this relationship between anxiety and
resistance to extinction learning could be reproduced in rodents by breeding
selectively high- and low-anxiety rats (Muigg, 2008). In addition, concomittant
measurements of neural activity confirmed the involvement of the fear extinction
circuitry for this process (ibid.).
1Vicarious conditioning names to the phenomenon that individuals can acquire fear responses
to a CS by observing other conspecifics’ fearful reaction to that CS. This can be shown to
occur in, e.g., rhesus monkeys (Cook, 1989).
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Fear Generalization
Generalizing the above ideas on extinction, recent theories link anxiety to a
failure to inhibit fear responses during safety learning (Davis, 2001; Jovanovic,
2012). In line with this, increased CR rates (as compared to healthy controls)
on CS− presentation, i.e., higher fear generalization, have been reported in
anxiety patients in a number of studies (Grillon, 1999; Peri , 1999; Glover, 2011;
Dunsmoor, 2015). In addition, studies in rodents revealed a consistent relation
between inter-individual differences in fear generalization scores and anxiety
(Duvarci, 2009; Botta, 2015): Animals that displayed high fear generalization
also tended to score high on anxiety tests.
US-Predictability
Finally, an important finding on the nature of sustained fear and anxiety is
that unpredictable aversive events are much more likely to lead to sustained
fear (Davis, 2010; Walker, 2009). When comparing two groups of subjects—one
which underwent classical conditioning with CS-US pairing and another in which
both stimuli were presented equally often but not paired with each other—it is
found that the latter displays much higher sustained fear, while the first only
exhibits phasic and CS-specific fear responses (Davis, 2010). This is consistent
with contemporary interpretations of conditioning as US prediction: In case the
CS is a clear predictor, no strong associations are formed with contextual cues;
but in case there are no phasic predictors, contextual cues form US presentations,
resulting in sustained and rather undirected states of fear. More generally, the
idea that uncertainty about future threats results in anxiety and that maladaptive
responses to uncertainty underly many disorders is central to a recently proposed
anxiety model (Grupe, 2013).
In summary, these results demonstrate a link between fear learning and the
emergence of anxiety. More particularly, two specific facets of this link should be
highlighted: Firstly, the emergence of anxiety depends crucially on predictability.
Anxiety is more likely to develop whenever the environment does not allow for
the prediction of aversive events, thus undercutting the ability to avoid them
or extenuate their effect. Secondly, sustained fear, or anxiety, is related to
the expression of phasic fear. Hypersensitivity to phasic cues, as in the above
examples of extinction learning and fear generalization, is usually considered a
hallmark of anxiety (Blanchard, 2008). These two aspects provide the foundation
for relating results of the conditioning models to anxiety in later chapters.
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1.4 Fear as a General Model for Learning
Apart from its high clinical relevance for the study of pathological anxiety, it
deserves emphasis that fear conditioning is a highly attractive model for studying
learning in general. It provides noteworthy practical advantages, stemming from
the very nature of fear learning and common to all variations of the paradigm:
Firstly, there are clear, quantifiable behavioural readouts, like freezing, fear-
induced startle, conditioned flight, etc. In addition, there is remarkable similarity
in fear expression and even the neural substrates across individuals and species.
Indeed, there is broad consensus on the pivotal role of the amygdala in fear
learning in a wide variety of species (see, e.g., LeDoux, 2000) .
Moreover, fear responses are very rapidly acquired, reducing experimental
costs tremendously. While the study of many other learning tasks requires
lengthy training sessions, significant fear responses can already be observed
within few trials. This has contributed to fear conditioning being one of the most
well-studied learning paradigms today and one of the earliest fields in which
clear links between neural mechanisms and behavior could be established.
Finally, due to the immense importance of the fear system for survival
and, hence, high selection pressure, there is good reason to assume it performs
in a near-optimal manner. This widens the scope of theoretical approaches
tremendously, since it allows for a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) of behavior.
That means, considerations pertaining to how information can be optimally
processed in the fear circuitry and used to learn to avoid threat are a viable
approach to studying fear learning. This will be developed in more detail in
chapter 3.
Taken together, in the case of fear learning, it is possible to investigate the
nature of the learning process theoretically on at least two levels. On the one
hand, a rich literature on the neural substrates is already available and steadily
growing, so it is becoming increasingly possible to constrain neurobiological,
mechanistic models and derive insight from bottom-up models. On the other
hand, it lends itself well to a rational, or normative, analysis, which describes
the process from a functional perspective.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows: The second chapter is devoted to providing
an overview of relevant physiological and anatomical data. This overview reflects
the scope of the computational models; it presents the brain structures that have
been found to play key roles in the acquisition or extinction of fear responses,
outlines their internal microcircuitries and mutual connectivities, and summarizes
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physiological results on the neural activity—and modulation thereof—in the
course of fear learning.
The third chapter explains the theoretical background of the high-level
modeling approach in more detail. The basic premise of Bayesian learning
is introduced and an overview of theoretical models of conditioning in the
cognitive sciences is provided. Subsequently, in the fourth chapter, mathematical
treatments of neural dynamics are discussed and an approximation for the firing
rates of conductance-based integrate-and-fire models is presented and applied to
the analysis of dynamics in two-population inhibitory networks.
Chapters five and six constitute the core of this thesis. In them, the two
computational models of the fear circuitry are presented and discussed. Finally,
the last chapter concludes the work with a discussion of the models, including
an analysis of key hypotheses and testable predictions, as well as emerging open
questions.

Chapter 2
The Neural Substrates of
Fear Learning
This work explicitly aims at providing models that are physiologically constrained.
A growing body of experimental literature on fear conditioning and its neural
substrates provides the basis for this approach. This research has established
that the amygdala, a group of nuclei located in the temporal lobe, is indispensible
for the acquisition of conditioned fear responses. For instance, pharmacological
lesions of the amygdala lead to a marked decrease in fear aquisition. In addition,
the socalled extended amygdala, which includes the central amygdala and stria
terminalis, is known to play a key role in mediating anxiety. In particular, the
bed nucleus of the stria terminalis is implicated in controlling anxious behavior.
Crucially, the neural circuitry involved in the acquisition and extinction of
conditioned fear extends much further. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
and hippocampus (HPC) have been reported to shape behavioral expression
of both fear and anxiety. Typically, the hippocampus is attributed a pivotal
role in contextual modulation of fear responses and the mPFC in high-level
control of fear and anxiety. This chapter gives an overview of the neuroanatomy
and neurophysiology of fear conditioning and presents results relevant to the
theoretical considerations in the main body of this work.
2.1 Basolateral Amygdala
The basolateral complex of the amygdala (BLA) is cosidered the main site of
acquisition and storage of fear memories (Davis, 1992; Fendt, 1999; LeDoux, 2000).
It can be subdivided into lateral (LA), basal (BA) and accessory basal nuclei. In
terms of cytoarchitecture, these nuclei are often described as “cortical”(McDonald,
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1992), and accordingly consist of mostly spiny, glutamatergic projection neurons
comprising about 80% of the total number of neurons, with an array of different
GABAergic interneuron subtypes making up the remainder.
2.1.1 Main Connections
The prominent role of the amygdala in fear conditioning is already apparent
in its neuroanatomical structure. Projections from sensory modalities carrying
CS-related information and form structures known to transmit nocioceptive
signals converge in the BLA, which is the main recipient of external inputs in the
amygdala. Specifically, the LA receives sensory inputs from all sensory modal-
ities via the cortex and thalamus. These inputs can be subvidived into direct
projections from the sensory thalamus (LeDoux, 1990) and indirect projections,
via the neocortex (LeDoux , 1991).
Moreover, the BLA—particularly the BA—is supplied with polymodal inputs
from different sources. Most notably, there are inputs from the prefrontal
cortex (McDonald, 1996; Rosenkranz, 2002), rhinal cortices, and hippocampus
(McDonald, 1996). A common line of thought is that the prefrontal inputs play a
role in mediating behavioral flexibility while the rhinal and hippocampal inputs
convey information about context and contextual memory. It is important to
note that these connections are reciprocal, indicating a role of the BA in the
formation and organization of memory in the mPFC and HPC.
Within the amygdala, connections are directed from the LA to the BA and
from both structures to the central amygdala (Ehrlich, 2009). Specifically, the
LA sends projections to the BA and the capsular division of the CEA. The
BA, on the other hand, targets mostly the medial part (CEm) of the CEA. In
addition, there are connections to the intercalated cell clusters of the amygdala.
The main connections of the BLA are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
2.1.2 Role in Fear Conditioning
A huge body of lesion studies—both permanent and reversible—clearly implicates
the BLA as a principal site for the formation and storage of CS-US associations.
For instance, it has been shown that lesions of the BLA before conditioning impair
acquisition of a fear response, while post-conditioning lesions block expression of
the fear response, presumably by preventing the retrieval of the fear memory.
Notably, however, some studies using pre-conditioning lesions indicate that the
basal part, BA, does not directly contribute to the acqusition and expression
of conditioned fear. Fear memory, it was demonstrated, can be acquired and
retrieved even in the case of pre- or post-conditioning lesions (Amorapanth, 2000;
Nader, 2001; Sotres-Bayon, 2004).
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Figure 2.1: Organization of the amygdala circuitry. a) View of an
amygdala slice stained with GAD67. The image illustrates the high concentration
of GABAergic neurons in the CEA and ITC, as compared to the BLA. b)
Simplified scheme of the amygdala circuitry. Sensory inputs reach the LA and
are forwarded to the CEA via the BA and ITCs. (adapted from Ehrlich, 2009)
CS-dependent Activity and Synaptic Plasticity in the LA
Electrophysiological recording techniques also allow for the investigation of
the neuronal activity during fear conditioning. The results corroborated those
mentioned before; it was found that the acquisition of a conditioned fear response
is accompanied by an increase in CS-evoked activity in the LA. Importantly, this
increase is stimulus-specific, i.e., the CS+ evokes stronger increases in activity
compared to the unpaired CS− (Collins, 2000), reflecting the relative rates of
conditioned responding.
While such increases could, of course, also be caused by plasticity in afferent
structures, e.g., the medial geniculate nucleus of the auditory thalamus (Gerren,
1983), there is ample evidence that they are indeed due to local plasticity
within the LA. For example, it could be demonstrated that plasticity in afferent
structures is critically dependent on the BLA (Maren, 2001). Moreover, there is
direct evidence for synaptic plasticity in the LA. Many studies have demonstrated
that NMDA-receptor-dependent changes in neuronal activity are essential for the
acquisition of conditioned fear responses by local pharmacological interventions
(Miserendino, 1990; Quirk, 1995, 1997; Gewirtz, 1997; Collins, 2000; Rodrigues,
2001). This lends strong support to the notion that NMDA receptor-dependent
long-term potentiation in the LA underlies associative learning, establishing a
remarkably clear link between synaptic plasticity and observable behavior.
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With respect to plasticity, a line of research that is notable from a theoretical
perspective tries to unravel how this synaptic plasticity in the LA is modulated
by expectation. Recent results suggest that long-term potentiation in the LA is
driven, at least in part, by a sort of reward-prediction error signal that arises in
the midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG) region (McNally, 2006, 2011). This
notion is based on findings that US evoked responses in the LA are stronger for
unexpected US than they are for expected US (Belova, 2007; Johansen, 2010)
and that direct stimulation of the PAG can drive fear conditioning (Di Scala,
1987). In line with this, deactivation of the PAG impaired acquisition of a
conditioned fear (Johansen, 2010). Notably, both the Rescorla-Wagner and the
TD learning rules, which will be introduced in section 3.2.1, are based on the
concept of expectation modulated learning.
Finally, a number of studies have begun to shed light on the role of inhibitory
neurons in the control of synaptic plasticity in the BLA. Activity-dependent
potentiation in the LA is facilitated when GABAergic neurons are surpressed
(Watanabe, 1995; Bissie`re, 2003; Shaban, 2006) and, conversely, activation of
GABA-receptors impairs acquisition of conditioned fear (Wilensky, 1999). More,
recently, it was found that a specific arrangement of two different interneuron
subtypes—parvalbumin (PV)- and somatostatin (SOM)-expressing interneurons—
plays a crucial role in gating synaptic plasticity in the BLA during fear learning
by controlling the activity of the principal neuron bidirectionally (Wolff, 2014).
While PV+ neurons preferentially target the soma of the principal neurons and
generate feedback inhibition, SOM+ neurons mostly project onto the distal
dendrite, and, in addition, the interneurons are differentially recruited by the CS
and US. During the CS, PV+ neurons are innervated and inhibit SOM+ neurons,
thereby releasing the principal neuron dendrite from inhibition. Conversely,
during the presentation of the US, both interneuron subtypes are inhibited,
facilitating principal neuron activity and gating associative plasticity.
Fear and Extinction Neurons in the BA
The discussion so far focused on the acquisition of conditioned fear in the
LA. During extinction learning, on the other hand, CS-evoked activity in the
LA is decreased (Hobin, 2003; Quirk, 1997) in some neurons—presumably by
depotentiation of thalamic inputs (Kim, 2007)—but remains constant in others
(Repa, 2001; An, 2012). More remarkably, in the BA, extinction learning is
associated with a switch in CS-evoked activity between two subpopulations of
principal neurons (Herry, 2008; Amano, 2011). At the beginning of extinction
training, one population displays high CS-evoked phasic activity, correlating with
behavioral expression of fear and hence termed fear neurons, but evoked activity
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gradually decreases in the course of extinction learning. Curiously, another
population, called extinction neurons, behaves in the exact opposite way: there
is little to no CS-evoked activity at the beginning, but the neurons acquire CS-
evoked responses during extinction. This switch in neural activity precedes the
decline in conditioned responding (see figure 2.2). Finally, a third population of
principal neurons is resistant to extinction learning, i.e., they exhibit CS-evoked
phasic activity throughout extinction learning. Notably, this switching between
fear and extinction neurons echoes the idea of fear and extinction memory
traces that was proposed based on behavioral results, most prominently the
phenomenon of fear renewal.
Mechanistically, the activity of fear and extinction neurons indicates mutual
competition. This led to the hypothesis that the switching is mediated by
intra-BA inhibitory neurons. In line with this, an increase in GABA levels
after extinction learning (Heldt, 2007) can be observed, and there is an increase
in IPSC amplitude and frequency in BA principal cells after extinction (Lin,
2009). Adding to this, a recent study reported differential plasticity of inhibitory
synapses depending on whether the cells targeted fear neurons, displaying a
decrease in evoked activity during extinction, or extinction-resistant neurons
(Trouche, 2013).
Importantly, interfering with this microcircuitry blocks behavioral transitions,
but not specifically expression of conditioned fear or fear extinction(Herry, 2008).
Injecting the GABA-agonist muscimol into the BA at different time points in the
paradigm has the effect of blocking transitions between high-fear and low-fear
states, e.g., blocking fear extinction during safety learning or fear renewal when
changing context (see Figure 2.2). This implies a role of the BA in modulation
and control of fear, while the LA appears as the main locus of associative learning.
2.2 Intercalated Cell Clusters
Further, the intercalated cells (ITC) of the amygdala have been implicated in
fear extinction. The ITCs do not form a cohesive nucleus, but rather a number
of small, densely packed clusters of mostly GABAergic (Pare´, 1993) cells around
the BLA (see figure 2.3). Based on their position relative to the BLA, they are
usually divided into lateral ITCs (lITC), medial ITCs (mITC), and the baso-
medially located main cluster (ITC) (Ehrlich, 2009). They are well connected
within the amygdala (Geracitano, 2007; Millhouse, 1986; Royer , 1999), with the
lITC exerting inhibitory control of the BLA (Marowsky, 2005), while the mITCs
and ITCs gate information flow from BLA to CEA (Pare´, 2003; Royer , 1999).
The ITCs receive sensory input from the thalamus and cortex (Asede, 2015),
and dense connections from the infralimbic cortex (Millhouse, 1986; McDonald,
20 CHAPTER 2. THE NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF FEAR LEARNING
Figure 2.2: Fear
and extinction
neurons. a) During
extinction learning,
fear neuron responses
gradually decrease,
while CS-evoked
activity in extinction
neurons increases.
Freezing responses
diminish after the
switch in neural
activity (gray bars).
b) Behavioral tran-
sitions are blocked
by selective and re-
versible inactivation
of the BA. Top row:
inaction after training
prevents acquisition
of extinction. Bottom
row: inactivation
after extinction pre-
vents fear renewal.
(adapted from Herry,
2008)
1996; Vertes, 2004), which can cause strong excitation of the ITCs (Amir, 2011).
Their inter-amygdala connections are organized topographically; the mITCs
receive projections mostly from principal cells in the LA, while the ITCs are
targeted by BA principal neurons, and synapse onto adjacent CEA neurons
(Pare´, 2003; Royer , 1999). Moreover, there is substantial intra-cluster recurrent
connectivity (Geracitano, 2007, 2012).
This connectivity already points towards a role in controlling CEA excitabil-
ity and hence fear expression, and indeed ITCs are mostly implicated in fear
extinction learning (Pare´, 2003). Extinction training leads to increased activity
in the ITC, as evidenced by heightened c-fos and Zif628 expression (Knapska,
2009; Busti, 2011). Moreover, it can be demonstrated that mITCs are necessary
for the expression of fear extinction memory by selective lesion (Likhtik, 2008),
or conversely, that facilitation of ITC activity enhances fear extinction (Ju¨ngling,
2008). Lastly, extinction training is accompanied by potentiation of BA synapses
onto ITC, presumably inhibiting CEm (Amano, 2010). Notably, this effect is
dependent on activity in the infralimbic cortex (ibid.).
More recently, findings also point towards a role of the medial ITCs in
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fear expression. It was demonstrated that BLA-mITC connections undergo
potentiation already during fear learning and that inputs from sensory areas
exhibit plasticity as well (Asede, 2015). These results indicate that ITCs also
induce fear expression via disinhibition of the CEm (Busti, 2011) and suggests
that, instead of just inhibiting fear expression, ITCs might form a parallel
pathway to LA that is capable of noth promoting and inhibiting fear expression.
2.3 Central Amygdala
The central amygdala (CEA) is a GABAergic nucleus located dorsomedially with
respect to the basolateral complex. Anatomically and physiologically, the CEA
can be subdivided into a lateral (CEl) and a medial (CEm) nucleus. Functionally,
it is generally considered the main output region of the amygdala and plays a
pivotal role in fear expression. While it was long regarded as a mere passive
relay in the fear circuitry, recent research highlights its role in acquisition of fear
responses and particularly fear generalization.
2.3.1 Connections with Other Brain Structures
In the fear pathway, the CEA is the next structure downstream of the basolateral
complex receiving amygdala-internal projections from the BLA (Pitka¨nen, 1995),
as well as the ITCs. Moreover, it receives direct projections from sensory areas
(Sah , 2003) including the auditory thalamus (Samson, 2005). Complementing
these, the CEA receives nocioceptive input as well via connections from the
parabrachial nucleus and solitary tract (Shimada, 1992; Jhamandas, 1996; Dong,
2010).
Moreover, the CEA has abundant out-bound projections to other brain
regions. The medial part consists of neurons targeting the hypothalamus (LeDoux
, 1988) and various brainstem nuclei (Veening, 1984). Of particular relevance
for the freezing response typically observed in the conditioning paradigm are
the connections to the periaqueductal gray (Behbehani, 1995; Rizvi, 1991), a
structure known to mediate analgesia (Basbaum, 1984) and defensive responses
like freezing (LeDoux , 1988; Davis, 1992). These different output pathways
mediate distinct behavioral fear responses (LeDoux , 1988; LeDoux, 2000).
2.3.2 Internal Structure: CElon and CEloff
As for internal structure, there are intrinsic connections (Jolkkonen, 1998; Lopez
de Armentia, 2004), and the wealth of neuron subtypes in the CEA (Viviani,
2011; Veinante, 1997) points towards the importance of inter-CEA inhibition
(Veinante, 2003; Huber, 2005; Ehrlich, 2009). Recent studies (Ciocchi, 2010;
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Haubensak, 2010) revealed and characterized a specific functional microcircuitry
within the CEl of particular importance to conditioning. During conditioning,
two subpopulations become distinguishable by their responses to the CS: one
exhibits excitatory responses (termed CElon), while the other population gets
inhibited (termend CEloff). The medial nucleus CEm, in turn, increases its
activity on CS presentation. Overall, the picture of an inhibitory microcircuitry
emerges, where the CElon subpopulation gets innervated by CS input from
the BLA and thalamus and inhibits the CEloff population by direct synaptic
connections. As a consequence, the CEm is released from inhibition, leading to
freezing (Figure 2.3). Notably, this functional distinction in CElon and CEloff
coincides with the expression of the protein kinase PKCδ (Haubensak, 2010).
CEloff neurons, i.e., the subpopulation of CEl neurons inhibited by the CS after
conditioning, expresses PKCδ, while CElon neurons do not. This microcircuitry
is illustrated in Figure 2.3 a.
2.3.3 Synaptic Plasticity in the CEA
Already before the discovery of this microcircuitry, studies have increasingly
pointed towards active changes in the CEA during fear conditioning. For instance,
reversible pharmacological interference in the CEA during fear conditioning was
reported to reduce fear responses during testing (Wilensky, 2000; Goosens, 2003)
and it was found that fear responses can be acquired by overtraining after
BLA lesions, a process that is CEA-dependent (Zimmerman, 2007; Rabinak,
2008). More recent results (Li, 2013; Watabe, 2013; Penzo, 2014) provide direct
evidence for synaptic potentiation and depression and, importantly, indicate that
plasticity within the CEl is subpopulation-specifc. The connections from the
BLA to SOM+ CEl Neurons, which roughly overlap with CElon neurons, show
a tendency to increase synaptic efficacy, while connections to SOM- neurons,
overlapping with CEloff, tend to decrease. This switch in relative synaptic
efficacy facilitates acquisition of a CS-evoked network response.
2.3.4 Tonic Inhibition in the CEA
Another important aspect of neural plasticity in the CEA relates to the tonic
activity. A salient finding in Ciocchi (2010) was that not only did phasic,
CS-evoked activity in the CEA change during conditioning, but also tonic
activity, i.e., the baseline firing, changed with experience. In CElon and CEm
neurons, baseline firing rate tends to decrease, while in CEloff, it increases.
Remarkably, the magnitude of these changes in tonic activity relates to the
behavioral expression of fear generalization. Animals that displayed stronger
increases in CEloff rate tended to generalize, i.e., exhibit higher CS− firing.
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Figure 2.3: The CEA microcircuitry. a) Sketch of the disinhibitory CEA
microcircuitry. b) Top row: Phasic responses for the three CEA subpopulations
before and after conditioning. Bottom row: Correlation with fear generalization.
Particularly in CEloff, there is a strong positive correlation between tonic rate
increase and fear generalization score. (adapted from Ciocchi, 2010)
Following up on these results, Paolo Botta (2015) showed that CEA neurons
undergo modulation of tonic inhibition during fear learning. Tonic inhibition
denotes persistent currents mediated by extrasynaptic GABAA receptors and
has been reported in other brain areas previously (Kaneda, 1995; Nusser, 2002;
Semyanov, 2004). These have a different structural composition and different
properties from their synaptic counterparts, most importantly a higher affinity
for GABA and low receptor desensitization (Farrant, 2005). By virtue of these
properties, they are persistently activated by low concentrations of GABA and
mediate a tonic inhibitory current on the cell membrane.
Importantly, in PKCδ+ neurons in the CEA, these tonic currents decrease.
This is fully consistent with the increase in baseline firing of CEloff neurons
reported previously. Furthermore, the effects on fear generalization are also
consistent: the lower the tonic inhibition in PKCδ+ neurons, the higher the
fear generalization scores. Critically, this is not a mere correlation; optogenetic
manipulation of the PKCδ+ population modulates fear generalization in the
same way. This lends strong support to the idea that tonic inhibition in the
CEA controls fear generalization.
Relation to Anxiety
Just like fear, anxiety is mediated by a distributed circuitry in which both
the BLA and the CEA are involved (Tovote, 2015). Early studies implicated
the CEA in the control of anxiety (Jellestad, 1986) and, more recently, it has
been shown that GABAergic signalling in the amygdala affects anxiety (Tasan,
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Figure 2.4: Tonic inhibition in the CEA. a) Extrasynaptic inhibition in
PKCδ+ decreases during fear learning. The right panel shows example current
traces. b) Fear generalization correlates with the post-FC tonic inhibition
(left panel) and stimulation of PKCδ+ cells increases fear generalization. c)
Optogenetic manipulation can modulate anxiety in the elevated plus maze (left
panel) and open field test (right panel) bidirectionally. (adapted from Botta,
2015)
2011). Together with the relation between fear generalization and anxiety, this
points towards a role of tonic inhibition in the central amygdala in the control
of anxiety. Indeed, it could be demonstrated that optogenetic stimulation of
PKCδ+ neurons increases anxiety scores in the open field test and elevated plus
test, while inhibition reduces them (Botta, 2015).
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2.4 Bed Nucleus of the Stria Terminalis
The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST)—another structure of the
extended amygdala and anatomically, neurochemically and cytoarchitectonically
related to the CEA (Alheid, 2003)—is commonly considered to be at the heart
of the circuitry mediating sustained fear, or anxiety (Walker, 2003). The BNST
has strong reciprocal connections with the amygdala (Krettek, 1978; Price, 1981;
Veinante, 1998, 2003; Dong, 2001) and there is increasing evidence that the
interplay between the amygdala and BNST is pivotal for the emergence of anxiety
(Walker, 2003; Davis, 2010; Duvarci, 2009).
While there is a wealth of results clearly implicating the CEA in the expression
of conditioned fear (see section 2.3), both pre-training (Gewirtz, 1998) and post-
training (Hitchcock, 1991) lesions of the BNST do not affect expression of
conditioned fear (see also LeDoux , 1988; Iwata, 1986). There is, however, data
implicating the BNST in the control of sustained fear. These come mostly
from studies investigating light-enhanced startle, where transition to a brightly
illuminated context causes sustained fear responses (Walker, 1997) and CRF-
enhanced starte, where infusion of the peptide corticotropin releasing hormone
(CRF) increases the amplitude of the acoustic startle response (Lee, 1997; Davis,
2010). These studies demonstrated that lesions of the BNST, but not CEA,
abolish light-enhanced startle (Lee, 1997; Walker, 2002). In addition, there is
evidence for a role of the BNST in the expression of contextual fear (Sullivan,
2004; Resstel, 2008; Haufler, 2013) and for a more general involvement in anxiety
(Sahuque, 2006; Lee, 2008; Duvarci, 2009). More recently, optogenetic studies
revealed specifities in the BNST. Stimulation of glutamatergic projections to the
ventral tegmental area lead to an increase in anxious behavior, while stimulation
of GABAergic projections has anxiolytic effects (Jennings, 2013). Moreover,
different regions of the BNST play distinct roles in the mediation of anxiety via
distinct outbound projections (Kim, 2013b).
Finally, there is evidence that connections from the CEl to the BNST are
involved in the expression of sustained fear (Davis, 2010). This is suggested by
the finding that CEA lesions impair acqusition of contextual fear (Koo, 2004)
and receives further support from crossed lesion studies (Jasnow, 2004; Erb,
2001). Interestingly, the reverse connections appear to play a role in modulation
of phasic conditioned fear. A recent study (Duvarci, 2009) reported that BNST
lesions do not decrease only anxiety scores in the elevated plus maze, but also
freezing to CS− presentations, i.e., reduce fear generalization, again consistent
with the previously described link between fear generalization and anxiety.
In summary, the current state of research implicates the BNST in the control
of anxiety, while the CEA is considered a key site for the expression of phasic fear.
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Nevertheless, the circuitries mediating fear and anxiety strongly overlap, and in
particular the CEA (but also BLA) affects anxious behavior. Additionally, there
is evidence pointing towards strong functional links between the two structures,
presumably reflecting the relation between phasic fear and anxiety.
2.5 Medial Prefrontal Cortex
The acquisition and expression of fear and extinction is not constrained to the
extended amygdala, however. A distributed and interconnected network spanning
additional forebrain structures has been found to be implicated as well. Among
these, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is particularly noteworthy and seems
to serve the control of emotional behaviors. The notion that the cortical areas
exert control over the older subcortical areas, like the amygdala, is by no means
new (for a review, see Sotres-Bayon, 2006). In the case of fear conditioning, it
is established, that the prelimbic (PL) and infralimbic (IL) cortices act on the
amygdaloid fear pathways and thereby influence fear expression. In particular,
the role of the latter, IL, in extinction learning was the subject of many studies
in recent years (Myers , 2007; Herry, 2010).
A neocortical structure, the neuronal organization of the mpFC mirrors other
sensory cortices with predominantly glutamatergic principal neurons, but also
GABAergic interneurons. Moreover, in rodents, these are organized in layers
(Marek, 2013), such as in the sensory cortex. Based on cytoarchitecture, it can
be subdivided into medial precentral cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, as well
as PL and IL, with the latter two known to play a role in the expression and
control of fear. While comparably little is known about the intrinsic connections
of the mPFC, it has been shown in anterograde (Jones, 2005) and retrograde
tracing (Hoover, 2007) studies that IL and PL are interconnected.
Additionally, IL and PL have strong reciprocal connections with the amygdala.
Both PL and IL project to the BLA (McDonald, 1996), innervating BLA neurons
(Likhtik, 2005), and the IL forms strong connections with the ITCs (Millhouse,
1986; Vertes, 2004). Conversely, the BLA targets both the PL and IL (Hoover,
2007). Recently, it was found (Senn, 2014) that fear and extinction neurons
exhibit specificity in their mPFC connectivity: among the PL-projecting neurons
identified by retrograde tracing, there were no extinction neurons, only fear
neurons, extinction-resistant, and non-responsive cells. Among IL-projecting
cells, on the other hand, no fear neurons were found. This resonates with studies
implicating the PL in fear expression and the IL mostly in extinction.
Such a role of the IL in the retrieval of extinction learning was first suggested
by lesion studies (Quirk, 2000) and corroborated with pharmacological inacti-
vations (Sierra-Mercado, 2006; Laurent, 2009). Remarkably, in these studies,
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acquisition was unaffected, only retrieval of extinction was impaired. Moreover,
it could be demonstrated that infusion of an NMDA-receptor antagonist (Burgos-
Robles, 2007) or MAPk inhibitor (Hugues, 2004) shortly after learning also
impaired the retrieval of extinction, pointing towards a role of the IL in memory
consolidation. Complementing these findings, there is CS evoked activity in the
IL during extinction retrieval, but notably not extinction learning (Milad, 2002)
and stimulation of IL reduces conditioned freezing (Milad, 2002, 2004). In light
of these findings, the IL is viewed as a main site for consolidation of extinction
memory.
The PL, on the other hand, appears to exert an opposite influence on fear
expression. Activity in the prelimbic cortex is necessary for the expression but
not acquisition of conditioned fear (Corcoran, Quirk, 2007). Further, studies
using pharmacological inactivation (Sierra-Mercado, 2011) and microstimulation
(Vidal-Gonzalez, 2006) in these two regions corroborate that the PL is involved
in fear, counterbalancing the IL’s role in extinction.
More recently, studies are beginng to shed light on the mechanistic details of
mPFC-BLA interaction that underly this control of fear and extinction. There
is evidence that the reciprocal connections between the BLA and mPFC may
underlie synchronization in the theta frequency range, and that this synchrony
is associated with safety learning (Likhtik, 2014). Moreover, it was shown that a
local inhibitory microcircuit in the prefrontal cortex controls fear expression by
disinhibition of principal neurons (Courtin, 2014). Importantly, this microcir-
cuitry was also demonstrated to play a key role in the entrainment and phase
control of theta oscillations.
2.6 Hippocampus
Finally, the hippocampus (HPC) is also known to play a role in fear conditioning.
Lesion studies have suggested different roles for the amygdala and HPC, such
that the HPC appears to be mostly involved in contextual conditioning (Kim
, 1992; Phillips, 1992), while the amygdala mediates cued fear conditioning.
Based on these, the notion emerged that the HPC encodes a presentation of
context, i.e., of the many stimuli that form the environment to the conditioning
process (Fanselow, 2000), a view that was mostly confirmed by subsequent
pharmacological lesion studies. This role of the HPC in contextual modulation
of fear is particularly relevant to fear extinction, a strongly context-dependent
learning process (Bouton, 2004). In line with this, it was found that pre-
extinction inactivation of the dorsal HPC blocks retrieval of extinction (Corcoran,
2005). This suggests that the HPC is involved in retrieval of context-dependent
extinction memory. Moreover, fear renewal in a new context can be prevented by
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pre-testing inactivation of the dorsal HPC (Corcoran, 2001; Hobin, 2006). These
contributions to extinction and renewal are likely mediated by hippocampal
projections to the mPFC (Hoover, 2007) and to the BA. For the purpose of
this work, it suffices to remark that the HPC transmits contextual information
relevant to cued fear conditioning to the amygdala network.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Approaches to
Fear Learning
“So, then, our fear of some harm ought to be proportional not only to
the magnitude of the harm, but also the probability of the event.”
– Antoine Arnauld & Pierre Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking, 1662
It is more than a mere curious sidenote that some of the earliest researchers
in the field of probability theory—long before the term probability was coined
as a technical term—thought of fear as guided by probability estimates. As
a matter of fact, probability theory was initially conceived as a mathematical
model of rational decision making. This is exemplified by Laplace famously
speaking of probability theory as “common sense reduced to calculation” (Laplace,
1814), as well as discussions of gambling problems in the early literature. The
mathematical axiomatization of probability theory in the first half of the 20th
century obscured this practical side, but the last decades saw a resurgence of
probabilistic theories in artificial intelligence research (see, e.g., Pearl, 1988;
Russell, 2009) and cognitive neuroscience(see, e.g., Knill, 2004; Ma, 2006; Doya,
2006). Many contemporary theories on brain function rephrase problems of
perception and learning as problems of statistical inference and make use of the
rich mathematical framework of probability theory. This school of thought is
often referred to as the Bayesian brain hypothesis. From this perspective, the
problem of perception is interpreted as Bayesian inference on the state of nature
from sensory input, and learning is thought of as inference on the underlying
structure (e.g., CS-US contingencies) of the environment (see, e.g., Friston, 2010).
Formalizing a specific experimental task in these terms can help elucidate which
computations need to be performed in order to solve the task optimally. In
combination with behavioral studies, this allows for hypotheses on the solution
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strategy the animal employs.
On the other hand, Bayesian inference as a model of brain function alone
cannot explain how computations are actually performed in the brain. Informa-
tion processing and learning in the brain have physiological substrates in the
activity of neurons and plasticity of synapses connecting them. Therefore, un-
derstanding the dynamics of neural networks (including both the short-timescale
changes in neural activity and the long-timescale changes in synaptic efficacy)
and the underlying physiological and molecular processes is indispensible for a
mechanistic understanding of learning processes. Although this understanding
relies on mostly empirical research, theoretical models of neural dynamics are
important tools for the interpretation of results and hypothesis generation.
This chapter provides a brief discussion of modeling approaches and an
overview of recent high-level models of conditioning. This is aimed at introducing
the main concepts relevant to the computational models presented in the following
chapters.
3.1 Normative and Descriptive Models
Models of Bayesian inference and those of neural dynamics have very different
goals and pose different approaches to modeling. The former aims at giving an
account of optimal behaviour as a starting point of analysis, while the latter
aims to simulate and understand experimentally observed neural activity. Both
fall into broader classes of models, respectively referred to as normative and
descriptive (Dayan, 2005).
Normative Models
Approaches based on statistical inference are usually normative: They take as
a starting point the task or problem facing the animal, and, from a sufficient
mathematical formulation, derive the optimal (as characterized by some perfor-
mance measure contained in the formulation of the problem) solution. Alluding
to the opening quote, the normative model specifies what the agent “ought to”
do. The fundamental assumption that the animal behaves rationally, rests on
the idea that animal behavior is optimized in the course of evolution (Anderson,
1990; Chater , 1999). Therefore, normative analysis derives top-down constraints
on models by recognizing that an animal’s behavior cannot be entirely arbitrary
if it is to continue to survive.
It needs to be highlighted that the results of such an analysis crucially depend
on the formulation of the problem, so great care needs to be taken in defining
the behavioural goals of the agent. In addition, such a top-down approach
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alone does not allow for any statements on how the brain implements these
computations and therefore often falls short of providing testable predictions in
a neurobiological experimental setting.
Descriptive Models
The alternative is a bottom-up approach, which constrains models by experi-
mental observations pertaining to behavior and/or physiology. This approach is
descriptive; the model aims to reproduce experimental results, e.g., patterns of
brain activity or behavioral phenomena. The purpose of this can be multifaceted;
it may a) provide support for the plausibility of a hypothesis; b) contribute
to our understanding of the neural dynamics beyond what has been unraveled
experimentally; c) reproduce an effect in a simplified model to understand the
causes; d) generate new hypotheses from explorative investigation, etc. While
this approach results in more biologically plausible models, it is fraught with
different problems. Importantly, the data are usually insufficient to constrain
more complex models fully.
Marr’s Three Levels of Computation
The shortcomings of a pure bottom-up approach have been discussed eloquently
by David Marr 1982, working in the field of visual perception. He famously
likened attempts to understand perception by studying only neurons to trying to
understand bird flight by studying only feathers. In order to provide some guid-
ance in combining top-down and bottom-up appraoches, Marr formulated three
distinct levels of computations, which became influential throughout theoretical
neuroscience:
• The computational/semantic level specifies what is computed, i.e., what
are the inputs and outputs and what is the goal of the computation.
• The algorithmic/syntactic level is concerned with which computation
is performed, i.e., how are inputs and outputs represented and which
algorithm is used to transform input to outputs.
• The implementational/physiological level deals with how the computation
is implemented in the brain.
At the computational level, conditioning can be formalized as US prediction,
or more generally, statistical inference, and decision-making tasks can be consid-
ered as maximization of reward or, equivalently, minimization of punishment.
The algorithmic level would then specify how the brain performs the computation,
i.e. which algorithm is used for statistical inference or which learning scheme is
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used to maximize reward. Finally, on the implementational level, we ask how
the neural networks of the brain can execute the computation and how elements
of the algorithm are represented in neural activity.
This separation of levels is conceptually useful, and in particular for high-level
models, restriction to a normative perspective has been proven to be highly valu-
able for understanding animal behavior. On the other hand, for understanding
implementation, the levels cannot be regarded in complete isolation from each
other (Poggio, 2010). The neural hardware, or wetware, constrains which and
how computations can be performed. On the other hand, the structure of the
brain developed in order to serve certain functions in the course of evolution, so
higher level demands presumably shaped implementation. Accordingly, models
in the implementational level can be embedded into higher-level concepts. This
simplifies interpretation and can lead to the emergence of new predictions.
3.2 High-Level Models of Conditioning
Specifically for conditioning, there is a long and fruitful line of research into the
high-level, computational principles guiding the acquisition of the conditioned
response. Since the contemporary Bayesian models used later in this work are
the progeny of a long line of modeling approaches, we start this section by
reviewing classical models of conditioning (for a review, see Pearce, 2001).
3.2.1 A Brief Genealogy of Theories of Conditioning
The first systematic investigations into conditioning were performed more than
a century ago by Ivan Pavlov (1927), who became the namesake of the classical
paradigm, and Edward Thorndike (1898) whose work is mostly associated with
operant conditioning. A number of important refinements have been made to
the theory of conditioning since then.
Early Models of Associative Learning
Both Pavlov and Thorndike have formulated the idea of associative learning,
proposing a strengthening of association between US and CS, or US and CR,
respectively. Although not formulated in mathematical terms, the notion of
associative learning is clear both in Thorndike’s Law of Effect (1898) as well as in
Pavlov’s interpretation of conditioning in the framework of reflex theory (1927).
Mathematical formulations were introduced in the following decades and the
empirically observed exponential learning curves were derived from learning rules
(see Thurstone, 1919; Hull, 1943; Bush, 1951). To obtain the experimentally
observed exponential learning curves, these models introduced the concept of
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a physiological upper bound on responsiveness that limits the acquisition of
the conditioned response, or, alternatively, the concept of response probability,
naturally bounded to [0, 1].
Prediction Error: The Rescorla-Wagner Model
An essential insight is that learning should be driven by the discrepancy between
the expectation of the agent and what actually happens, the so-called reward
prediction error (RPE). While the aforementioned models, especially Bush (1951),
contain precursors to this idea, it is first stated explicitly in the learning model by
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972. The Rescorla-Wagner model quickly grew influential
in learning theory and RPEs have since become one of the most successful
concepts in cognitive science and neuroscience.
In the Rescorla-Wagner model, for each stimulus i, its association strength
wi with the US is increased or decreased by
∆wi = αiβ(λ−
∑
wixi)xi = αiβ (λ− y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RPE
xi (3.1)
where αi and β denote learning parameters for each CS (αi) and the US (β),
respectively. λ ∈ {0, 1} is a binary variable, indicating the presence or absence
of reinforcement, while the xi ∈ {0, 1} are binary variables indicating presence
of stimulus i. Consequently, updates on wi are performed only when stimulus
i is presented1. The animal’s US-prediction y, which is typically assumed to
have an observable correlate in the strength of conditioned responding, is given
by the sum of association strengths of all stimuli presented in that moment:
y =
∑
wixi = w
ᵀx.
Importantly, this model implies that, when considering more than one condi-
tioned stimulus, the changes in association strength of one stimulus also depend
on the association strength of all the others via the overall prediction term∑
wixi = w
ᵀx. This leads the model to capture a number of behavioural
effects that have eluded previous ones. Most notably, it can account for the
phenomenon of blocking described by Kamin a couple of years earlier (Kamin,
1969). As described in section 1.2.3, this indicates that mere US occurence is
not sufficient for associative learning to happen, but that the driving force of
learning is rather unexpected US occurence, an insight formally expressed in
equation (3.1). Other effects captured in the model (some of which unknown by
the time of its formulation) include conditioned inhibition, overexpectation and
1In the original formulation, the binary variables xi are not explicitly included, but the
reader is instructed to only perform the update for present stimuli. Using the binary variables
xi here is just a difference in notation aimed at making the exposition of the model more
consistent with the remainder of the work.
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protection from extinction by a conditioned inhibitor (see Pearce, 2001).
From a mathematical perspective, the Rescorla-Wagner rule implements
a stochastic gradient descent. The reward prediction error is, up to a factor,
equivalent to the gradient of the mean square prediction error E(λ− y)2. Not
surprisingly, similar rules are used elsewhere, e.g., in the Widrow-Hoff-algorithm
1960 for the least mean squares filter and many other algorithms. Notably, these
parallels between algorithms used in computer science and high-level models of
conditioning are a recurring theme.
Associability: Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall Model
One important phenomenon not captured by the Rescorla-Wagner model is latent
inhibition, the observation that repeated exposure to a CS before conditioning
significantly retards acquisition of a response (Lubow, 1965, and section 1.2.3).
How quickly the association wi between a stimulus i and US is strengthened
in the Rescorla-Wagner-model depends directly on the learning parameter αi,
accordingly termed associability of stimulus i. It is easy to see that permitting
a decrease of the associability αi during preexposure could account for latent
inhibition.
Mackintosh provided a rule for how αi should be updated during learning
(Mackintosh, 1975). In this model, associability of a stimulus depends on how
accurately it predicts reinforcement. A stimulus i is regarded as a good predictor,
if the discrepancy between its own associative strength and outcome λ− wixi
is small compared to the contribution of all other stimuli λ −∑j 6=i wjxj , or,
conversely, as a poor predictor if it is bigger or equal. As a consequence, during
preexposure, the associability of a stimulus decreases, because other stimuli,
including context, predict the non-occurrence of the US just as well or better.
Contrary to the predictions of the Mackintosh model, however, it was found
that latent inhibition can also be observed if the CS is paired with a weak
US before a subsequent conditioning phase with a strong US (Hall, 1979). In
Mackintosh’s theory, the prediction would be that initially pairing with a weak
US increases associability (because the CS is a good predictor of that weak US);
instead retarded acquisition of a response to the strong US has been observed.
An elegant solution to this problem was proposed by Pearce and Hall (1980).
Associability should be high during learning for good predictors, but once learning
is complete and the US is predicted correctly, associability should decrease. These
demands can be realized by making associability dependent on the absolute
reward-prediction-error
∆αi = η(|λ−wᵀx| − αi)xi = η(|λ− y| − αi)xi. (3.2)
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The update of association weights wi is the same as in (3.1). Whenever the
RPE is high while stimulus i is presented, αi is increased, and for low RPE, i.e.,
good prediction, it is decreased. αi converges towards E|λ− y| and η ∈ [0, 1] is
a parameter controlling how quickly it converges. For η = 1, the associability
would always depend on only the last presentation of stimulus i. Effectively, the
rule in equation (3.2) computes a running average of |λ− y|, so we can think of
the associability as an indicator of uncertainty, which takes a low value in a very
well predictable environment and a high value in a less predictable environment.
In this model, latent inhibition from preconditioning with weak US can easily
be explained. During pairing with the weak US, the associability is initially
increased, because the US comes unexpectedly, leading to high RPE. Later
in learning, however, the US is well predicted and therefore the associability
decreases, which explains the observed retardation of learning in the second
phase of the experiment.
Temporal-Difference-Learning
The models described so far are trial-level models. The underlying assumption
was that the update step is performed at the end of a trial after the presentation
of the US and various CSs. The models did not include the precise temporal
characteristics of CS and US presentation in their learning rules. These are,
however, known to have notable effects on learning. Also, none of the aforemen-
tioned models addresses second-order conditioning, the observation that after
conditioning a stimulus i to the US, this stimulus can act as a reinforcement
signal to condition another stimulus j (see section 1.2.3).
Real-time models, on the other hand, can be designed to incorporate these
phenomena. They are updated moment by moment2. This makes them more
attractive as scientific explanations, since they do away with the artificial and
somewhat arbitrary division of the animal’s experience into trials. Also, they
are more amenable to engineering applications, which ultimately played a big
role in their broad success.
Real-time models are by no means a recent approach; the first notable example
dates back to 1939 (Hull, 1939). It was only in the 80es, though, that a crucial
insight emerged: the learning update should depend on the time derivative of
some form of composite of real US and US prediction (Sutton, 1990). That is to
say, whenever US prediction or actual US increases unexpectedly, the association
weights of currently present stimuli should be reinforced. Note that this expands
on the notion of reward prediction error in the Rescorla-Wagner model in a
2Often, the models are formulated in continuous time, but also discrete time steps are
possible.
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subtle, yet important way. Models based on this idea are summarily called
time-derivative models.
The most important of these is temporal-difference-learning (TD-learning,
Sutton, 1990, 1998), the relevance of which extends far beyond animal learn-
ing theory. In TD-learning, the agent seeks to predict how much reward (or
punishment) he will receive in the near future. The future reward is given by
vt = λt+1 + γλt+2 + γ
2λt+3 + γ
3λt+4 + ... =
∞∑
i=0
γiλt+1+i. (3.3)
λt is the US at time step t and γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discounting factor, which makes the
agent rate rewards (or punishments) in the immediate future higher than later
ones. The goal of learning is to estimate the value vt and how different stimuli xi
contribute to it. For this, we use the same basic form that the Rescorla-Wagner
model used: The agent’s internal estimate v¯t depends linearly on the stimuli
present at time t, v¯t =
∑
wixi,t = w
ᵀxt.
The key to deriving the weight update lies in the recursive form of vt. We
can reformulate equation (3.3) as
vt = λt+1 +
∞∑
i=1
γiλt+1+i = λt+1 +
∞∑
i=0
γi+1λt+2+i = λt+1 + γvt+1 (3.4)
So, the value at time t equals the sum of immediate reward λt+1 and the value at
the next time step discounted by γ. Equation (3.4) establishes a relation between
the value at two subsequent time steps. It also demonstrates how the value of
the following state is treated equivalently to actual reward in TD-learning.
Equation (3.4) holds for the true value vt, which is unknown to the agent.
Thus, for the predictions v¯t to be correct, equation (3.4) needs to hold also for v¯t
and v¯t+1. We can move the subsequent estimates towards fulfilling this criterion
by using the discrepancy between the left and right hand side, the socalled
TD-error, as a reinforcement term. This yields the update for the weights:
∆wi = αiβ (λt+1 + γv¯t+1 − v¯t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TD-error
xi,t. (3.5)
αi and β are again learning parameters; the same as in equation (3.1). Notice
that the estimate v¯t+1 is used for the update (3.5) instead of the true value
vt+1. Generally, this method of using estimates to update estimates is termed
bootstrapping. It hails from dynamic programming and, in this case, can be
shown to converge to the true values vt. Intuitively, this works out because later
estimates (closer to the actual rewards) tend to more accurate than earlier ones.
In this equation, the discrepancy between the current estimate v¯t and the
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value it should take according to equation (3.4) (λt+1 + γv¯t+1) drives learning,
paralleling the reward-prediction-error in the Rescorla-Wagner formula. It is not
exactly the same, however. The TD-error used here also includes the prediction at
the subsequent time step. Therefore, it not only evaluates whether a discrepancy
between actual reward and reward prediction happened at this time step, but
rather whether the overall expectation of future reward has been changed by the
outcome of this time step. TD-error is high, if either the immediate reward turns
out higher than expected (analogous to RPE), or if the subsequent state predicts
much higher future rewards than were expected in the current state (not included
in RPE). The latter is the mechanism by which second-order conditioning works
in the model. Since US prediction is included in the TD-error, conditioned
stimuli that predict the US can act as reinforcers in very much the same way as
the US.
Strong experimental support for the relevanceof TD-learning for neural coding
comes from studies on midbrain dopamine neurons (Schultz, 1997). A series of
studies has demonstrated that the firing activity of dopaminergic neurons in
the substantia nigra and the ventral tegmental area closely mimicks the TD-
error in equation (3.5). Subsequently, the application of TD-inspired modeling
approaches has led to a long and fruitful line of research (reviewed in, e.g., Schultz,
2004; Glimcher, 2011). In addition, TD-learning has become a common staple
in AI applications (Russell, 2009). In the preceding exposition, the simplest
version of the algorithm was presented, but extendeding it to include actions
by the agent, like in an operant conditioning task, is straightforward. In this
formulation, it is suitable for solving tasks that require optimization of long
action sequences before obtaining feedback in the form of reward or punishment.
Context-dependent Memory Traces
In all of the models presented so far, context is treated like any other stimulus,
that means it can form an association with the US just like transient stimuli. If
US probability is higher in context A than in another, then context A acquires a
higher association weight wcontextA.
Nonetheless, findings on extinction and fear renewal are at odds with this
simple vista (Pearce, 2001). Firstly, in the Rescorla-Wagner-model, extinction
learning should lead to negative associations between the US and the extinction
context. However, no evidence for such a negative strength of associations could
be found experimentally (Bouton, 1983). Thus, although the context might form
associations with the US as predicted by Recorla-Wagner, many experimental
results suggest that it also independently affects conditioned responding as an
occasion setter (see 1.2.3).
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A different way to put this is that contextual cues hierarchically control
CS-US associations. This implies, among other things, that during extinction
learning, a new, context-dependent, CS-US association, or memory trace, is
formed that inhibits expression of conditioned responses, rather than destroying
the original association. Since this new memory trace is highly context-dependent,
after return to the conditioning or a third context, conditioned responses are
restored. Finally, generalizing the notion of context to include temporal aspects,
the phenomenon of spontaneous recovery can also be explained.
3.2.2 Kalman Filter as a Model of Associative Learning
In all the models discussed so far, knowledge about the environment is represented
in the form of scalar weights. Crucially, all these models do not explicitly include
how certain the agent is about his knowledge. The Bayesian framework allows
the inclusion of uncertainty by representing knowledge in the form of probability
distriutions over weights. Then, the width of these distributions, i.e., the variance,
is a measure for how certain the agent if its estimate. In the course of learning,
the probability distributions are updated using Bayes’ theorem (for a more
detailled introduction to Bayesian learning see appendix D). In general, this is
a very computationally costly operation and reduced models are needed. The
Kalman filter model of conditioning (Sutton, 1992; Dayan, 2000; Kruschke, 2008)
is one of the simplest and most popular of these.
The central feature of the Kalman filter is the assumption that all these
probability distributions involved are well approximated by a normal distribution
(Kalman, 1960) and hence fully characterized by their means and covariances.
This greatly simplifies the update step: Instead of having to update the entire
distribution, it is sufficient to update mean and variance.
We start by assuming the same model for US-prediction as in the Rescorla-
Wagner model, i.e., the anticipated US-strength is given by y =
∑
wixi = w
ᵀx,
where again, x denotes the current sensory input and w the association weights.
In contrast to the classical models, however, in the Bayesian framework in
general, the anticipated outcome is expressed not just by a scalar value, but by a
probability distribution, reflecting the degreee of belief in all possible outcomes.
For the Kalman filter in particular, a normal distribution is used:
P (y|w) = N (y|wᵀx, ν) = 1√
2piν
exp
[
− (y −w
ᵀx)2
2ν
]
(3.6)
The distribution is centered around the weighted sum wᵀx, with variance ν,
which is a free parameter and influences the speed of learning. Put simply, the
agent holds y = wᵀx to be most likely, but also considers higher and lower y
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possible.
Notice, that equation (3.6) is also the likelihood for the Bayesian update.
This equation fully determines the agent’s internal model, i.e., it formalizes the
agent’s prior assumptions on how the expected US strength y can be estimated
from sensory input using the concept of association weights w. Essentially, from
now on, we just treat the association weights w as inference variables. Central
to the Kalman filter is the assumption that the prior distribution over w is a
multivariate normal distribution:
P (w) = N (w|µ,C) = 1√
(2pi)ndet(C)
exp
[
−1
2
(w− µ)ᵀC−1(w− µ)
]
. (3.7)
Here µ denotes the mean of the distribution, and C is the covariance matrix. In
each trial t, after having observed the true US strength yt, we now perform the
Bayesian update (D.1) with the likelihood (3.6):
P (w|yt) = αP (yt|w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
eq. (3.6)
P (w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
eq. (3.7)
. (3.8)
The product of two normal distributions is always also a normal distribution,
this is what the practicality of the Kalman filter rests on. As a consequence,
we can derive an update for the mean µ and covariance C from equation (3.8),
which fully captures the Bayesian update:
∆µ = [ν + xᵀCx]−1 (y − µᵀx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RPE
Cx
∆C = − [ν + xᵀCx]−1 CxxᵀC
(3.9)
Mirroring Rescorla-Wagner, the mean weight update ∆µ contains a reward-
prediction-error. Further, the magnitude of the update step depends on µ and
the covariance C.
The term in the square brackets in both expressions in equation (3.9) is the
variance of the marginalized prediction P (y) =
∫
P (y|w)P (w) dnw, i.e., it is a
measure for how certain the agent is in its prediction of y; therefore, it contains
the prior uncertainty ν and the uncertainty about the weights that contributed
to the prediction xᵀCx. This prediction uncertainty contributes inversely to
the update speed, i.e., if the agent was very certain, but his prediction was
violated leading to high RPE, there will be a big update step. This resonates
with the notion of surprise driving weight updates, which is at the heart of the
Rescorla-Wagner model.
In addition, the term Cx controls learning speed. Let’s first consider only
the diagonal elements of C, diag(C) = {c11, ..., cnn}, which are the variances of
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the weights cii = Vwii. The higher cii is, the faster the weight update. This
means that weights that the agent is very uncertain about are updated more
readily, while, conversely, weights that the agent is very confident about are not
as easily changed. This captures the underlying idea of the Pearce-Hall model,
that once learning is complete and the US is well-predicted, the associability of
the predictive stimuli decreases.
A second consequence of the term Cx in the µ-update is more subtle. Note
that the covariance update ∆C is negative3 and does not depend on the outcome
y. Therefore, cii can only decrease, and how strongly it decreases depends on its
current value (the higher the cii, the stronger the decrease) and xi, i.e., whether
the stimulus i is active or not. More clearly, whenever a stimulus i is presented,
the variance of its association weight decreases, regardless of outcome. From this,
it follows that a stimulus i that is only presented before the US and not at other
times will have a higher weight variance cii than a stimulus j that is paired with
the US, but also presented at random times (e.g., pre-exposure in a previous
trial). The associability of stimulus i, which is a better predictor of the US than
stimulus j, is therefore higher. Hence, the Kalman update in equation (3.9) also
takes into account how accurately a stimulus predicts reinforcement, favoring
better predictors, thereby meeting the key design goal of the Mackintosh model.
Thirdly, because of the covariance term Cx the Kalman filter captures a
phenomenon not explained by the previously discussed models: the case of
backwards blocking. In backwards blocking, two stimuli are paired together
with the US in the first phase of the experiment. In the subsequent phase, only
one of the two is paired with the US. Intriguingly, this weakens the conditioned
response to the other stimulus, demonstrating that a stimulus’ association weight
can be modulated in its absence. In the Kalman filter model, this results from
off-diagonal elements in the covariance matrix. An important consequence of
the outer product xxᵀ in the C-update in (3.9) is that C acquires non-zero
off-diagonal elements, if stimuli are correlated with each other. Assume two
stimuli, i and j, are repeatedly presented together, this leads to a negative
covariance term cij = cji < 0 (Note that C can only decrease according to
equation (3.9)). The weight update of µj , when only stimulus i is presented, is
then given by
∆µj = [ν + x
ᵀCx]−1 (y − µᵀx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RPE
cijxi (3.10)
This leads to a weight update for j in the direction opposite to the RPE. Imagine
stimuli i and j were paired together with the US before and now i alone is
3It should be mentioned that it this not a necessary propoerty of the Kalman filter model.
By assuming the real weights w can be subject to change, e.g., by a diffusion process, the
variance update can also have positive terms (see Daw, 2012).
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paired with the US, there would initially be a positive RPE because stimulus
i only accounts for half of the US-prediction. This positive RPE leads to a
decrease in the associative weight of stimulus i, was well as a decrease of the
weight of j via equation (3.10). Notably, however, it predicts the opposite of
sensory pre-conditioning. The repeated pairing of two stimuli and subsequent
conditioning of one of them should—in the Kalman model—lead to the other
stimulus decreasing association weights. However, the opposite is observed
experimentally (see 1.2.3).
In summary, the Kalman filter reproduces the effects captured by earlier
models, and, in addition, observations about changes of CS-US associations in
the absence of the CS, most prominently backwards blocking. Crucially, while
the Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall models introduced changes of associability ad
hoc to reproduce observations, the Kalman filter model derives these changes
from first principles, demonstrating the potential of Bayesian approaches for
learning models.
3.2.3 Latent Variable Models of Conditioning
More recent proposals (Courville, 2006; Gershman, 2012) rooted in the Bayesian
paradigm emphasize the importance of inferences about the structure of the
environment. This idea, that animals seek to discover the causal structure of
their world is not new (Tolman, 1935). However, in the Bayesian framework,
it can be expressed in mathematical terms and becomes amenable to deeper
analysis.
All of the models discussed so far presupposed a direct link from CS to US,
formally expressed in association weights w. The Kalman filter model went one
step further and replaced simple scalar weights with probability distributions
over weights. Latent variable models introduce intermediate variables, which act
as a cause for both CS and US. The causal variable, which is closely related to
the notion of state, remains unobserved itself, hence latent; it is only inferable
by its consequences, CS and US. Importantly, the inclusion of a latent variable
implies a certain causal structure in the environment. The latent variable allows
organizing experience into a number of states.
Figure 3.1 sketches the supposed causal structure and the direction of inference
during US prediction. Having observed the conditioned stimuli x, the animal
infers the probability distribution of the causal variable s, using a set of weights
that encode the conditional probabilies P (s|x). From its internal estimate of the
probability of the causal variable s, the animal can now infer the US-prediction
y, using a different set of weights. Mathematically, this way of inference relies
on the assumption of conditional independence P (x|s) of all the stimuli given
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the causal variable s.
Discriminative vs. Generative Models
Learning in this model, again, amounts to inferring the weights, like in the
Kalman filter model. Yet, there is an important differnce: The Kalman filter
model (and also the earlier models discussed) is a discriminative model, i.e.,
it aims to predict US-probability given a conditioned stimulus was presented.
Put in mathematical terms, it inferes only the conditional probability P (y|x).
Critically, it does not allow for predictions of CS-probability P (x). Nonetheless,
there is evidence animals learn about CS-probabilities, as well.
The latent variable model allows the inference of the full joint probability
distribution P (y,x), i.e., the probabilities of CS and US and how they depend
on each other. This approach is termed generative (Bishop, 2006; Courville,
2006), since the complete distribution is generated4. For this purpose, the
internal model is built on the previously mentioned assumption of conditional
independence given the state s:
P (y,x) = P (y, x1, ..., xn) =
∫
P (y|s)P (x1|s)...P (xn|s)P (s) ds (3.11)
For the sake of simplicity—and consistency with the Kalman filter model—let
us assume s = {s1, s2, ..., sm} is a finite number of states and the distribution
P (y|s) is a normal distribution:
P (y|s) = N (y|µ, ν) = 1√
2piν
exp
[
− (yt − µ)
2
2ν
]
(3.12)
Analoguously, we can define the conditional probabilities P (xi|s). The choice
of distributions fully determines the internal model and hence the likelihood
function.
Overall, the number of weights and variances involved is 2(n+ 1)×m, where
n is the number of stimuli x and m is the number of hidden states s. Compare
this with the total number of inference variables 1/2n(n + 1) in the Kalman
filter; for a low number of possible states m the memory requirements are much
lower than for the Kalman filter. This is due to the assumption of conditional
independence and if it was not for different states, this would lead to erroneous
behavior whenever the assumption is not justified. Crucially, however, allowing
different states enables the animal to infer these higher order statistical features
of the environment while at the same time being much more memory-efficient
than a Kalman filter model with full covariance matrix. In keeping with this,
4as opposed to the discriminative model, which only aims at predicting y, but does not
model the x-probabilities.
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Figure 3.1: Latent variable models of conditioning. a) Bayesian network
scheme for latent variable models. Solid arrows indicate causal structure, while
dotted arrows indicate direction of inference during US prediction. b) Schematic
of the partial reinforcement extinction effect.
many present formulations allow the number of latent causes to grow dynamically,
as learning progresses (see, e.g., Gershman, 2010).
Partial Reinforcement Extinction Effect
The central innovation of latent-variable models is the notion of detecting distinct
states to structure the environment and to handle changes. Extinction learning
is an important example of such a change and one very striking experimental ob-
servation pertaining to extinction is the so-called partial reinforcement extinction
effect (PREE, see section 1.2.3 and figure 3.1). For a purely associative theory,
this effect is puzzling, since we would expect the partially conditioned animal to
have formed weaker associations, which, as a result, should be unlearned more
readily. From a statistical learning perspective—and particularly within the
latent-variable-model—it can be explained easily. The animal detects changes in
its environment and accordingly recognizes it is in a new phase of the experiment.
Note that for partial conditioning, the transition from occasional pairing to
no pairing is much more subtle than in the case of full conditioning, in which
the 100% contigency of CS and US abruptly terminates at the beginning of
the extinction phase. The latter change is much more easily detected, and as
a consequence the animal can unlearn much quicker. Importantly, out of the
discussed models, the latent-variable model is the first to account for PREE.
The Kalman-filter model, albeit also a statistical model, does not capture this
effect, because it does not include the notion of state to reflect the environmental
change.
It deserves emphasis that the latent-variable model splits learning and US
inference in two distinct sub-processes. Firstly, it involves inference on the
state of the environment, and, secondly, inference of the US probability within
this state. This is reminiscent of the notion of hierarchical contextual control
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discussed earlier. We can make the idea of hierarchical control more explicit by
conceiving state changes as a problem of model selection (Courville, 2003). It
was mentioned earlier that the exact formulation of the internal model is left
to the designer of the model. This becomes an even more important issue as
we increase the complexity of the internal models, e.g., for the latent-variable
models. Obviously, different internal models will perform differently in predicting
the future. By model selection, in this regard, we mean endowing the agent with
the ability to choose between a number of internal models depending on their
respective performances.
Note that the internal model incorporates the agent’s belief about the struc-
ture of the environment. If something changes in the structure of the environment,
it might therefore be appropriate to change the internal model. So we can think
of the internal model in terms similar to state; switching between models is
analogous to switching between states in the latent-variable model. How does
the agent make the choice? There are many methods to evaluate relative model
performance and select the model accordingly. They all revolve around estimat-
ing how likely the observed combination of inputs and outcomes are under each
model—or, if we allow for state changes, under a sequence of models.
RLSC Models of Conditioning
A closely related family of models are reinforcement learning state classification
(RLCS) models (Redish, 2007; Tronson, 2012). These models do not invoke the
Bayesian framework; particularly, they do not present knowledge in the form of
probability distributions and their updates are not derived from Bayes’ theorem.
However, they explicitly include the notion of state classification and explain
phenomena like the PREE in basically the same way.
Again, there are two learning processes at work in parallel. The first is
about finding predictive cues and learning association weights via reinforcement
learning algorithms like TD-learning. The second is about learning how to group
different clusters of sensory cues, including context, into distinct states in order
to be able to detect changes in the environment and react accordingly. These
models merit mention as they emphasize that the idea of state learning in latent
variable models is not reliant on the use of Bayesian methods.
We conclude this discussion of higher-level conditioning models by highlighting
the theme of state learning, which underlies many modern approaches. Basically,
these models can be thought of as picking up the notion of different memory
traces formulated much earlier, but address the question of how the animal
decides when to start a new memory trace instead of modifying the present one
during learning, and when to switch between different stored memory traces in
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recall.
3.3 Inference and Decision Making
In relating these models to behavioral experiments, usually conditioned respond-
ing is taken as a proxy for the US prediction of the model. This a simplified
view. Recognition of a certain state of the environment or estimation of a
certain US probability does, in general, not necessitate one specific response.
It is a fundamental question to which extent inference and action selection are
decoupled from each other in conditioning.
3.3.1 Model-Based and Model-Free Learning
At least to modes of learning are conceivable and supported by evidence: Firstly,
direct associations could be formed between CS-related sensory input and ap-
propriate actions, i.e., actions that lead to desirable (or less aversive) outcomes
are reinforced. This is commonly referred to as model-free learning. Conversely,
model-based learning denotes a mode of operation in which the animal forms
a representation of the environment and expectations about future events and
values, and, based on these, chooses the appropriate action. While model-based
learning is more commonly discussed with relation to instrumental condition-
ing, recently the opinion that also classical conditioning can have a strong
model-based component gains ground.
For the case of classical conditioning, the distinction echoes another impor-
tant dichotomy: Model-free learning is learning of stimulus-response associations,
whereas model-based learning more closely corresponds to learning CS-US as-
sociations and selecting responses separately. Mostly, the evidence in favor of
CS-US associations and hence model-based learning comes from experiments in
which the value of the US is modified after training. In the appetitive domain,
there is a number of variations to achieve this (see Dayan (2014) for a review).
In the aversive domain, it is naturally more tricky, but some studies also support
revaluation with aversive stimuli. For example, after aversive conditioning using
a loud noise as US (Rescorla, 1973), this loud noise can be presented often
enough for the animal to get habituated and not show a response anymore in
a second phase. Notably, even though the CS was not presented in the second
phase during which US responding diminished, the CS also does not evoke a
response anymore (as compared to a suitable control).
Further evidence in favor of model-based learning during Pavlovian condition-
ing comes from studies on pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT, see, e.g. Corbit
(2005); Balleine (2006); Holmes (2010), or Campese (2013) for the aversive do-
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main). PIT denotes the effect that a previously classically conditioned stimulus
facilitates instrumental responding under new circumstances. This effect further
demonstrates that learning during Pavlovian conditioning is not restricted to
forming an association between conditioned stimulus and the specific response
(e.g., freezing).
Hence, decision-making becomes a multi-stage procedure in the model-based
framework. Firstly, the relevant probabilities are inferred and the state of
the environment classified, and in another step, the action that minimizes
expected utility under this state is chosen. So what is the benefit of modular,
two-stage decision making? Most importantly, splitting the decision process
in state inference and action selection allows for more flexible modulation of
behavior. The same event, e.g., exposure to US, might call for different actions
depending on context, or the subjective value might change depending on other
parameters. If inference and decision are combined, the chosen action will be
the same whenever the event is expected, leading to highly monotone modes
of behavior, sometimes called sphexish. The two-stage decision process allows
for selecting different actions, while predicting basically the same event, if
the accompanying circumstances have changed. Put more generally, learning
inference and action selection separately allows for quicker adaptation to changes
in only one subdomain.
3.3.2 The Role of Uncertainty
In a situation of perfect knowledge this decision problem becomes trivial; the
agent just chooses the action which maximizes reward or minimizes punishment.
The discipline of decision theory is therefore mostly concerned with decision
making under uncertainty5. Normative approaches postulate that the agent take
into account uncertainty when making a decision (Glimcher, 2003; Ko¨rding, 2007).
With respect to coding, this suggests that the agents holds uncertainty estimates
of the revelant variables (Knill, 2004; Daw, 2005). In principle, presenting the
subjective knowledge about a variable y in the form of a complete probability
distribution P (y) already contains all information about uncertainty. However,
utilizing specific measures of uncertainty, such as the entropy for discrete variables
or variance of coefficient of variation for continuous ones, greatly simplifies many
computations and arguably lends itself better to a neural implementation. This
is a premise similar to the Kalman filter, where it is assumed the distributions
5In keeping with the literature (e.g., Dayan, 2000), we denote by uncertainty a feature of
the subjective state of knowledge of the animal. To refer to features of the environment, we
use predictability when speaking of US as a measure for how well it can be predicted from
sensory cues, and reliability as a property of CSs, quantifying how reliably they predict a US.
Hence, uncertainty can be a consequence of unreliability and unpredictability, but might also
merely be due to incomplete knowledge.
3.3. INFERENCE AND DECISION MAKING 47
involved are reasonably close to normal distributions, and hence keeping track of
mean and covariance suffices. How such measures of uncertainty are represented
in the brain is still an open question. While some argue for a distinguished role
of specific brain areas in encoding global uncertainty signals (e.g. Singer, 2009),
most theoretical accounts hold that encoding of uncertainty about a variable is
bound to the presentation of that variable.
For understanding the neural coding of uncertainty and its effect on decision
making better, it has turned out to be useful to classify uncertainty depending
on which stage of the decision process it relates to (Bach, 2012). Sensory
uncertainty denotes uncertainty associated directly with sensory information
relevant to the decision. In the conditioning example, this would be, for instance,
uncertainty about the sensory discrimination between CS+ and CS− and this
form of uncertainty should be higher, the more similar the two stimuli. The
next stage in the processing, at which uncertainty might arise is state estimation.
This state uncertainty we would expect to be particularly high early in extinction
learning, for example, when uncertainty whether the environment is dangerous
or not is high. In the course of extinction learning, this uncertainty presumably
diminishes as the animal learns to classify the extinction context as a new, safe
state.
The next stage refers to the transition rules. Rule uncertainty describes
subjective lack of knowledge on how actions affect the probabilities of transi-
tioning in new states. This aspect is less applicable to Pavlovian conditioning,
but could in principle be studied using an operant conditioning paradigm. More
importantly, outcome uncertainty reflects the degree of uncertainty about the
immediate future. In the case of conditioning, it could be quantified as the
estimated variance in US strength y. Two aspects of outcome uncertainty deserve
to be highlighted here: First, to describe the effect outcome uncertainty has
on learning, one should make a distinction between expected and unexpected
outcome uncertainty. Expected uncertainty arises from a known unreliability
and unpredictability in the environment (Yu, 2005). Notably, this expected
divergence between the reward estimate and outcome should not lead to a learn-
ing update, contrary to an unexpected reward prediction error. Accordingly,
some learning rules suggest keeping an estimate of the expected variance of
the reward prediction error during learning (Preuschoff, 2007). Furthermore,
and independent of the learning update, outcome uncertainty can be shown to
have a significant effect on decision making, most evident in the phenomenon of
risk aversion. While expected utility theory and related accounts can explain
these findings by a non-linear utility function without invoking explicit coding of
uncertainty, there is evidence that measures of outcome uncertainty are encoded
and affect the decision (D’Acremont, 2008; Bach, 2012).
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Hence, uncertainty does play an important role in decision making. The
decisions of a rational agent should not only depend on his estimates of the mean
Ey, but also take into account how certain he is of this estimate. Accordingly,
research into the neural mechanisms behind decision making focuses in no small
part on finding neural substrates of uncertainty coding (Yu, 2003; Daw, 2005).
It follows that, if we view the fear response in classical conditioning as a simple
binary decision between “freezing” and “no reaction”, this decision should, among
other things, depend on how certain the animal is in its US-prediction. This
point will be discussed in more detail in the computational model of the central
amygdala in chapter 5.
Chapter 4
Neural Dynamics
Sofar, the exposition followed a normative approach. High-level models of
conditioning were introduced, and computational and algorithmic aspects of
conditioning were discussed. Any such computations in the brain are performed
by interacting populations of neurons. Therefore, a complete understanding of
the neural circuitry of conditioning necessarily has to include an understanding
of neural dynamics (Gerstner, 2002; Izhikevich, 2007). In this chapter, important
concepts for the study of neural dynamics are introduced and specifically in-
hibitory networks, like the central amygdala, but also the striatum, are considered
in more detail.
In section 4.2, a novel approximation for the solution of the Fokker-Planck
equation for conductance-based neurons is introduced. Subsequently, in section
4.3, this analytic approximation is used to analyze the dynamics of a network of
two mutually inhibiting populations. Many important features of the network
dynamics and their dependence on parameters, like connectivity, background
input strength and others, are well captured by this approximation, as numerical
simulations confirm.
4.1 Mean Rate Approaches
The simplest approach is to assume the populations to be perfectly homogeneous
and only consider the mean rates for each population. Consider, for instance,
the CEl microcircuitry: Let von and voff denote the mean membrane potentials
of the CElon and CEloff subpopulation, respectively. Further, assume a mapping
r = f(v) from mean membrane potential to mean firing rate r. We can then
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approximate the membrane potential dynamics in this microcircuitry by
τ
d
dt
(
von
voff
)
= −
(
von
voff
)
+
(
won,on woff,on
won,off woff,off
)(
f(von)
f(voff )
)
+
(
bon
boff
)
, (4.1)
or, in vector notation
τ
d
dt
v = −v + Wᵀf(v) + b. (4.2)
Here, τ is the neural time constant. wi,j is the functional connectivity from i to
j and bi denotes the background input to population i. The first term −v takes
into account the decay of the membrane potential towards rest due to leakiness.
Without it, the model neurons would be perfect integrators of input. When we
allow for time-dependent external inputs on the right hand side, or,
τ
d
dt
v = −v + Wᵀf(v) + b + νext(t), (4.3)
this simple model can already reproduce the phasic responses observed in the
CEA microcircuitry qualitatively.
4.1.1 Stationary Points and Stability
Using this formalism, other important properties of the network dynamics can be
exemplified. For instance, it is straightforward to compute the resting membrane
potentials, i.e., the values v takes in the absence of external input νext(t), by
setting the left hand side in equation (4.2) with the time-derivative to zero:
0 = −v + Wᵀf(v) + b
v = Wᵀf(v) + b.
(4.4)
Whenever condition (4.4) is fulfilled, there is no change in time, since the time
derivative is also zero. A point v0 which fulfills this condition is called a stationary
point. Depending on the exact shape of the transfer function f(v), there can be
multiple stationary points, i.e., equation (4.4) can have more than one solution.
In the special case of two inhibitory populations with no within-population
connections, the stationary mean rates von and voff of the two populations can
be computed numerically by solving the self consistent equation for von
von = bon + woff,onf(voff ) =
= bon + woff,onf (boff + won,offf(von)) .
(4.5)
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and subsequently substituting the solution v∗on into
v∗off = boff + woff,onf(v
∗
on). (4.6)
The graphical rendering of equations (4.5) and (4.6) in figure 4.1 illustrates
how there can be multiple solutions. When the two sides of the equations are
plotted together, the solutions are given by the intersection points.
This raises the issue of stability. Is each of these stationary points a point
the membrane potential converges to, or, asked differently, if the membrane
potential is perturbed slightly from the fix point, will it return to the stationary
point? Consider the middle stationary point in panel b) of figure 4.1; if it
is perturbed to the left, i.e., the membrane potential v is decreased slightly,
the term Wf(v) + b becomes smaller than v and therefore the right hand side
in equation (4.2) becomes negative and v decreases even further. Conversely,
a small perturbation to the right leads to further increase in the membrane
potential. Hence, this stationary point is unstable; small perturbations lead to
the membrane potential moving away from it. By the same reasoning, we can
see that the outer stationary points in panel b) as well as the sole fixpoint in
panel a) are stable points. If they are perturbed, the membrane potential moves
back to the stationary point.
More generally, the condition for stability is that the derivative of the right
hand side of the membrane potential dynamics equation (4.2) is smaller than
zero. In the multi-dimensional case, this means the derivative over all element
(membrane potentials):
d
dv
(− v + Wᵀf(v) + b)∣∣
v=v0
= J−v+Wᵀf(v)+b(v0) (4.7)
where J denotes the Jacobi matrix, defined as:
Jg(x)(x0) =

dg1
dx1
∣∣
x=x0
· · · dg1dxn
∣∣
x=x0
...
. . .
...
dgn
dx1
∣∣
x=x0
· · · dgndxn
∣∣
x=x0
 . (4.8)
The condition for stability in the multidimensional case is that the real parts of
all of the eigenvalues are smaller than zero.
Equations (4.4) to (4.7) allow us to compute the stationary points and
whether they are stable. The equations show that stability depends, among
other things, on the functional connectivity W. Figure 4.1 c) shows how the
network stability changes when w¯, the absolute connection strength, is increased.
For low w¯ there is only one stationary point which is stable. When increasing
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Figure 4.1: Stability of the simple II-network. a) Graphical rendering of
equations (4.5) and (4.6) b) Pitchfork bifurcation where two additional solutions
emerge and the stable solution becomes unstable.
the absolute connection strength two additional stationary points form, and the
previously stable stationary point becomes unstable. Due to the characteristic
shape of the bifurcation diagram, this sort of bifurcation is called a pitchfork
bifurcation. To the right of the bifurcatio point, two stable stationary points
emerge, and the unstable intermediate point acts as a saddle point. This means,
if the membrane potential is above this saddle point, it will converge towards
the upper stable point, otherwise to the lower one. Hence, the unstable point
separates the domains of attraction of the two stable points. Practically, this
means transient external input can lead to switching between these two stable
points, one with high CElon- and low CEloff- firing and the other vice versa.
4.1.2 Mean Field Approximation
The approach can be extended to networks with a spatial connectivity structure
(Amari, 1977). Mathematically speaking, the underlying idea is a socalled
continuum limit, i.e. the assumption that the number of neurons is so high, that
individual neurons can safely be replaced by a neuron density and the interaction
is mediated by a field. So instead of speaking of the membrane potential vi of the
neuron i at position xi, we think of the membrane potential as a function of space
v(x). This makes it possible to capture distance-dependent connection densities
betweeen neurons in a kernel w(‖x − y‖), where x and y are the positions of
neurons. Applying the same principles as in the previous subsection, we can
formulate the neural field equation:
τ
d
dt
v(x) = −v(x) +
∫ ∞
−∞
w(|x− y|)f(v(y)) dy + b (4.9)
Note that this equation can also be formulated for multiple populations as we
have done in equation (4.2). For the sake of simplicity, however, we constrain
ourselves to the single population case here.
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Analogously to the previous section, we can compute the stationary solution by
setting the left hand side of equation (4.9) to zero. This yields the equation
v(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
w(|x− y|)f(v(y)) dy + b. (4.10)
This integral equation has one trivial solution v(x) = const. = v0. The equation
then simplifies massively and the value v0 can be computed in a similar way as
before:
v0 =
∫ ∞
−∞
w(|x− y|)f(v0) dy + b = f(v0)w¯ + b (4.11)
Here, w¯ is used as a shorthand for
∫
w(|x− y|) dy. As in the previous section, w¯
is a measure for the absolute connection strength, justifying the repetition in
notation.
Notably, the form of this solution is independent of the shape of the connection
kernel. Its stability, however, crucially depends on the shape of the connection
kernel w(|x− y|). Consider two different shapes: Firstly, a gaussian bell curve
around the center
wGauss(∆x) =
w¯√
2piσ2
exp
(
−∆x
2
2σ2
)
. (4.12)
Here, the connection density decays as the distance ∆x from the neuron increases
and the parameter σ is a measure for how wide the neuron’s connections reach
in space (see figure 4.2). Also note that in keeping with the previous definition
of w¯, the connection kernel is normalized such that its integral equals w¯.
Secondly, consider a symmetric gamma-distribution shaped connection kernel
wGamma(∆x) =
w¯|∆x|n−1 exp
(
− |∆x|θ
)
2θnΓ(n)
, n > 1. (4.13)
With this connection profile, the connection density starts at 0 then increases
to a maximum at a distance of ∆x = (n − 1)θ, after which it decays to zeros
(see figure 4.2)). While the gaussian connection kernel has maximal connectivity
close to the center, the gamma kernel has maximal connectivity at a distance
determined by n and θ. Accordingly, the gaussian is an example of socalled
on-center-inhibition, while the gamma-kernel is off-center inhibition (see Rinzel,
1998).
For investigating stability with these different kernels, consider a small
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Figure 4.2: Spatial patterns of activity. a) Connection kernels: Gaussian
(red) and Gamma-kernel (blue) b) Fourier transforms of the connection kernels.
c Numerical solution for equation (4.15) for Gaussian (red) and Gamma-kernel
(blue).
perturbation around v(x) = v0 = cont.:
v(x) = v0 + ν(x, t). (4.14)
In this equation  is a very small (compared to v0) perturbation parameter and
ν(x) is an arbitrary, but bounded function of position x and time t.
The dynamics can then be computed by inserting equation (4.14) into equa-
tion (4.9). This yields
τ
d
dt
(
v0 + ν(x)
)
= −(v0 + ν(x))+ ∫ ∞
−∞
w(|x− y|)f(v0 + ν(y)) dy + b
τ
d
dt
(
v0 + ν(x)
)
= −v0 − ν(x) +
∫
w(|x− y|)
(
f(v0) +
df
dv
∣∣∣
v=v0
ν(y)
)
dy + b
τ
d
dt
ν(x) = −ν(x) +
∫
w(|x− y|)df
dv
∣∣∣
v=v0
ν(y) dy.
(4.15)
In the first step, it was exploited that the perturbation is assumed small and the
transfer function f(·) can be linearized around v0. Subsequently, in the second
step, the stationarity condition for v0, τ
d
dtv0 = −v0 + w¯f(v0) + b, was subtracted
and afterwards  was divided out.
The resultant integral equation in (4.15) can be treated much better in the
Fourier domain. For this purpose, a Fourier transform with respect to space x is
applied to both sides of the equation, yielding
τ
d
dt
FT [ν](k) = −FT [ν](k) + FT [w](k)df
dv
∣∣∣
v=v0
FT [ν](k)
τ
d
dt
ν˜(k) = −ν˜(k) + w˜(k)df
dv
∣∣∣
v=v0
ν˜(k).
(4.16)
The second equation in (4.16) introduces the shorthand notation ν˜ for FT [ν]. k
is the spatial frequency. Importantly, in the Fourier domain, the integral term, a
convolution of w(x) and ν, becomes a product, which allows for an analytical
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solution.
We can now investigate the stability for each frequency component k sepa-
rately. Based on the same reasoning as before, the condition for stability of ν˜
for any frequency component k is
d
dν˜
(
− ν˜(k) + w˜(k)df
dv
∣∣∣
v=v0
ν˜(k)
)
< 0
−1 + w˜(k)df
dv
∣∣∣
v=v0
< 0.
(4.17)
Note the similarity of this equation with (4.7). In the case of an inhibitory
network, w(|x − y|) is negative. Moreover, assume the transfer function is
monotonically increasing and therefore dfdv
∣∣
v=v0
is positive, irrespective of v.
Hence, if w˜(k) is negative for all k, the condition in equation (4.17) is always
fulfilled. It follows, that, in the case of an inhibitory network, a necessary
condition for constant-rate solution to be unstable is that w˜(k) has positive parts.
More generally, stability in a network with distance specific connection density
depends crucially on the shape of the Fourier transform of the connection profile
w(|x− y|).
The Fourier transforms w˜ for both the gaussian wgauss(|x−y|) and the gamma
wgamma(|x− y|) connection kernel can be computed analytically. They are given
by
w˜gauss(k) = w¯ exp
(
−1
2
(σk)
2
)
w˜gamma(k) = w¯<
(
1
(1 + ikθ)
n
) (4.18)
Figure reffig:meanfield shows these fourier transform (without w¯)s. The gaussian
transforms into another gaussian, the width of which is inversely related to the
width of the original gaussian. So the transform of a gaussian kernel is positive
for all values of k. The Fourier transform of the gamma kernel, on the other
hand, has negative parts at a non-zero frequqency. This means for an inhibitory
connection kernel (w¯ < 0), w˜gamma(k) takes positive values for some frequency
components k. If, in addition, the slope of the transfer function dfdv
∣∣∣
v=v0
is high
enough for condition (4.17) to not hold anymore, the spatially homogeneous
solution v(x) = v0 = const. becomes unstable. The minima of w˜gamma(k) are the
frequency components which increase the strongest after the perturbation and
hence determine the spatial periodicity of the emerging pattern. This minima
can be computed as
kc = arg min
k
w˜gamma(k) =
tan pin+1
θ
. (4.19)
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To summarize, the analysis shows that stability crucially depends on three
factors: Firstly, the slope of the transfer function at the stationary point dfdv
∣∣∣
v=v0
needs to be sufficiently high for instabilities to emerge. Secondly, the absolute
strength w¯ of the connections contributes in the same way, i.e., high enough w¯
is a condition for instability. These two factors are the same as in the mean
rate approach. In addition, for the mean field approach with distance dependent
connectivity, the shape of the connection kernel is pivotal.
In a purely inhibitory network, this means specifically that only a connection
kernel w(|x− y|), of which the Fourier transform w˜(k) has negative parts at non-
zero frequencies, like the gamma kernel, can lead to the spatially homogeneous
solution v(x) = v0 = const. becoming unstable. The network then converges
towards a solution with spatial periodicity with frequency kc in (4.19). In other
words, this means that stable bumps of high activity form at equal distances
given by 2pikc . In two or three dimensions, these bumps are arranged in hexagonal
(2D) or tetrahedral (3D) pattern. Spreizer (2016) analyzed the emergence of
these bumps in numerical simulations and corroborated the outlined analysis.
4.2 Stochastic Network Dynamics
The transfer function f(·), which maps mean membrane potential to mean firing
activity, was so far not constrained in a biologically meaningful way. Usually, for
mean rate approaches, a sigmoidal function is chosen. For more realistic models,
it is indispensible to understand how fluctuations and input statistics affect the
output firing rate of a single neuron.
4.2.1 The Conductance-based Integrate-and-Fire Neuron
The conductance based integrate-and-fire (IAF) neuron model reduces the mem-
brane potential dynamics to a simple RC-circuit (Tuckwell, 1979; Burkitt, 2006).
The membrane itself acts as a capacitor and there is a leak conductance gL to
simulate the flow of potassium ions. In addition, there is an excitatory and
an inhibitory conductance which are activated by incoming spikes, simulating
the transient activation of synaptic receptors. The dynamics of the membrane
potential Vm can be rendered as
C
d
dt
vm = −(vm − r)gL︸ ︷︷ ︸
leak current
−(vm − exc)gexc(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exc. currents
−(vm − inh)ginh(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inh. currents
. (4.20)
The  denote the reversal potentials. r is the resting membrane potential; in the
absence of external input, the membrane potential converges towards r. The
first term on the right hand side can be thought of as modeling K+ currents, so
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the reversal potential r is usually chosen to be around −70mV. The latter two
terms model synaptic activation. All the excitatory currents are lumped together
in the term (vm − e)ge(t), where e is the effective reversal potential (usually
r ' 0mV). Since the reversal potential e is higher than vm, the middle term
causes an increase in membrane potential whenever the excitatory conductance
ge(t) is bigger than zero. Conversely, the reversal potential i for inhibitory Cl
−
currents is mostly (but not necessarily) lower than vm (i ≈ −70mV), so that
activation of the inhibitory conductance gi(t) leads to a decrease of vm.
The conductances gexc(t) and ginh(t) mimick synaptic activation. Accord-
ingly, they are increased whenever excitatory or inhibitory spikes are transmitted
to the neuron. The transient changes of conductance caused by incoming spikes
depent on the specific formulation of the model. Generally, one chooses a kernel
function g(t) to mimick the conductance transient caused by one incoming spike
and the total conductances gexc and ginh are given by
gexc,inh(t) =
∑
tj,k<t
wjg (t− tj,k) . (4.21)
Index j specifies the presynaptic neuron and wj is the synaptic weight from
neuron j. The other index, k, is the spike count, i.e. tj,k denotes the k
th
spike from neuron j. For gexc(t) the sum in equation (4.21) goes over all past
excitatory spikes, while for ginh(t) all the inhibitory spikes are summed.
The kernel g(t) chosen for simulations in this work is the socalled alpha-
function. The shape of the conductance transient for each spike is then given
by
α(t) = t/τ2 exp (−t/τ) . (4.22)
τ is a time constant for the transient and excitatory and inhibitory conductance
can have different time constants. Typically, the time constant τ for excitation
is chosen to be smaller than the inhibitory one, reflecting the faster synaptic
dynamics of AMPA and NMDA receptors as compared to GABA receptors. The
function in equation (4.22) has some properties which make it an appealing
candidate for modeling the time course of synaptic activation. Initially, it
increases quickly until reaching maximal activation at t = τ and then it decays
back to zero.
Equations (4.20) to (4.22) describe the subthreshold membrane potential
completely. The relation to ouput firing is introduced artificially in IAF neurons.
Unlike the Hodgkin-Huxley model, the IAF model does not model the occurence
of action potentials as such. Rather, it assigns an output spike, whenever a
certain threshold potential vthr is crossed. At any time the membrane potential
reaches vthr an output spike is transmitted to all the postsynaptic neurons and
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the membrane potential is reset to the resting potential r.
4.2.2 The Fokker Planck Formalism
Probably the most pertinent insight gained from spiking neuron models, as
opposed to a mean rate approach, is that output firing depends not only on the
average input to the neuron, but also on the variance and other higher order
statistics (see, e.g., Destexhe, 2001; Kuhn, 2003). Therefore, any attempt at
analyzing the neural transfer function,i.e., the mapping from input to output
firing, of the conductance based integrate-and-fire neuron, necessarily has to
take into account stochastic input.
The Fokker-Planck equation (Risken, 1996; Gardiner, 1997) provides an often
used analytical tool to approximate the firing of IAF neurons under stochastic
inputs (Johannesma, 1967; Amit, 1997; Brunel, 1999; Richardson, 2004). Consider
a network of conductance-based LIF neurons. The dynamics of the membrane
potential vi of a single neuron i are given by equations (4.20) and (4.21). Strictly
speaking, the following approximations are based on the assumption of infinitely
fast synapses, i.e., a delta-function kernel, but comparison with numerical results
shows that they hold also for more realistic synaptic rise and decay times when
using the alpha-function kernel in (4.22). Further, we assume throughtout the
remainder that inh ≤ r so that the membrane potential is bound to be in the
interval [inh, vthr].
Application of the Fokker-Planck equation is based on the diffusion approxi-
mation, an approximation justified in the case of small wij and high input rates.
For a high number of afferent neurons and low individual event amplitudes, the
resulting shot noise determining the conductance can be well approximated by a
Brownian motion. This is a valid assumption for neural networks, e.g., in cortex,
individual neurons typically receive large numbers of small amplitude synaptic
inputs (Abeles, 1991). Hence, the input conductances (4.21) can be replaced by
a diffusion process
gexc,inhi (t) ≈ µex,in + σex,inW (t). (4.23)
Here, Wt is a standard Wiener process. The mean µex,in and variance σ
2
ex,in
of the conductance terms can be calculated from the synaptic kernel g(t) and
the rate of synaptic events using Campbell’s theorem (Papoulis, 1991). The
membrane potential dynamics (4.20) can then be rendered as
C dvm(t) = [−(vm(t)− r)gL − (vm(t)− ex)µex − (vm(t)− in)µin] dt−
−(vm(t)− ex)σex dW (1)(t)− (vm(t)− in)σin dW (2)(t).
(4.24)
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Note that two separate Wiener processes (as indicated by the superscripts)
are used to reflect the assumption that excitatory and inhibitory inputs are
independent. The moments of the first-hitting time to the threshold potential,
i.e., the time it takes the membrane potential to reach vthr, can be computed
for such a process using the Fokker-Planck formalism (Siegert, 1951).
The Fokker-Planck formalism provides a framework to cast the stochastic
membrane potential dynamics in equation (4.24) in the form of a parabolic
partial differential equation describing the time evolution of the probability
density ρ(vm, t) of the membrane potential (Risken, 1996; Gardiner, 1997). In
this specific case, the Fokker-Planck equation is given by
∂
∂t
ρ(vm, t) =
1
C
∂
∂vm
([(vm − r)gL + (vm − e)µe + (vm − i)µi] ρ(vm, t)) +
+
1
2C2
∂2
∂2vm
([
(vm − e)2σe2 + (vm − i)2σ2i
]
ρ(vm, t)
)
.
(4.25)
For notational convenience and conceptual clarity, this can be rearranged using
the notion of probability flux terms:
∂
∂t
ρ(vm, t) = − ∂
∂vm
[Jr(vm, t) + Jinp(vm, t)] (4.26)
The first term, Jr(vm, t), is an input-independent relaxation flux describing of
the membrane potential caused by the leak conductance gL and is given by
Jr(vm, t) = − 1
C
(vm − r)gLρ(vm, t). (4.27)
The relaxation flux is directed towards the resting potential r and the magnitude
for each vm depends on the distance from the resting potential and the local
probability density ρ(vm, t). The latter flux term in equation (4.26), Jinp(vm, t),
denotes the input flux and captures the drift and diffusion due to excitatory and
inhibitory synaptic inputs
Jinp(vm, t) = − 1
C
[
(µex + σ˜
2
ex)(vm − ex) + (µin + σ˜2in)(vm − in)
]
ρ(vm, t)
− 1
C
[
(vm − e)2σ˜2ex + (vm − i)2σ˜2in
] ∂
∂vm
ρ(vm, t)
(4.28)
Here, we intruduced the substitution σ˜2ex,in =
σ2ex,in
2C for notational convenience.
The µex- and µin-dependent parts on the right hand side of equation (4.28)
present the drift of the membrane potential caused by excitation and inhibition
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Figure 4.3: Transfer function and membrane potential distribution.
a) Transfer function computed by simulation (red) and Laplace approximation
(blue) for medium k (top row; ge = 0.5nS, gi = 0.1nS and λi = 5.0kHz) and high
k (bottom row; ge = 0.05nS, gi = 0.01nS and vi = 50.0kHz). b) Corresponding
membrane potential distributions for 1) Top row: λe = 12.kHz (left) and
λe = 14.kHz (right); 2) Bottom row: λe = 120.kHz (left) and λe = 140.kHz
(right)
towards their respective reversal potentials, analogously to the relaxation flux
in (4.27). The parts containing σ˜2ex and σ˜
2
in present the diffusion caused by
the random inputs. Therefore, these terms also depend on the gradient of
the probability density ρ(vm, t), mediating the flux from high-probability to
low-probability regions.
For estimating the firing rate, we are interested in the stationary solution,
i.e., the solution with constant probability flux. Since the membrane potential is
reset to r every time the threshold potential vthr is reached, there is a finite,
rate-dependent flux from vthr to r compensating for the flux in equation (4.26)
in the range [r, vthr[:
Js(vm, t) + Jinp(vm, t) =
r if r ≤ vm < vthr0 else. (4.29)
Importantly, r, the value of the constant flux, is the rate at which the
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threshold potential is reached and thus equivalent to the mean output firing
rate of the network. From equation (4.29), the stationary probability density
ρ(vm) can be computed up to the factor r. Finally, imposing the normalization
condition
∫
ρ(vm) dvm = 1 eventually yields the rate r. This procedure is easily
demonstrated in the no-fluctuation limit. The necessary steps for both the no-
fluctuation limit and the fluctuation case are outlined in detail in the appendix.
In figure 4.3, the results of this approximation for the transfer function and the
membrane potential distribution are compared with numerical simulations. The
analytical approximation to the Fokker-Planck equation provides a good fit to
the mean firing rate.
4.3 II-Network Dynamics
The Fokker-Planck approximation can be used for refining the treatment of
stability of a network of two mutually inhibiting populations (see 4.1.1), like
the CEl. Using the previous results, the mean firing rate of each populations
can be approximated and we denote the neural transfer function following from
equation A.14 by f(ve, vi, ge, gi; θ), where ve,i are the excitatory and inhibitory
input rates, ge,i the respective conductance amplitudes, and θ contains neuron
specific parameters, like reversal potentials etc. Assume that the excitatory
background input to population 1 is given by ve,1 and that each neuron receives
an average inhibitory input of n2p21r2, where n2 is the number of neurons in
population 2, p21 is the connection probability from population 2 to 1 and r2
is the mean output rate of population 2, and vice versa. The dynamics of the
system can be approximated by
τ
dr1
dt
= −r1 + f (ve,1, n2p21r2, ge, gi; θ1) =
τ
dr2
dt
= −r2 + f (ve,2, n1p12r1, ge, gi; θ2) =
(4.30)
and the stationary mean rates r1∗ and r2∗ can be computed numerically by
solving the self consistent equation
r1 = f (ve,1, n2p21r2, ge, gi; θ1) =
= f (ve,1, n2p21f(ve,2, n1p12r1, ge, gi; θ2), ge, gi; θ1)
(4.31)
and by subsequently substituting the solution r∗1 into
r2 = f (ve,2, n2p12r
∗
1 , ge, gi; θ1) (4.32)
we obtain the stationary rate of population 2 in equlibrium. In the upper
62 CHAPTER 4. NEURAL DYNAMICS
[bt]
Figure 4.4: Stability of the II-network. a) Bifurcation diagram for increas-
ing gi and ge (top panel) and within population connectivity pinternal (bottom
panel). White area is balanced state, red is bistable and oscillatory regime.
Dashed line indicates bifurcation points calculated using the FP approximation.
b) Raster plots. Top: Balanced; Middle: Oscillatory; Bottom: Bistable.
panel of figure 4.4a, these equations are rendered graphically. The grey line
corresponds to the left hand of equation (4.31), and the red line to the right hand
side. Additionally, the blue line indicates the corresponding rate r2 according to
(4.32). Importantly, depending on the strength of recurrent inhibition gi, there
can exist only one or three solutions. The stability of solutions is determined by
the derivative of the right hand side at the intersection point. If it is lower than
1, as in the top panel, the solution is stable. To see why this is the case, consider
a rate r1 slightly lower than its equilibrium point, that is, left of the intersection
in figure 4.4a. If the right hand side in equation (4.31) is higher than the left
hand side, then the time derivative in equation (4.30) is positive and r1 increases;
equilibrium point is stable. In summary, as the strength of inhibition between
the populations is increased while adjusting background input to keep the firing
rate constant, the system undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation and the balanced
state becomes unstable. Two stable fixed points emerge, with one population
overpowering the other.
As comparison with simulation results in figure 4.4 shows, this critical point
can be predicted well using the Fokker-Planck approximation. It depends
crucially on the product of the slopes of the two population transfer functions
at the operating point. Hence, factors like input variability, which decrease the
slope, shift the critical point (figure 4.4b, top panel). Similarly, inhibition within
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Figure 4.5: Effect of output rate. a) For increasing output firing rates the
synchronous state (blue) becomes more predominant. b) Raster plot (top) and
instantaneous firing rate (bottom) of synchronized firing at 15Hz mean rate. c)
Top: Frequency on mean firing rate. Bottom: The power in the fourier domain
as a function of gi for a mean rate of 10Hz.
a population decreases the population gain and increases the domain of stability
of the balanced state (figure 4.4b, bottom panel).
Notably, in the intermediate regime, anti-phasic oscillations arise. These are
due to synchronization of neural firing in each population underthe effect of
inhibition, a well known phenomenon (Van Vreeswijk, 1994). Accordingly, the
frequency of the oscillations equals the mean firing rate (figure 4.5c). Especially
for high output firing rates, neural firing is tightly synchronized already for
comparably small gi (see figure 4.5). Notably, the transition from balanced firing
to synchrony is a continuous transition, as is evident by the smooth increase of
amplitude power before saturation is reached. That means there is no clearly
defined transition. Conversely, it falls of sharply at the transition to the bistable
regime.
Finally, we investigated how asymmetry affects network stability. Firstly, the
relative connection density λ = p12/p21 was altered while keeping the recurrent
inhibition, i.e. the product p12p21, constant. Remarkably, this alteration does not
affect stability significantly. In the synchronous regime, however, the oscillation
amplitudes of the population receiving stronger direct inhibition are increased
significantly compared to the other population; in other words, firing in this
population is more tightly synchronized. Comparing the amplitudes at the
main oscillation frequency in the fourier domain reveals that the difference in
amplitude is roughly equal to the factor λ. Secondly, we varied the output firing
rates such that the two populations operate at different output firing rates, while
the sum of output firing is kept constant at 20Hz. For increasing difference
between the populations, the frequency of oscillations follows the higher rate, but
the synchronous regime becomes smaller. This is indicated by the bifurcation
diagram in figure 4.6c.
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Figure 4.6: Effect of asymmetry. a) Asymmetric connection densities
p12 = λ
2p21, where the product remains constant. b) Example rate histogram
(top) and relative amplitudes of oscillations on λ. c) Effect of different output
firing rates.
4.4 Discussion
In section 4.2 and appendix A, an analytic approximation to the solution of
the Fokker-Planck equation for conductance-based neurons was presented. This
derivation builds on previous formulations in which numerical integration was
used (Richardson, 2004) or the approximation only covered one reversal potential
term, i.e., either excitation or inhibition (Kovacˇicˇ, 2009). The approximation
presented here is valid for two reversal potential terms thereby allowing for
simultaneous excitatory and inhibitory inputs.
Based on this approximation, the dynamics of a two population network with
reciprocal inhibition were discussed in the subsequent section. The numerical
analysis confirmed the validity of the Fokker-Planck approach for estimating fir-
ing rates and predicting the pitchfork bifurcation for strong recurrent inhibition.
Moreover, it deserves emphasis that the usefulness of the Fokker-Planck approx-
imation for this sort of analysis extends beyond estimation of the bifurcation.
By estimating the gradient of output firing rates r1 and r2 with respect to the
excitatory inputs ve,1/2 it is possible to adjust the external background inputs
much more efficiently. When using a Newton-Raphson type algorithm for tuning
the network to the desired output firing rates, the estimated gradients can be
used to quickly adjust the network to desired baseline firing rates. In the next
chapter, this type of analysis is demonstrated for the specific example of the
central amygdala.
Chapter 5
Tonic inhibition Controls
Fear Generalization in the
Central Amygdala
In this section, a more specific central amygdala model is presented which
is used to investigate how fear expression is modulated in the downstream
central amygdala. In particular, the effects of tonic inhibition reported in Botta
(2015) and depicted previously in subsection 2.3.4 on fear generalization are
investigated. For this purpose, a large-scale spiking neural network model of the
central amygdala was devised.
To study the relationship between extracellular inhibition and response
behavior we developed a descriptive bottom-up model of the central amygdala.
The network model consisted of three populations os spiking neurons that
represent CElon, CEloff and CEm. Consistent with experimental data (Ciocchi,
2010) there was higher connection density from CElon to CELoff than vice versa,
and CEloff projected more strongly onto the CEm (Fig. 5.1a; see appendix B for
details). First, we tuned the background input to obtain 5Hz baseline firing rates
in the three populations, mimicking their firing rates in vivo in pre-conditioning
state. As Fig. 5.1d illustrates, the network model reproduced the CS responses
observed experimentally. Consistent with experimental observations (Li, 2013),
it was assumed that before conditioning the synaptic weights won from the input
population to CElon are weaker than those to CEloff (woff ) and the relative
strength reverses during fear conditioning (see Fig. 5.1c). Therefore, in the
pre-conditioning state, due to mutual inhibition between the CElon and CEloff
population, external input was blocked and there was no phasic response in
any of the three populations. However, after mimicking the synaptic changes
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Figure 5.1: CEA
network model.
a) Schematic of the
network simulation.
Numbers indicate
connection densities.
b) Fit of neural
transfer function of
the conductance-based
integrate-and-fire
neuron model to
patch-clamp record-
ings in the top panel;
bottom panel shows
fit of sub-threshold
membrane potential
dynamics. c) Synaptic
weights before and
after fear condition-
ing. d) Simulated
responses to transient
(gaussian, see inset in
panel a) stimulation
for each population
before and after fear
learning.
induced by fear conditioning (i.e., increasing won) the three populations showed
the expected phasic responses.
5.1 Recurrent inhibition determines the stimu-
lus sensitivity of the central amygdala
The balance of activity in the CElon and CEloff neurons that determines the out-
put of the CEm depends further on two key parameters: the mutual connectivity
between the Celoff and Celon populations (wrec) and the variance of background
input which is determined by the amplitude of the afferent synapses on the two
populations. To further investigate this dependence, we systematically varied
the synaptic weight between CElon and CEloff, wrec, and the variance of the
input (Fig. 5.2). For weak wrec the positive feedback by disinhibition is still
outweighed by factors constraining the firing rates and both populations could be
balanced at 5Hz by external input. But for higher wrec, the network underwent
a bifurcation at which the balanced state became unstable and only one popula-
tion remained active. This led to a bistable regime, in which transient external
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input could switch the activity between the two populations (see inset in Fig.
5.2a). Notably, in the intermediate range of wrec, the two populations exhibited
anti-phasic oscillations. In this regime, recurrent inhibition synchronizes the
neurons within each population. Increasing the variance of background input
stabilized the network dynamics, i.e., the bifurcation point only occurred for
higher wrec.
Figure 5.2: Network dynamics. a) Bifurcation diagram: in the white area
CElon and CEloff activity are balanced, in the grey area the balanced state
is unstable, and in the intermediate area (blue), the two populations oscillate
anti-phasically. b) Response amplitude and duration for different strength of
recurrent inhibition (EPSP = 0.5 mV, dotted horizontal line in panel a). c)
Response shape for 1) wrec = 0.0035 and 2) wrec = 0.022 (indicated by vertical
lines in b). d) Response amplitude on synaptic strength between input and
CElon population for each population. Brightness indicates strength of recurrent
inhibition wrec. e) area under the curve on recurrent inhibition strength wrec
for CEm population.
Interestingly, during phasic stimulation, the effects of increasing wrec became
already apparent in the balanced state. Stronger recurrent inhibition led to a
continuous increase in response duration and response amplitude (Fig. 5.2b).
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Also, synchronization after phasic stimulation caused reverberations that out-
lasted the stimulus by hundreds of milliseconds (Fig. 5.2c), reminiscent of the
experimentally observed phasic responses (Ciocchi, 2010). This close match
between simulation and experimental measurement led us to hypothesize that
the strength of the mutual inhibition between CElon and CEloff is tuned close
to this bifurcation point.
For a network operating point close to the bifurcation, the strong mutual
inhibition makes the network highly sensitive to changes in stimulus-specific
synaptic weight won (Fig. 5.2d). Assuming that acquisition of a phasic response
is dependent on synaptic plasticity of won, the slope of the response amplitude
plotted on won is an important measure for how quickly responses can be acquired
as synaptic strength won is upregulated (Fig. 5.2d). This functional perspective
further supports our hypothesis that a network operating point close to the
bifurcation is useful as it increases sensitivity and may speed up acquisition of
stimulus-response associations.
Furthermore, at an operating point close to the bifurcation (wrec ≈ 0.02 nS),
the network detects phasic inputs most reliably (Fig. 5.2e). While for weak
recurrent inhibition the area under the receiver-operating-characteristic curve
steadily increased as response amplitude increased, the emergence of oscillations
for stronger recurrent inhibition had a detrimental effect on input processing.
Based on these considerations, the value wrec = 0.02 nS is assumed for fur-
ther analysis and simulations, because it reproduced experimentally observed
responses well and optimized this performance measure of input processing.
5.2 Tonic inhibition controls network gain
Next, we investigated the effect of tonic conductance changes on the network.
To this end, we varied the tonic conductance values in both the CElon and
CEloff population. As expected from previous experimental findings (Botta,
2015), tonic inhibition controlled both the baseline firing rates as well as the
amplitude of phasic responses. In general, decreasing tonic inhibition in the
CEloff population (top axes in Fig. 5.3a) amplified phasic responses in all three
populations. In addition, increasing tonic inhibition in the CElon population
had the same effect qualitatively as that of decreasing goff , both on baseline
firing and phasic responses (Fig. 5.3b). Also note, that this effect on response
amplitude is non-monotonic; for strong modulation of tonic inhibition (strong
enough to reduce the baseline firing rates of CElon and CEm to near 0) response
amplitude tends to decrease (Fig. 5.3b).
How tonic inhibition affects the phasic response can be understood in terms of
a change in the operating point of the CEA network. To illustrate this, Fig. 5.4a
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Figure 5.3: Tonic inhibition and network gain. a) Amplitude of phasic
response on baseline firing rate for each population. Upper axis shows corre-
sponding change in goff (note that for CEloff, this axis in the opposite direction).
Solid lines indicate analytic approximation. b) Contour plots of the phasic
response amplitude for changes of both goff and gon (Dashed line indicates data
in a).
shows the CEm firing rate as a function of total input to CElon. The operating
point of the network is determined by intrinsic excitability and background input.
Prior to learning (Fig. 5.4a, left panel), the background input was adjusted
to produce CElon and CEloff baseline rates of 5Hz. The sigmoidal lines for
each population show how the output rate depends on input to CElon: for
very low input and CElon activity, CEloff-firing is close to its maximum rate,
and strong inhibition confines CEm firing to near zero rates, whereas at the
other extreme high CElon firing rates silence CEloff thereby impeding inhibition,
and CEm firing saturates. The responsiveness of the network is minimal on
the extreme ends, because in either case CEm firing becomes almost constant,
irrespective of input to CElon. In between, responsiveness takes a maximum
when CEloff baseline firing is slightly higher than CElon. The bottom panel
illustrates responsiveness as the difference in rate given additional phasic input.
Tonic inhibition changes the operating point of the network by modulating
intrinsic excitability, in such a way as to increase responsiveness (compare the
left and right panels in Fig. 5.4a). As can be seen in the Fig. 5.4, this effect is a
direct consequence of change in the activation threshold of the central amygdala
neurons (notice the shift the transfer function in Fig. 5.4a and Fig. 5.4b) and
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no change in single neuron gain is required.
Fully consistent with this, bringing about a change in baseline firing rates
by modulating the background input to the network has the same effect on
phasic responses as the change in tonic inhibition (Fig. 5.4d). Adjusting the
background to yield the same baseline firing rates as the decrease in CEloff tonic
inhibition does yields CS-responses of comparable magnitude. In other words,
the increase in network responsiveness is due mostly to the additive effect of
the decrease of tonic inhibition on single neurons. Multiplicative effects such
as increases in the gain (i.e. slope of the transfer-function) of single neurons
which can also be caused by tonic inhibition (Mitchell, 2003; Chance , 2002),
contribute only marginally to the increase of network gain in this particular case.
Hence, the model shows that the effect of tonic inhibition on phasic responses is
mediated by the change in baseline firing rates (see schematic in Fig. 5.4c).
Finally, assuming a monotonically increasing mapping (e.g. sigmoidal) from
CEm phasic responses to freezing probability, the increase in CEm responses
can explain the relative increase in CS− freezing rate and the higher fear gener-
alization scores observed experimentally by a ceiling effect (Fig. 5.4b): because
CS+ responses are already close to saturation, further increases in network
responsiveness lead to higher fear generalization scores. Thus, we argue that
this increase in network responsiveness is a causal link between change in the
tonic conductance and a tendency towards fear generalization, i.e. higher CS−
freezing.
5.3 A functional role for tonic inhibition
It deserves highlighting that fear generalization is not necessarily a mere failure
at discriminating the two stimuli (Shepard, 1987). We therefore investigated
the question whether the experimentally observed changes in tonic conductance
and their effect on fear generalization could be functionally relevant? By scaling
response amplitude, tonic inhibition controls a trade-off between sensitivity
and precision. As the preceding section showed, high tonic inhibition in CEloff
leads to weaker responses to phasic stimuli and, presumably, lower freezing
rates for CS−, but also possibly fewer CS+ responses, i.e., high precision but
low sensitivity. By contrast, low CEloff tonic inhibition, and accordingly high
responsiveness, leads to reliable detection of CS+, but also increases the number
of false alarms, i.e., CS− freezing, resulting in lower precision (see Fig. 5.5a)
and—as an observable result—fear generalization. Importantly, controlling this
tradeoff can help improve overall fitness. We can simplify and formalize this
notion by assigning a cost CFN to failing to predict US, i.e. not freezing on CS
+
presentation, and a cost CFP to unnecessary fear responses. Given these, the
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Figure 5.4: Schematic of network gain modulation. a) Baseline firing
rates (top panel) and response to phasic stimulation (bottom panel) for all three
populations as a function of CElon background input. The vertical line indicates
the operating point of the network. b) Putative fear generalization ratio for
different ∆goff . c) Causal chain in the model: Tonic inhibition changes baseline
firing rates, which causes a change in network gain. This in turn underlies
the effect on fear generalization. d) Changes in baseline firing rate determine
network gain, irrespective of whether they are caused by tonic inhibition (full
blue squares) or changes in background input to CEloff (open gray circles).
tonic conductance value g∗off which minimizes the mean cost can be estimated
(see Fig. 5.5b).
To explore the consequences of functional modulation of tonic inhibition,
we considered two factors: US strength and predictability of the environment.
For the latter, we mimicked partial conditioning, a variation of the paradigm in
which CS and US are paired with a given probability. In this scenario, the US
becomes less predictable for the animal. In both cases, high US-intensity and
unpredictability, the network sensitivity should be increased to minimize mean
cost. For stronger US, this is a direct consequence of the higher CFN . In the
case of unpredictable US, post-learning synaptic weights are lower due to the
irregular pairing of CS and US and, in order to evoke a network response, an
increase in network sensitivity is expedient. Hence, in both cases, the optimal
δg∗off is lower than under normal conditions, i.e., tonic inhibition ought to be
modulated more strongly. Notably, both high US intensity and unpredictability
have been reported to be associated with increased fear generalization (Ghosh,
2014; Laxmi, 2003).
Finally, it is intriguing to speculate by which mechanisms tonic inhibition
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Figure 5.5: Functional modulation of tonic inhibition. a) Left: Sensitiv-
ity and precision of CS detection on tonic conductance. Middle: Mean cost (based
on cost for false positives and false negatives) for different tonic conductances;
optimal ∆goff is indicated by red arrow. Right: Optimal tonic conductance
changes for different US strength (top) and for lower predictability (bottom). b)
Changes in tonic conductance of CElon (green) and CEloff (blue) for 1) normal
conditioning, 2) conditioning with stronger US, 3) partial conditioning. Right
panel shows tonic conductances after learning.
could be adjusted to suit US strength and predictability. The central amygdala
receives projections from the parabrachial nucleus (Shimada, 1992) which is
involved in the processing of nocioceptive stimuli and can, therefore, be a
plausible candidate for providing US information. In addition, there is evidence
for modulation of tonic inhibition by GABA-spillover in other brain areas
(Semyanov, 2004; Farrant, 2005). Interestingly, a heuristic GABA-spillover rule
(see methods), together with US input, can lead to modulation of tonic inhibition
in a way consistent with functional demands. This suggests the hypothesis
that tonic inhibition might implement an approximate temporal integrating of
absolute reward prediction errors in the CEA, thereby providing an uncertainty
estimate.
5.4 Discussion
In the present study we combined two approaches. First, we employed a de-
scriptive, bottom-up approach and devised a spiking neural network model of
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the central amygdala microcircuitry based on physiological data. The model
allowed for investigation of the role of extrasynaptic inhibition in shaping baseline
firing rates and phasic responses in the CEA subpopulations. Specifically, we
demonstrated that tonic inhibition controls network responsiveness, providing a
mechanistic explanation for the observed increase in fear generalization. Thus,
corroborating and complementing previous experimental results (Ciocchi, 2010;
Botta, 2015), the model explains the crucial role of extrasynaptic inhibition in
the CEA for the flexible modulation of fear expression.
Based on this notion, we took a normative approach, hypothesizing about
functional roles of response modulation by tonic inhibition. The main result
of the network model—that tonic inhibition increases network responsiveness,
thereby putatively boosting freezing probability— implies that under stronger
US strength and for lower predictability, CEloff tonic inhibition should be further
decreased to minimize expected cost (Fig. 5.5). Note that the concomitant high
CEloff activity was reported to correlate with anxiety (Botta, 2015), and that
both strong US and low predictability during fear conditioning can be shown
to induce sustained fear and anxiety in rodents (Davis, 2010; Seidenbecher,
2016). Hence, this result is in good accord with empirical data and suggests that
intrinsic excitability (e.g. extrasynaptic inhibition) and network activity are the
key variables that define the important role of the central amygdala in processing
CS-US features and controlling anxiety via projections to the bed nucleus of
the stria terminalis (Krettek, 1978; Price, 1981; Veinante, 1998). Specifically,
these two variables can process CS-US features (intensity and predictability) in a
manner consistent with the presumed role of the CEA in shaping anxiety. Thus
our model gives a mechanistic account of psychological theories that associate
anxiety disorders with oversensitivity in the face of unpredictable threat (see,
e.g., Grupe, 2013).
Central amygdala has been implicated in the encoding of expectation and
surprises e.g. surprise-induced boosting of attention during learning (Holland,
1999, 2006). In our neural network model, this encoding is achieved in the
form of temporal integration of the reward prediction error by GABA spillover
dynamics. It is conceivable that the mechanisms for evaluating surprise serve
a double function: mediating surprise-induced enhancement of learning and
fine-tuning the expression of conditioned responses as described here.
On a higher level, our model blends into a model-based view of Pavlovian
conditioning (see,e.g., Dayan, 2014), in which the central amygdala is assigned
the task of action-selection. In our model we implicitly assumed input to the
CEA to be indicative of US probability, and the central amygdala network
itself was implicated in making the decision whether to freeze or not. For this
computation, we exploited the structure of the CeL network which consists of
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two mutually inhibiting neuron populations. Note that CeL network architecture
is very similar to striatum, which is also implicated in decision making and
action-selection (Balleine, 2007; Wickens, 2007). Importantly, normative analysis
suggests the CEA considers uncertainty in this decision making (Fig. 5.5a).
We demonstrated that GABA spillover dynamics can, in principle, lead to an
estimate of uncertainty by temporal integration of reward prediction error (Fig.
5.5b). However, it is also conceivable that uncertainty is signaled to the CEA
from other brain structures, e.g., by dopaminergic midbrain neurons. Indeed,
recent research has implicated communication from the substantia nigra pars
compacta to the CEA in the coding of surprise and associated effects on learning
(Lee, 2008). To further expand on this role of action selection, note that the
CEA can mediate other action programs as well (LeDoux , 1988). For instance,
CEA has been reported to be involved in the switch to active fear responses
(Gozzi, 2010). Mechanistically, our computational model of the central amygdala
can be expanded to include another population and describe switching between
more than two options.
A number of testable predictions follow from our model. On a computational
level, we predict that the central amygdala adjusts network responsiveness by
modulating tonic inhibition depending on US strength and predictability. Ac-
cordingly, we expect CEloff tonic conductances after fear learning to be lower
in animals that have undergone conditioning with a stronger US or with less
predictable US, for example in partial conditioning or uncued US presentations.
Further, on an implementational level, the model suggests that GABA-spillover
plays a role in encoding uncertainty. As a consequence, preventing spillover
should prevent fear generalization and anxiety in situations of unpredictable
threat. However, this may be currently difficult to investigate, because blocking
extrasynaptic inhibition altogether has the effect of increasing CEloff firing, lead-
ing to high baseline anxiety. An essential assumption underlying the dynamics
and function of the network is that reciprocal inhibition is just sufficient to bring
the network close to the bifurcation (see Results, Fig. 5.2). As a consequence of
this, we expect that only slightly increasing the efficacy of GABAergic inhibition
in the central amygdala has the effect of precluding firing in one population
altogether, and conversely, decreasing the efficacy of inhibition should slow down
acquisition of a phasic response and hence freezing.
Since the fear circuity is already relatively well understood, it is an attractive
model system for studying the neural substrates of learning and emotion. Future
research will shed further light on the mechanisms of acute fear and anxiety, and
how these phenomena are linked in the brain. In this, computational models like
the one presented can be an important ressource to corroborate experimental
results and contribute to hypothesis generation.
Chapter 6
A Computational Model of
State-Switching in the BA
during Fear Learning
The CEA model presented in the preceding section—in particular the normative
analysis of tonic conductance changes—have presupposed that the input to the
CEA is indicative of US probability or expected US strength. In this section a
model which aims at describing how such an estimate can be computed in the
afferent circuitry is presented.
Note that predicting danger is in general a much more complex task than mere
association learning between CS and US. Contemporary theories of conditioning,
like the ones outlined in sections 3.2, accomodate this by introducing more
complex models featuring hierarchically organized learning processes, which
allow the animal to organize its sensory experience and infer structure in the
environment. This complexity, we hypothesize, is reflected in the intricate
organization of the fear circuitry. To develop this notion in further detail, a
specific model of the circuitry is presented and analyzed in this section. It is
demonstrated that the model can reproduce a number of experimental findings,
and predictions following from its main assumptions are discussed in more
detail. Furthermore, since the model itself is not formulated on a neural network
level, possible biological implementations of the most relevant computations are
considered.
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6.1 Formulation of the Model
The key aspect of latent variable and related models presented previously is
the notion of a hidden state and inference thereof. That means the learning
process is split in two separate parts: inference of the state of the environment,
which is not directly observable itself, and learning of the contingencies between
aversive events and sensory cues in each state. In the present model, the state
inference is assumed to be encoded in the BLA-mPFC circuitry, while synaptic
plasticity in LA and the ITCs mediates learning of the CS-US contingencies.
Contrary to previous formulations in which the number of states is allowed to
grow dynamically and in principle unboundedly (Courville, 2006; Gershman,
2012), in this model, only two states are assumed, even though it is easily
generalized to allow for a higher number of states.
There is another subtle difference in how the assignment of state leads to US
prediction. While in the previous formulations, the US probability is computed
directly from the inferred state by its conditional probability P (US|state), in
this model, the state estimation controls which associative pathway is selected
for US prediction. In this respect, the model is closer to theories of conditioning
invoking model selection (e.g., Courville, 2003) or state classification (Redish,
2007; Tronson, 2012), i.e., the switching between different internal models for
US-prediction depending on prediction performance. This implies the existence
of multiple associative pathways and an agency which switches between these
pathways.
With regard to biological implementation, these associative pathways in the
model are constituted by the lateral amygdala and intercalated cell clusters,
which converge onto the central amygdala yielding the final US prediction. In
this framework, the lateral amygdala forms the main pathway and learns the
association between CS and US like a Kalman filter (cf. section 3.2.2). The
alternative pathway via the ITCs modifies this US prediction, if this pathway is
activated by the state estimation structures BLA and mPFC.
While the changes might compromise the conceptual clarity of the original
formulation (Courville, 2006), they allow for a better fit to anatomical and
electrophysiological results on the neural circuitry. The basic circuitry of the
model is outlined in figure 6.1.
To develop these notions more formally, we introduce the variables xi,t for
phasic sensory cues, yt for the unconditional stimulus and zi,t for contextual
information. Further, let si,t (i ∈ 1, 2) denote the two states. The first index i
denotes stimulus identity, while t is a time index. The lateral amygdala forms the
main pathway for estimating the US probability P (yt|s1,t) assuming the animal
is in state 1. To this end, the Kalman filter model is implemented to mimick
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Figure 6.1: BLA model. a) Schematic of the model (see main text for
explanations). b) US prediction in the course of acquisition in context A (trials
1-20) and extinction in context B (trials 21-60) c) Renewal in context A (left),
context B (middle) and a new context C (right). Blue bars show renewal with
inactive BA.
learning in the lateral amygdala. As in subsection 3.2.2, the LA-dependent US
estimate is given by a normal distribution with mean wᵀxt and variance ν, i.e.,
P (yt|s1,t) = N (yt|wᵀxt, ν). (6.1)
Subjective knowledge about the weights w is again represented by a normal
distribution and the mean and variance estimates undergo the learning updates
given by equation (3.9) in subsection 3.2.2 (see also B). By virtue of this
arrangement, many conditioning effects that are captured by the Kalman filter
model, in particular latent inhibition and backwards blocking, are mediated by
the LA in the model.
Downstream of the LA, the BA estimates the probability P (s1,t), based
on contextual input and (after US presentation) the reward prediction error
emerging in the LA pathway. For this purpose, it keeps the estimates P (zi|s1)
and P (zi|s2) for different contexts and P (r|s1) and P (r|s2), i.e., estimates of
the expected reward prediction r error of the LA pathway for each state. The
pre-US state estimate at time t in the BA is depending on its previous state
estimate (i.e., at t− 1) and the context and it is given by
P (si,t|zt) ∝ P (zt|si,t)
∑
j
P (si,t|sj,t−1)P (sj,t−1). (6.2)
It is this pre-US state estimate which affects conditioned responding by controlling
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the activity in the ITC pathway. Here, the transition matrix Tij = P (si,t|sj,t−1)
incorporates prior beliefs about how likely the environment is to change. In
the model, it is kept fixed, but it could be made a subject of learning, too.
After US presentation, the state estimate is further refined, taking into account
the expected reward prediction error for each state. Hence, the post-US state
estimate can be computed as
P (si,t|zt, rt) ∝ P (rt|si,t)P (si,t|zt). (6.3)
The validity of these sequential update steps is justified by the assumption of
conditional independence between zt and rt given st. That means, the joint
probability density P (zt, rt, st) factorizes into P (zt|st)P (rt|st)P (st). Impor-
tantly, the conditional probabilities P (zi,t|sj,t) and P (r|sj,t) (i ∈ A,B... and
j ∈ 1, 2) are subject to learning processes which are assumed to have neural sub-
strates in synaptic plasticity of HPC-BA connections (for P (zi|s1) and P (zi|s2))
and LA-BA connections (for P (r|s1) and P (r|s2)). Since the context variable
zi = {1, 0} is a binary variable indicating whether context i is active or not, the
learning of P (zi|s1) and P (zi|s2) simply involves counting the occurences and
non-occurences of context i, when in state s1, or s2 respectively. Mathematically,
the subjective degree of belief in P (zi|sj) can be formalized as a beta-distribution
B(cij , c¯ij), where cij is the count of occurrences of zi when in state sj and c¯ij is
the count of non-occurences (see C). By this mechanism, the BA, but not the
LA, learns about context during cued conditioning. Consequently, inactivating
the BA during renewal has the effect that all context-specificity of recall is lost
(see figure 6.1). For the state inference based on reward prediction error, the
internal expectations are held in the distributions P (r|s1) and P (r|s2), which
are assumed to be normal distributions. The means and variances are updated in
a way analoguous to the Kalman filter, weighted by the post-US state estimate.
Notably, the learning updates for the conditional probability estimates require
the post-US state estimate. That means, the BA, in the model, uses its own state
estimates to updates the parameters of the conditional probabilities. This is very
similar to expectation-maximization, an algorithm for fitting mixture models
(see, e.g., Bishop, 2006). In other words, the model BA learns context-state
associations and keeps track of the expected reward prediction error for each state.
If the reward prediction error is higher than expected, or the context changed,
a state switch becomes more likely. Further, the priors for the conditional
distributions are chosen such as to favor s1 (see appendix C), i.e., s1 is the
standard state, and s2 is activated whenever expectations are violated.
The BA state estimate does not affect the US prediction directly, but it con-
trols activation of the alternative associative pathway via the ITCs. Depending
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on the estimated probability of state s2, ITCs are upregulated, yielding the total
US prediction
Eyt = wᵀxt − P (s2,t)wᵀITCxt (6.4)
In the standard state, when P (s2,t) = 0, this is just the LA dependent prediction.
In case the BA assigns a higher probability to the state s2, however, the ITC
estimate modifies the overall prediction by subtraction. Note that, in principle,
ITCs could mediate also an increase in expected US strength via disinhibition.
Finally, as the last model component, the mPFC refines the BA state es-
timation with computations that factor in the history of the process. These
computations are dependent on working memory and initial state estimates
trasmiited from the BA. Notably, these computations do not necessarily have
to happen in real time, which allows for a role of the mPFC in post-learning
consolidation of memory in the model. More precisely, in the model, the mpFC
estimates the probability for the entire history
P (s1:t, x1:t, y1:t, z1:t) = P (s0)
t∏
t=1
P (xt, yt|st)P (zt|st)P (st|st−1) (6.5)
To this end, Gibbs sampling is performed (see appendix C) on the past history of
the process (including phasic cues xi,1:t and contextual inputs zk,1:t, but also USs
y1:t) using the state estimates transmitted by BA as a starting point. In between
different phases of the experiment, the results of this sampling, which yield a
refined estimate of the entire state history sj,1:t and of the relevant conditional
probabilies, P (xi,tyt|sj,t and P (zk,t|sj,t), are used to create random samples and
replay them to the BA, a process which improves and consolidates the BA-held
weight estimates.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 State-switching in the BA
The hypothesis that the BA estimates current state while the LA learns the
association between sensory cues and the US is central to the model. For this
state estimation, the BA uses contextual information (zi,t) from HPC and LA-
dependent information about how surprising observed outcomes were (quantified
by a reward prediction error rt). With respect to neural implementation, it
is worth noting that US-evoked neural activity in some LA neurons is indeed
modulated by outcome expectations (Johansen, 2010). The presented model
would suggest that these expectation-modulated US responses in the LA subserve
state estimation in afferent the basal part of the amygddala.
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Figure 6.2: BA state
switching. a) The state esti-
mates of the two states (s1 in
red, s2 in blue) over trials dur-
ing early extinction learning.
In the background (gray bars)
the overall US prediction is
shown. b) Overall US predic-
tion during learning (trials 1-
20) and extinction (trials 21-
60) in the intact model (red)
and with BA inactivation dur-
ing extinction (blue). c) Post
extinction US prediction (trial
60, gray bars) and renewal
(US prediction on trial 61) for
ABA context in intact model
(left), BA inactive during ex-
tinction (trial 20-60) and BA
inactive during renewal (trial
61).
There is a noteworthy difference to previous accounts. While most other
models treat contextual input and phasic sensory cues equivalently, this model
imposes a clear separation in that contextual inputs exclusively serve state esti-
mation and do not form explicit US associations. Direct context-US associations
are presumed to be formed in the HPC and are not included here. This is inspired
by behavioral results indicating differential roles of context and phasic cues (see
subsection 3.2.1). Hence, while the HPC itself is assumed to mediate context as
a conditioned excitor or inhibitor, the HPC-BA connections mediate the role
of context as an occasion setter by influencing state estimation. Anatomically,
this is possibly reflected in the organization of inputs to the amygdala, in that
hippocampal projections predominantly target the basal part.
As is illustrated in figure 6.2a, model state estimates in the BA mimic the
experimentally observed activity of BA fear and extinction neurons (cf. 2.2 and
Herry (2008)). This is in line with the interpretation of these BA subpopulations
as encoding a switch between high- and low-fear states in Herry (2008). Moreover,
deactivating state estimation replicates the effect of pharmacological inactivation
of the BA reported there; i.e., with the BA inactivated, context-dependent
state-switching during extinction is prevented. Importantly, in the model, this
does not only impair extinction learning. Since all the reduction in freezing
which happens without state-switching is indeed due to unlearning in the LA
pathway, this form of extinction is immune to renewal. As a result, lower freezing
scores during renewal might be observed for BA inactivation during extinction
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learning (see figure 6.2c).
6.2.2 Behavioral Phenomena
Similarly, state-switching can be prevented or delayed if the change in environ-
mental state is not a clearly observable change. An important example for this is
the socalled partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE, see subsection 1.2.3).
If CS and US were only paired with a probability of 50% during training phase,
extinction learning is significantly delayed compared to control. In the statistical
learning framework, this is explained by a failure in detecting the transition
from training to extinction phase. More precisely, in the model, state switching
is prevented after partial conditioning because the negative reward prediction
error during extinction is already expected from the training phase. Formally,
this is reflected in a higher variance of the distribution P (r|s1) after training
(figure 6.3b). In the control condition, this distribution narrows around 0 at
the late stage of fear learning, since US is well predicted and reward prediction
error reliably around 0. The negative reward prediction error then results in a
low likelihood P (r|s1) for state s1 and the switching to state s2. Figure 6.3c
shows the likelihood ratio P (r|s1)/P (r|s2) (in logarithmic scale). In the partial
conditioning case, it is always around 1 indicating that the RPE does not favor
one state decisively, while in the full conditioning case, the transition is clearly
apparent by a rapid decline of P (r|s1)/P (r|s2).
While the PREE is a consequence of state-switching in the BA in the model,
latent inhibition and blocking—both forward and backward (see subsection
1.2.3 and figure 6.4)—are purely LA-dependent in the model. This is a direct
consequence of the choice of Kalman filter for mimicking the LA. If the CS
was presented already prior to conditioning (blue trace in Figure 6.4a), then
learning is delayed. This is due to a decrease in the variance of the weight for
Figure 6.3: PREE. a) US prediction during acquisition and extinction for full
(red) and partial (blue) conditioning b) Internal US likelihood estimate after
the acquistion phase (i.e., at trial 20) c) Likelihood ration for reward prediction
error r during acquisition and extinction.
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Figure 6.4: Latent inhibition and backward blocking. a) Top: US
prediction for control stimulus (red) and a stimulus that was presented without
CS in trials 1-20. Bottom: Variance of weight for both stimuli. b) Top left:
Total US prediction during backward blocking. Top right: US prediction for
each stimulus at trials 21 (left) and 61 (right). Bottom left: Weights for each
stimulus during backward blocking. Bottom right: Covariance matrix at trial 21.
that specific stimulus, which results in a smaller learning update (see subsection
3.2.2). Similarly, backward blocking is also mediated by the covariance matrix,
but by its off-diagonal entries. As the two stimuli, CSA and CSB , are presented
together, the covariance matrix acquires negative values for its off-diagonal
elements (dark blue spots in the covariance matrix plot in Figure 6.4b). These
off-diagonal elements lead to a learning update on the weight associated with
CSB , even though only CSA is presented in the second phase. It is intriguing to
speculate that the interplay of interneuron subtypes which are known to form
microcircuits controlling the plasticity in principal neurons (Wolff, 2014) could
underlie the implementation of these computations. Plasticity of the connections
between these interneurons could be a neural substrate of the learning updates
on the covariance matrix.
6.2.3 The Role of the mPFC
The mPFC’s proposed role in the model is twofold. First, it refines the online
state estimate computed in the BA using access to the history of the process via
working memory. This is illustrated in Figure 6.5a: The state transition in trial
20 is only detected with delay in the BA as evidence accumulates. Exploiting
memory of the history of the process, i.e., x1:t, y1:t and z1:t, the model mPFC
can produce a refined post hoc estimate of the history of states s1:t active during
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learning and detect the transition more sharply in hindsight. Notably, these
processes can be performed oﬄine, in between different phases of the experiment.
Secondly, having acquired refined estimates of the relevant statistics of the
generative process, P (s), P (x, y|s), and P (z|s), the mPFC plays back episodes to
the BA which improve and consolidate the BA-held estimates of the conditional
probabilities. As a consequence of this, the BA-held estimates are moved closer to
the real values and the variance decreases (see 6.5b for the BA estimates of P (z|s)).
Preventing this process by post-extinction deactivation of the mPFC has the effect
of impairing extinction recall (Figure 6.5c). This is in line with experimental
results showing that post-extinction lesion or inactivation of the mpFC impairs
extinction memory (Burgos-Robles, 2007; Hugues, 2004). Another notable
consequence of this assumption on the role of the mPFC is that deactivation
of the mPFC throughout the entire learning phase has the effect of delaying
extinction learning (Figure 6.5d). This is because the state transition is detected
quicker and more reliably when mPFC-dependent consolidation of fear memory
occurred. This implies there could be two mechanisms at play with opposite
effects when the mPFC is deactivated already during learning: On the one hand,
memory consolidation makes the fear memory more resistant to unlearning, but
on the other hand, a mPFC-mediated refinement of state estimation allows for
quicker detection when expectations are violated early in extinction learning
and, hence, speed up extinction learning by earlier state-switching.
Finally, the sampling operation that the model mPFC performs requires as a
starting point the BA-generated online state estimate. Hence, the flow of informa-
tion in the model is bidirectional. While the mPFC controls consolidation of fear
and extinction memories in the BA, the reverse connections provide the mPFC
with a prior estimate for inferring the generative model. Manipulating the prior
estimate transmitted to the mPFC produces effects consistent with experimental
results on optogenetic manipulation of PL- and IL-projecting BA neurons (Senn,
2014). Transmitting an estimate of high fear state (s1) probabilities (presumably
corresponding to stimulation of PL-projecting fear neurons) leads to deficits in
extinction recall (Figure 6.5e). The effect of transmitting a low fear state (s2)
estimate is not significant, since the actual estimate switches early to s2 even
without manipulation, but iotherwise it would improve extinction recall.
6.3 Discussion
The model is used to explore the proposition that switching between fear and
extinction neurons in the BA is a neural substrate of statistical state learning.
Multiple fear learning pathways, namely LA and ITCs, are controlled dynamically
by this BLA-mPFC state-switching microcircuitry. Generally, we propose that
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Figure 6.5: The role of the mPFC. a) State estimation of the BA (red) and
the mPFC after one itheration (blue) and two iterations (gray). b) Pre- and post-
consolidation subjective probability distributions of the conditional probabilities
P (zA|s1) and P (zB |s2). c Extinction recall under control conditions (red) and
post-extinction mPFC-deactivation (blue). d Extinction learning under control
conditions (red) and pre-conditioning mPFC-deactivation (blue). e Extinction
recall for control (left), transmitting the estimate P (s1) = 1 (middle) and
transmitting P (s2) = 1 to the mPFC.
the LA and ITCs form a dynamically regulated network, at the core of which
are excitatory neurons in the LA, but which can be expanded by inhibitory and
disinhibitory pathways via the ITCs. This increase in network complexity allows
for flexible control of behavior and it is regulated by the BA-mPFC controlling
activity in the ITCs.
Mechanistically, the Kalman filter suggested for the LA could be implemented
in the principal neurons of the LA, with the inhibitory microcircuits gating
plasticity (see, e.g., Bissie`re, 2003; Wolff, 2014). Particularly, connections between
inhibitory neurons could mediate the effect of the covariance matrix in the Kalman
filter. Activity-dependent plasticity within the inhibitory microcircuit could
learn correlations between co-occuring stimuli in a way similar to the covariance
matrix update prescribed in equation (3.9) in subsection 3.2.2.
Similarly, inhibitory connections might play a role in encoding the switching
between two or more states as well. Assuming that the statistical notion of
states embraced here has a neural substrate in the activity of groups of principal
neurons (see Herry, 2008), state-switching is likely mediated by inhibitory in-
terneurons (Lin, 2009; Trouche, 2013). A recent modeling study (Vlachos, 2011)
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simulated and analyzed the dynamics of a biologically realistic BA network and
reconstructed switching dynamics between populations driven by contextual
inputs. The dynamics of this spiking neural network model are fully consistent
with the function assigned to the network here.
An important point of the presented model is interpreting these switching
dynamics in terms of switching between states that are not defined solely based
on valence, i.e., high-fear and low-fear, but in statistical terms. This raises
questions about the connectivity of BA neurons encoding states. It was recently
found that high-fear neurons preferentially target the PL, while fear extinction
neurons target the IL (Senn, 2014). Which BA subpopulations would become
active during fear reversal, a paradigm in which the former CS+ becomes the
CS− in the second phase and the former CS− is now paired with the US? The
overall valence would not change, yet, in terms of statistical contingencies, the
second phase is clearly different. Further characterizing the activity of BA
neurons during CS− and CS−-presentation and the connectivity of subgroups
could enhance our understanding of which environmental features underlie state
coding in the BA.
The notion of state-switching adapted here also leads to predictions that were
already mentioned in the main text. For instance, after preventing state-switching
in the BA and a long extinction learning phase, the resultant decrease in fear
responses should be immune to renewal, since the extinction learning is actual
unlearning of LA synaptic weights (see Figure 6.2c). Also, impairing consolidation
of fear memory by inactivating mPFC during and after fear conditioning has
the perhaps paradoxical effect of delaying extinction learning in the model (see
Figure 6.5d). This is because the state transition is more readily detected when
fear memory has been consolidated, and, hence, the switching occurs more
swiftly.
Finally, in the presented model, the amygdala actually performs discriminative
learning, that means neither the LA, nor the ITCs, nor the BA learn about
the probabilities of sensory cues x. In the model, only the mPFC learns the
full distribution. One consequence of this is that sensory preconditioning (see
subsection 1.2.3) is mPFC dependent and should not occur when the mPFC
is deactivated. More generally, models like this one, which include hypotheses
on where in the circuitry specific computations are implemented allow for
high specificity in experimentally testable predictions and, in conjunction with
neural network level models, have the potential to fill in gaps in our theoretical
understanding of the fear circuitry.
The presented model moves towards implementing statistical learning of
latent variables or states in the neural circuitry of fear conditioning. It was
demonstrated that such a model can capture a number of effects and possible
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implementations in neural networks were discussed. The model gives an account
of how, in principle, the amygdala circuitry can learn to predict danger in a
changing environment and communicate estimates of US probability to the
CEA and some predictions and open questions were discussed. Further studies,
both experimental and computational, will reveal important new insights on the
nature of this learning process and complete our understanding of the role of
the amygdala in fear learning.
6.4 Synopsis
In this chapter, a model of state inference and US prediction in the BLA-
mPFC circuitry was presented to complement the CEA model on control of
fear expression by tonic inhibition. While the two models are different in scope
and methods, they constitute a coherent account of the neural circuitry of fear
conditioning when combined. In this framework, the basolateral amygdala—
in accord with the ITCs, prefrontal cortex and hippocampus—estimates the
probability of impending US presentation. Note that this task is in general much
more complex than mere associative learning, and it is presumably for this reason
that a fairly complex network of structures is involved in the process. To develop
this notion in further detail, I built on latent-variable models of conditioning
which give a formalized account of structure learning. Learning structure, in
these models, amounts to classifying experience into latent variables or states
during learning, as well as learning CS-US contingencies for each state. Apart
from explaining a number of behavioral effects, this framework echoes the notion
of fear and extinction memory traces. The switching between states, or memory
traces, has a neural substrate in the activity of neurons in the BA. Starting from
this premise, the model ascribed subcomputations to the structures involved and
the consistency with experimental results was demonstrated.
Subsequently, the CEA mediates fear expression based on the US-probability
estimate it receives from its afferents. The CEA model in section 5 simulates
this on a spiking neural network level and describes how modulation of tonic
inhibition controls the responsiveness of the network to phasic stimulation. On a
computational level, a key aspect of this model is that the control of responsive-
ness should be governed by a number of factors, foremost US predictability, if
the network is to serve its presumed function optimally. While GABA spillover
is suggested in the model as a specific mechanism for estimating predictability
by temporal integration of reward prediction errors, it is also conveivable that
structures external to the CEA estimate US predictability and influence tonic
inhibition, the more so, since uncertainty estimates are also needed in the model
for other operations like state estimation in the BA.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Outlook
Taken together, the two models presented in this work give a coherent account
of how acquisition and extinction of fear responses, as well as the control of
fear generalization, can be implemented in the neural circuitry. Particularly,
extinction and fear generalization have important implications for the emergence
of pathological anxiety. In this work, a model of probabilistic state-switching
in the BA underlying extinction learning and mechanisms for controlling fear
generalization in the CEA were analyzed and discussed using computational
methods. These models reproduce known experimental findings and offer new
insights into the mechanistic details and functional organization of the circuitry.
Further, on a conceptual level, it was a principal goal of this work to make
steps towards bridging the gap between high-level, computational models of fear
conditioning and the implementational, neural network level. This combination
is fruitful for constraining the models further—by both physiological constraints
and functional considerations—and increases the potential for experimentally
testable predictions. Correspondingly, this concluding chapter is devoted to
outlining predictions and key hypotheses in more detail, addressing important
open questions and possible expansions to the models, and finally providing an
outlook on possible general directions for theoretical research on the neural basis
of fear conditioning.
7.1 Predictions and Hypotheses
It is worth explicating the predictions that follow from the main hypotheses of
the models in more detail at this point. The central hypothesis of the BLA model
is that switching between different latent states is implemented in the basal part
of the amygdala. This is inspired by and fully consistent with the experimental
data and interpretation in Herry (2008). However, the interpretation in terms
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of latent variables and the details of the model presented previously allow for a
number of arguably not too obvious predictions that follow from this hypothesis.
Firstly, the model assumes two parallel pathways, LA and ITC, the involve-
ment of which is controlled by the BA and mPFC. Under normal conditions,
extinction learning is preceded by the activation of the alternative ITC pathway,
in which a neural substrate of extinction memory is formed by synaptic plasticity.
If state-switching is prevented by, e.g., pharmacological inactivation of the BA,
however, some amount of extinction learning in the LA-pathway should still
remain. This notion suggests that extinction that was acquired in this case is safe
from renewal, because it posits actual unlearning of the original, LA-dependent
fear memory trace. Hence, lower fear scores during the renewal test are expected
when the BA is inactive during extinction learning and the extinction phase is
long enough to still produce extinction learning.
Notably, state-switching also can have more subtle implications. Second-
order conditioning and conditioned inhibition are two learning phenomena that
happen in the same experimental procedure. In the first phase, one stimulus is
conditioned by pairing with the US, while in the main phase of the experiment
another stimulus is presented together with the previously conditioned stimulus.
Initially, second-order conditioning takes place, i.e., the new stimulus also acquires
a response, merely by pairing with the US. Subsequently, however, this new
stimulus becomes a conditioned inhibitor. That means that when presented
with a third stimulus that has been conditioned and elicits a response, the
stimulus blocks the conditioned response (Yin, 1994). Recently, it was proposed
that this change from second-order conditioning to conditioned inhibition is
associated with a transition to a more complex state in the animal’s model of the
environment (Courville, 2003). In the presented model, this would imply that the
BA is involved in controlling the switch from second-order conditioning, which
has been reported to be LA-dependent (Gewirtz, 1997), to conditioned inhibition,
which the model suggests would be mediated in the alternative ITC-pathway.
Accordingly, BA-inactivation should enhance second-order conditioning at the
expense of conditioned inhibition.
Another fairly subtle point relates to the processing of conditioned stimuli.
The latent-variable models on which the BLA model is based infer a generative
model of the environment, which means that they learn to infer the full probability
distribution including the probability of conditioned stimuli. In our model, the
LA performs discriminative learning, i.e., it does not learn about CS probabilities.
Inference of CS statistics is mPFC-dependent in the model, and, correspondingly,
effects that rely on the learning of CS statistics, like sensory preconditioning
(see subsection 1.2.3), should be affected by lesions of the mPFC but not by
temporary inactivation of the LA in the preconditioning phase.
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Within the framework presented in this thesis, US prediction in the BLA is
followed by a separate processing step in the CEA as a result of which freezing
responses are initiated or not. Thus, the present account adheres to a model-
based perspective of conditioning (Dayan, 2014) in that the decision to freeze
is dissociated from estimating US prediction. This functional placement of the
CEA together with the previously presented analysis of network dynamics allows
for further testable predictions. For instance, it is assumed that the strength of
mutual inhibition between the two CEA subpopulations is tuned such that the
network is close to the bifurcation described in section 4.3. As a consequence,
manipulations that increase synaptic efficacy only slightly in the entire network
should have the effect of shutting down one population entirely. Conversely,
decreasing the efficacy of GABAergic inhibition in the network should delay the
acquisition of a response.
Moreover, it is conceivable that modulation of tonic inhibition and synaptic
plasticity of BLA-CEA connections are mutually dependent. From a functional
perspective, the combination of local—that is, neuron-specific—synaptic plastic-
ity and the global—network-wide—modulation of tonic inhibition can have the
effect of producing more reliable responses at the expense of discriminability of
inputs. While tonic inhibition enhances network sensitivity for all inputs, synap-
tic plasticity is input-specific but therefore also more susceptible to stochasticity
in the input. Hence, noise-contaminated inputs can lead to variability in the
synaptic weights, which can be detrimental to output reliability. However, if
these two modes of plasticity are employed in combination, a good compromise
between reliability and discrimination can be achieved, very similar to regulariza-
tion for navigating the bias-variance-tradeoff in classification problems (Bishop,
2006). Assuming that function is optimized in such a way in the CEA network,
one would expect that there exists a negative correlation between the magnitude
of changes in synaptic strength and tonic inhibition during fear conditioning.
That means, if there is stronger decreases in tonic inhibition in CEloff, there
should be less synaptic plasticity. This follows also from assuming a reward
prediction error as a driving force for changes in synaptic efficacy. If tonic
inhibition is downregulated, network responses increase, leading to a smaller
reward prediction error.
Finally, it is a central aspect of the high-level interpretation of CEA function
that tonic inhibition is adjusted to uncertainty and US predictability. Normative
analysis suggests that in situations of unpredictable threats, the animal is com-
pelled to lower its freezing threshold by decreasing CEloff tonic ihibition. From
this, it follows that higher decreases in CEloff tonic inhibition should be expected
for animals that undergo partial conditioning or unsignaled US presentations.
More broadly, taking into account that CEloff stimulation enhances anxiety
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(Botta, 2015), we hypothesize that this adjustment of tonic inhibition in the CEA
to uncertainty is the linking mechanism by which US unpredictability heightens
anxiety.
7.2 Open Questions
In addition to these more concrete predictions, there are a number of questions
that arise in this perspective on the fear circuitry. While the presented models,
in their current formulation, make no specific predictions on these questions, the
main ideas underlying the models bring them to the fore. At the heart of the
BLA model is the notion of state coding in the BA-mPFC circuitry. The key
hypothesis is that fear states are encoded in the reciprocal connections of the
BA with the mPFC and hippocampus. But what really makes a fear state? Or
put differently, on what basis is experience organized into different states in this
circuitry? Here, the anatomical organization within the circuitry might help
shed light on these questions.
An obvious feature, which is already implied in the terminology of fear and
extinction states, is the valence. This would suggest the BA-IL circuitry is
specific for positive valence, i.e., the removal of fear, while the BA-PL circuitry is
specific to negative valence, the anticipation of an aversive event. Alternatively,
it is equally possible, and indeed suggested in the current formulation of the
model, that the BA-IL circuitry is activated by violation of expectations. This is
well in line with accounts in the cognitive sciences that implicate the infralimbic
cortex in the flexible modulation of behavior and recent proposals on the role of
the IL in fear (e.g. Barker, 2014). More concretely, the question then is which
drives the activation of neurons with preferentially IL-connections in the BA:
the change in valence in the transition from fear learning to extinction or the
change in CS-US contingencies. Consider for instance the phenomena of latent
inhibition described earlier. In the pretraining phase, the CS is presented very
often without the US and fear learning is delayed in the training phase when CS
and US are paired. Do the BA neurons that are activated during acquisition—the
negative valence neurons—exhibit predominantly projections to PL like the fear
neurons in the classical paradigm, or are they mostly IL-projecting neurons
encoding for violation of expectations as the CS that was previously considered
safe before turning into a precursor of the US? The former would suggest that the
specificity in connections reflects valence coding, while the latter would suggest
that it is statistical contingencies that matter.
Similarly, fear reversal can also be used to investigate this distinction. In
fear reversal, there is one training phase of discriminative conditioning with
CS+ and CS−, followed by a rule change, such that in the second phase of the
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experiment the previous CS− is now paired with the US while the intial CS+ is
not paired any longer. This means that only the statistical CS-US contigency
changes, but the overall valence of the phase remains the same. Again, this
raises the issue of connectivity of the BA neurons that become activated during
extinction of the first CS+ and fear acquisition on the previous CS−. Since
the IL-projecting BA neurons in the model encode not merely for extinction,
but rather more generally for violation of expectations, the model predicts that
IL-projecting neurons are increasingly activated during both the acquisition of
the new CS+ and the extinction of the new CS−. Note in this respect, that fMRI
recordings of neural activity during fear reversal in humans also heavily implicate
the ventromedial PFC during reversal learning (Schiller, 2010). Paradigms like
these, which investigate the difference in neural substrates of changes of valence
vs. changes in CS-US contingency, can help elucidate the coding of information
and, as the case may be, the nature of state classification in the BA.
Further downstream, in the central amygdala, the mechanisms by which tonic
inhibition are modulated remain mostly elusive so far. The CEA model suggests
that tonic inhibition is adjusted according to US strength and uncertainty,
and it is demonstrated that GABA spillover in conjunction with US-dependent
innervation from the parabrachial nucleus is a viable candidate for this purpose.
Still, of course, different mechanisms, such as neuromodulators, might mediate
the changes of tonic inhibition. Note that a number of neuromdulators have
been implicated in the coding of uncertainty previously (Yu, 2005). Moreover,
surprise encoding from other brain structures, e.g., the substantia nigra pars
compacta (Lee, 2008), can be transmitted to the CEA and mediate changes of
tonic inhibition.
Moreover, irrespective of the mechanism, it is intriguing to ask whether the
changes in tonic inhibition return to pre-conditioning levels during extinction
learning. There is evidence that, concomitantly with the decline of fear, the
phasic responses revert (Duvarci, 2011), but whether the same happens for
changes in tonic rates is unclear. From the model, in particular the heuristic
GABA spillover rule, we would expect that the changes remain. Given the more
general interpretation of tonic inhibition increasing network sensitivity, this would
imply that animals displaying stronger changes in baseline firing rate should also
be more prone to fear renewal. Future research will shed further light on many
of these questions and thereby potentially elucidate a functional link between
the processing of CS-US statistics—most prominently US predictability—in fear
learning and the emergence of anxiety.
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7.3 Outlook
Finally, this concluding section is devoted to outlining possible future directions.
First, possible extensions to the specific models are briefly discussed and eventu-
ally more general aspects of future theoretical work on the neural circuitry of
fear conditioning are sketched.
7.3.1 Further Development of the Computational Models
Importantly, the model of the BLA stopped short of providing a truly imple-
mentational model. I undertook it to hypothesize about where computations are
located, and demonstrated the consistency of this hypothesis with experimental
results and derived predictions, but how the computations are implemented in
neural networks was not within the scope of the presented model. While there
is a spiking neural network model describing the switching between fear and
extinction neurons (Vlachos, 2011), it remains a challenging problem to include
the PFC and possibly hippocampus in such a neural network level account. In
particular, the mPFC performs computations that are not straightforward to
implement in neural networks. More recently, however, specific implementations
of sampling algorithms of the sort used in the model have been proposed for
spiking neural networks (Buesing, 2011).
Moreover, developing the notion of associative learning in the BLA further
poses theoretically interesting questions. The present model assumes a Kalman
filter in the LA, a form of Bayesian learning, motivated by a range of behavioral
results that are discussed earlier in this thesis. In addition to the behavioral
data, there is an active line of research on how Bayesian-like learning can have
physiological substrates in synaptic plasticity (see, e.g., Deneve, 2008b,a; Kappel,
2015). It is intriguing to speculate that this might also be the case in the LA,
especially given the Bayesian signature in behavioral conditioning phenomena.
And if so, what is the role of interneurons in this mechanism? The importance
of inhibitory gating of plasticity in the BLA is becoming more apparent (see,
e.g., Bissie`re, 2003), and a specific microcircuitry controlling synaptic plasticity
in the BLA was characterized recently (Wolff, 2014). Can such microcircuitries,
and plasticity within them, mimic the properties of the Kalman filter model? In
particular, can interconnections approximate the effects of the covariance matrix
discussed in section 3.2.2? The Kalman filter description posits that synaptic
plasticity at different synapses and possibly neurons are not independent from
each other. Could such dependencies be mediated by a network of interneurons?
Remarkably, a network model approximation of the Kalman filter suggested by
Dayan (2001) includes inhibitory connections undergoing plasticity mediating
the covariance matrix. Further theoretical models can elucidate if, and under
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which conditions, the Kalman filter computations could be implemented in a
LA-like network structure and which predictions follow. In combination with
experimental work, this could provide implementational detail on a well-described
high-level learning algorithm and create a link between an abstract functional
model and concrete physiological mechanisms.
Another implementational issue pertains to action selection in the CEA. In a
general view of the model, CEA dynamics implement a switch between different
action programs. Only freezing and flight were discussed so far, but in principle
the notion can be expanded further. So far, the focus lay on the two population
case (CElon and CEloff) and the three population case (adding CRF) was
introduced only briefly. Importantly, dynamics become much more complicated
for multiple populations, and generalizing to three or more populations is a non-
trivial problem. It is worth noting that studying CEA dynamics further could
provide ways of establishing links between network structure and constraints
on behavior. For instance, the three population model (see section B) suggests
transitions into flight behavior are not possible without a brief freezing phase,
and observations indicate this might actually be the case (Fadok, personal
communication). Indeed, an important argument for developing network-level
models of conditioning further is the prospect of deriving constraints on behavior
that stem from the hardware and do not follow from a high-level rational model.
7.3.2 Fear as a General Model of Learning Revisited
These points are readily extended to a more general perspective. In line with
contemporary theories of conditioning, I treated processing in the BLA as
implementing statistical inference. This follows a long line of reasoning that
started with the insight that conditioning is best thought of as learning relations
between stimuli in order to predict aversive events (Rescorla, 1988). Furthermore,
the example of the Kalman filter has shown that the Bayesian framework provides
an elegant description of conditioning phenomena. A broad line of research
in theoretical research is currently based on the Bayesian paradigm, and it
has been shown to generate important insights, e.g., in the study of vision
and motor control (Knill, 2004). Considering that the fear system is already
relatively well understood, it has the potential to further contribute to our
general understanding of the implementation of statistical learning and gauge
the merit of the Bayesian paradigm as a general principle.
Moreover, the conceptualization of inference in the BLA and decision making
in the CEA bears relevance to a question of general importance arising recently;
the distinction of model-based and model-free learning (Dayan, 2014). Are
inference and decision making separate computations as Bayesian decision theory
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would suggest, or are they inextricably linked in the brain? The evidence so far
indicates that both happen in the brain and it is important to appreciate that
behavioral results alone will not allow for a thorough investigation of the issue.
The study of neural substrates of fear conditioning, and the separate learning
processes in the BLA and CEA, can certainly contribute greatly to resolving how
inference and decision making are split into different stages and how different
serial and parallels pathways work together to accomodate both model-based
and model-free learning. Are associations formed directly between fear-inducing
stimuli and the conditioned responses, or is there an intermediate processing
step that involves inference on the state of the environment including potential
imminent danger? Studies of the anatomic organization already point towards
some answers. There are direct projections from sensory areas to the CEA (Sah ,
2003) and it has been shown that CEA-dependent conditioning can take place in
the case of pre-training BLA lesions, albeit delayed (Balleine, 2006). This is also
consistent with ideas from animal learning theory (Konorski, 1967). Presumably,
the superposition of two separate learning systems—direct stimulus-response
learning in the sensory thalamus-CEA pathway and two-step inference-decision
learning—holds advantages from both paradigms, i.e., the speed of acquisition
of simple stimulus-response learning and the flexible modulation of behavior an
inference-based decision allows. The problem of how these systems are regulated
or interact in order to function smoothly in accord with each other becomes
pressing then. It will be an interesting issue of theoretical inquiry and the
rapid progress of experimental research on the fear circuitry promises to offer
important new insights that can guide this inquiry.
The presented models, as well as previous accounts, include a hierarchy of
learning processes. At the lower level, there is associative learning between
CS and US, and at the upper level experience is organized in different states,
e.g., high-fear and low-fear states. Anatomically, this could, at least partly, be
mirrored by the organization of the amygdala and PFC. Given the importance
of hierarchical processes for our understanding of cognition, the circuitry of fear
conditioning, which is already relatively well described, lends itself well to studies
on the neural substrates of learning processes that are organized on multiple
levels and on how these learning processes are coordinated.
In summary, this work promotes the statistical learning perspective on fear
learning. Behavioral research has shown that statistical models provide a good
description of the higher-level features of fear conditioning and a wide range
of behavioral phenomena. However, up until recently, the implementational
intricacies emanating from this perspective were not amenable to experimental
research. With the advent of new imaging and stimulation techniques, many of
these answers now come into reach. For instance, it is becoming realistic to find
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answers relating to the coding of US probability, e.g., whether or how an impend-
ing US with 50% probability (for instance, in a partial reinforcement schedule)
is encoded differently from a US of half the intensity but with 100% probability
of occurence (and therefore the same expectation value). Experimental research
(Reijmers, 2007; Han, 2007) , as well as a recent modelling study (Kim, 2013a),
showed that the fraction of neurons recruited to the fear memory trace in the
LA is comparably small ( 25%) even though all of these neurons received the
necessary input and the number of active neurons remains fairly constant, pre-
sumably due to competitive mechanisms within the LA (Zhou, 2009). Does a
lower US probability P (US|CS) in partial conditioning lead to fewer neurons
recruited to the memory trace, is the activation per neuron weaker, or is the
coding indistinguishable? As the resolution of recording techniques improves,
questions like this can be tackled experimentally. Similarly, it is intriguing to
speculate about neural substrates for many of the behavioral effects outlined in
section 1.2.3. Is, for example, backwards blocking affected by interfering with
GABAergic signalling in the LA during the blocking phase? Investigating the
neural substrates of these effects is more than a mere exotic sideline to the study
of conditioning; it holds the potential to resolve important issues and shed new
light on the nature of learning.
In order to understand the complex organization of the neural circuitry
involved in fear conditioning, it is indispensible to explore the complexity of
the learning problem. However, for this purpose, one need not depart from the
paradigm of classical fear conditioning. Fear conditioning combines robustness,
which is the main basis for its past success, with flexibility. The broad range of
experimental variations found in the animal psychology literature is testimony
to this. In the future, technical advances will make it possible to exploit this
flexibility increasingly also in a neurobiological setting. It is my hope that
computational models like the ones presented in this thesis can serve as a useful
ressource in this endeavour.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the Analytic
Approximation
No-Fluctuation Case
To compute the rate in the no-fluctuation case, we set the fluctuation terms
σ˜2ex,in = 0 and, by inserting equations (4.27) and (4.28), (4.29) can be rendered
as
[(vm − r)gL + (vm − ex)µex + (vm − in)µin] ρ(vm) = −rC. (A.1)
From this, the probability density ρ(vm) is easily derived as
ρ(vm) =
 rC(gL+µex+µin)(vs−vm) for r ≤ vm < vthr0 else. (A.2)
using the effective reversal potential
vs =
rgL + exµex + inµin
gL + µex + µin
(A.3)
for notational convenience. Note that vs > vthr is a necessary condition for the
integral of ρ(vm) to converge on the range [r, vthr[. This condition is equivalent
to there being a net drift towards the threshold vthr, which—in the absence
of fluctuations—is a prerequisite for output firing. Applying the normalization
condition on ρ(vm) finally yields the mean rate
r =

gL+µex+µin
Clog
(
vs−r
vs−vthr
) for vs > vthr
0 else.
(A.4)
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Fluctuation Case
In the case of non-negligible fluctuations in the input, the solution is becoming
more complex. For finite σ˜2ex,in, the derivative of the membrane potential
distribution ρ(vm) on the right hand side of equation (4.28) cannot be omitted
any more. Hence, solving the full differential equation is required. For this
purpose, we first introduce a dimensionless re-scaling of vm
x(vm) = arctan
(
σ˜2ex(vm − ex) + σ˜2in(vm − in)
σ˜exσ˜in(ex − in)
)
. (A.5)
Note that the bounds on vm ∈ [in, ex] translate into new bounds for x: xin =
x(in) = arctan (−σ˜ex/σ˜in) and xex = x(ex) = arctan (σ˜in/σ˜ex). Further, we
introduced the rescaled probability density %(x). In order to be compatible with
the differential equation (4.28), we demand it fulfills the condition %(x) dx =
ρ(vm) dvm. As a consequence, it is given by
%(x) =
1
C
σ˜exσ˜in(ex − in)ρ(vm). (A.6)
Importantly, the normalization condition
∫
ρ(vm) dvm = 1 which underlies com-
putation of the mean output firing rate r also needs to be adapted. Considering
the above equations, we get
C
∫ xthr
xin
%(x)
cos2(x)
dx = σ˜2ex + σ˜
2
in. (A.7)
In addition, we found it helpful to further introduce the shorthands xs and k in
order to simplify notation. Let xs denote
xs =
µexσ˜
2
in(ex − in)− µinσ˜2ex(ex − in)− gL
[
σ˜2ex(ex − r) + σ˜2in(in − r)
]
(gL + µex + µin)σ˜exσ˜in(ex − in)
=
gLtan(xr) + µextan(xex) + µintan(xin)
gL+ µex + µin
(A.8)
Comparing the second line with equation (A.3), this variable can be interpreted
as a fluctuation-case analog of the effective reversal potential vs (not in the strict
sense, though; xs 6= x(vs)), which motivates the naming. The variable k, on the
other hand, is given by
k =
gL + µex + µin
σ˜2ex + σ˜
2
in
. (A.9)
This variable, with the total mean conductances in the numerator and the
fluctuation terms σ˜2ex,in in the denominator, can be understood as an inverse
measure for the amount of conductance fluctuations, i.e., the lower k the more
variable are conductances relative to its their magnitude. Notably, the limit
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k →∞ corresponds to the no-fluctuation case.
Taking into account all these newly defined variables, equation (4.29) can be
transformed into
[kxs − (k + 1)tan(x)] %(x)− %′(x) =
r if xr < x < xthr0 else. (A.10)
with the shorthand expressions xr = x(r) and xthr = x(vthr). The homogeneous
solution to this differential equation is easily found to be
%hom(x) ∝ expkxsxcosk+1(x). (A.11)
Obtaining the particular solution, requires us to incoorporate the boundary
conditions that the density %(x) vanishes at the firing threshold xthr, and that
it is continuous at the reset point xr. The first boundary condition is due to
the reset when hitting the firing threshold, the second one reflects that there is
nothing preventing diffusion in negative direction at x = xr, so discontinuities in
%(x) vanish. Note that the condition %(x) = 0 at x = xin is not included explicitly
since it is of no help in formulating the particular solution and it is fulfilled
approximately anyway in the parameter ranges in which the Fokker Planck
approximation is valid and yields non-zero output firing rates. It is relatively
straightforward to include these conditions and, accordingly, the particular
solution can be rendered as
%(x) =
%hom(x)
∫ xthr
x
r
%hom(y)
dy for xr < x < xthr
%hom(x)
∫ xthr
xr
r
%hom(y)
dy for xin < x < xr.
(A.12)
As before, eventually the normalization condition (A.7) is exploited to obtain
the rate r. This requires computation of the double integral
Φ =
∫ xthr
xin
%(x)
dx
cos2(x)
=
=
∫ xr
xin
∫ xthr
xr
%hom(x)
%hom(y)
dy dx
cos2(x)
+
∫ xthr
xr
∫ xthr
x
%hom(x)
%hom(y)
dy dx
cos2(x)
.
(A.13)
An approximation for this integral Φ is presented in the next chapter. Once it is
computed, the rate r follows as
r =
σ˜2ex + σ˜
2
in
CΦ
=
gl + µex + µin
CkΦ
. (A.14)
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Treatment of the Double Integral Term
The double integral term Φ can, of course, be computed numerically. Here,
however, we propose an analytic approximation. Asymptotic expansion for this
double integral are discussed in Hanson (1983), in our case, approximating the
double integral is significantly simplified by changing the order of integration
first.
To this end, the integral will be rearranged. First, inserting equation (A.11)
into equation (A.13) can be rewritten as
Φ =
∫ xr
xin
∫ xthr
xr
e−kxs(y−x)
(
cos(x)
cos(y)
)k+1
dy dx
cos2(x)
+
+
∫ xthr
xr
∫ xthr
x
e−kxs(y−x)
(
cos(x)
cos(y)
)k+1
dy dx
cos2(x)
.
(A.15)
Then, we can apply the substitution u = y − x to obtain
Φ =
∫ xr
xin
∫ xthr−x
xr−x
e−kxsu
[cos(u)− sin(u)tan(x)]k+1
dudx
cos2(x)
+
+
∫ xthr
xr
∫ xthr−x
0
e−kxsu
[cos(u)− sin(u)tan(x)]k+1
dudx
cos2(x)
.
(A.16)
Since y is always greater than x (see equation (A.15)), the new variable u = y−x
ranges from 0 to xthr − xin. The integration interval of the inner integral with
respect to u depends on the integration variabel of the outer integral, x. Note
that the domain of integration can be recast in such a form that it depends on
u and the order of integration can be interchanged. This is possible since the
integrands do not diverge in the domain of integration. The change of integration
is best illustrated by visualizing the above equation as a 2D integral (see figure
1b). Recasting the boundaries and changing the order of integration yields
Φ =
∫ xthr−xin
0
∫ xthr−u
xin
e−kxsu
[cos(u)− sin(u)tan(x)]k+1
dxdu
cos2(x)
+
+
∫ xr−xin
0
∫ xr−u
xin
e−kxsu
[cos(u)− sin(u)tan(x)]k+1
dxdu
cos2(x)
.
(A.17)
After this change, the inner integral with respect to x can be solved analytically.
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As a result, we obtain:
Φ =
1
k
∫ xr−xin
0
e−kxsu
[(
cos(u− xthr)
cos(xthr)
)k
−
(
cos(u− xr)
cos(xr)
)k]
du
sin(u)
+
+
1
k
∫ xthr−xin
xr−xin
e−kxsu
[(
cos(u− xthr)
cos(xthr)
)k
−
(
cos(u− xin)
cos(xin)
)k]
du
sin(u)
.
(A.18)
Rendering this in the form of two Laplace integrals finally yields
kΦ =
∫ xthr−xin
0
e−kf1(u)
du
sin(u)
−
∫ xthr−xin
0
e−kf2(u)
du
sin(u)
(A.19)
with the arguments of the exponential given by
f1(u) = xsu− log [cos(u− xthr)] + log [cos(xthr)] (A.20)
and
f2(u) =
xsu− log [cos(u− xr)] + log [cos(xr)] for u ≤ xr − xinxsu− log [cos(xin)] + log [cos(u+ xin)] for u > xr − xin. (A.21)
It is easily verified that f1(0) = f2(0) = 0 and that f1(xthr − xin) = f2(xthr −
xin). Further, it can be shown that f1(u) < f2(u) on the integration interval
[0, xthr − xin]. Hence, the lowest values of f1(u) dominate the integral (A.19)
when k → ∞. The first derivative of f1(u) is given by tan(u − xthr) + xs.
Therefore, a necessary condition for the existence of a minimum of f1(u) within
the integration interval is that xs < tan(xxthr). Note that this reflects the
boundary vs > vthr encountered in the no-fluctuation limit (in opposite direction,
however). If xs < tan(xxthr), f1(u) takes values smaller than 0, and the integral
in (A.19) takes very large values for k →∞. This leads to very low rates (see
eq. (A.14)), and corresponds directly to the case vs < vthr, in which no output
firing occurs in the no-fluctuation limit.
Laplace approximation
Finally, in order to get an approximation for kΦ, we develop the asymptotic
expansion of the Laplace integrals in equation (A.19) by developing the argument
functions f1(u) and f2(u) to second order around their respective minima within
the integration interval (see Orszag and Bender 6.4, p266). If k is high, which is a
condition for the underlying diffusion approximation anyway, the areas where the
arguments take higher values can safely be neglected. Thus, for xs > tan(xthr)
(when the maximum is at u = 0 and f1,2(0) = 0), the integral (A.19) can be
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Figure A.1: Comparison of Laplace approximation, numerical inte-
gration and simulation. a) Transfer functions computed by simulation (red),
Laplace approximation (blue) and numerical integration of equation (A.15) (grey,
dashed) for high k (left panel; ge = 0.05nS, gi = 0.01nS and λi = 0.0kHz),
medium k (middle panel; ge = 0.5nS, gi = 0.1nS and λi = 0.0kHz) and low k
(right panel; ge = 5.0nS, gi = 1.0nS and λi = 0.0kHz). Note that the approxi-
mation is almost indistinguishable from the numerical integral, even for low k.
b) Scheme of the 2D integral in equation (A.16) and its boundaries. The red
area indicates the first term, and the blue area the second term in (A.16). The
formulation in (A.17) corresponds to integrating the area spanned by (xin, 0),
(xthr, 0) and (xin, xthr − xin) and subtracting the small triangle in the lower left
corner. The integrand is indicated by contour lines.
approximated by
kΦ ≈
∫ ∞
0
[
e
−k
(
a21u
2
4 +b1u
)
− e−k
(
a22u
2
4 +b2u
)]
du
u
, k →∞ (A.22)
with a21,2 = 2f
′′
1,2|u=0 and b1,2 = f ′1,2|u=0, the coefficients of the second-order
expansion of f1,2(u) around u = 0. Note that
1
sin(u) was also replaced by its
expansion 1u . It should be pointed out that the two terms need to be treated
together, since each integrand in equation (A.19) by itself diverges at u = 0. For
the difference in equation (A.22), however, there exists a solution to the integral.
For ease of notation, we further define z1,2 =
√
k
b1,2
a1,2
=
√
k
2 cos(xthr,r)(xs −
tan(xthr,r)) and the function
D(z) = z22F2
(
1, 1;
3
2
, 2; z2
)
− 1
2
pierfi(z), (A.23)
where, 2F2
(
1, 1; 32 , 2; z
2
)
denotes the hypergeometric function, and erfi(z) the
imaginary error function. In the computation of D(z), numerical problems can
arise since both minuend and subtrahend quickly grow to very large values as
z is increased. To circumvent these, it is convenient to exploit that ddzD =
ez
2√
pi [erf(z)− 1]. Further, since D(z) is a univariate function, it can easily be
tabularized to speed up computations. With the new function D(z) and the
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variable z, the approximate solution of the integral can be written as
kΦ = D(z1)−D(z2)− Log
(
a1
a2
)
. (A.24)
While the derivation is for the case xs > tan(xthr), the approximation works
well for the case xs . tan(xthr) and for the case xs  tan(xthr) the output rates
are very close to zero. Therefore, for all practical purposes, it is sufficient to
derive the approximation for that case. In figure 1, the Laplace approximation
is compared to the numerical solution of the integral and the transfer function
of a simulated IAF neuron, for a low-, medium and high-fluctuation case. As
expected, the approximation gets worse the higher the fluctuation in the input
are, i.e., the lower k. But note that equation (A.24) approximates the integral
very well even for comparably low k. Overall, the loss in accuracy incurred
by the approximation of the integral is minimal compared to the overall error
inherent to the Fokker Planck approximation.
No-Fluctuation Limit
We can check for consistency with the results derived for the no-flucutation case.
The no-fluctuation limit is the limit k →∞ which, by the way z is defined in
equation (A.23), corresponds to z → ±∞. As mentioned before, xs = tan(xthr)
(and hence z = 0), corresponds to vs = vthr, the threshold between firing and
no-firing in the no-fluctuation limit. We can obtain the behavior around this
point by generating the power series expansion at − and +∞. For negative
z, i.e., in the limit z− > −∞, the function D(z) grows rapidly with leading
term −√piexp (z2) /z and kΦ→∞. Expanding about +∞, however, yields the
leading terms for D(z):
limz→∞D(z) = −γ
2
− log(2z) (A.25)
where γ = 0.5772... denotes the Euler-Mascheroni constant. The limit of kΦ for
large k and positive zis therefore given by
limk→∞,z>0kΦ = log(2z2)− log(2z1)− log
(
a1
a2
)
= log
(
2z2a2
2z1a1
)
= log
(
b2
b1
)
= log
(
n− tan(xr)
n− tan(xthr)
)
= log(
vs − r
vs − vthr ).
(A.26)
For the last step, we have used the definitions of x (A.5) and n (A.8), as well
as vs from the no-fluctuation limit. Comparing the equations for the rate in
the no-fluctuation case (A.4), and equation (A.14), this result confirms that the
no-fluctuation case treated in the beginning is contained as the k →∞ limit of
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the approximate solution for the fluctuation case.
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Table A.1: Neuron parameters for simulations in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.
gL [nS] C [pF] r [mV] i [mV] e [mV] vthr [mV]
Population 1 3.0 90.0 -65.0 -70.0 0. -40.0
Population 2 3.0 90.0 -65.0 -70.0 0. -40.0
Simulation Parameters
For the simulations on the dynamics of the II-network in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3
the neuron parameters in table A.1 were used. Furthermore, the synaptic time
constants (see equation 4.22) were set to τi = 2.ms and τe = 0.2ms and the
connection density between populations is 20%. Unless specified otherwise, the
excitatory conductance ge = 0.1nS and the internal connection density is zero.

Appendix B
Methods and
Supplementary Material
CEA Model
Network Model
Each of the three populations, CElon, CEloff and CEm, is modeled by 2000
conductance-based-integrate and fire neurons. This neuron model simulates the
dynamics of the membrane potential vm of a single neuron by the equation
C
d
dt
vm = −(vm − r)gL − (vm − e)ge(t)(vm − i)gi(t)− (vm − i)gtonici . (B.1)
Here, gi(t) and ge(t) are transient conductances caused by synaptic inputs and
gtonici is a tonic conductance term that is used to model extrasynaptic inhibition;
gL denotes the leak conductance, driving the membrane towards the resting
potential EL. The reversal potentials,EI and EE , control whether increases
in conductance have a hyperpolarizing or depolarizing effect on the membrane
potential. A spike is generated whenever the membrane potential Vm hits a
firing threshold Vthr, upon which Vm is reset to the resting potential EL. The
model parameters have been obtained by fitting the model to both subthreshold
dynamics and input-output-curves (Fig. 5.1b) from patch-clamp recordings. A
spike causes an alpha-function shaped increase in inhibitory conductance gI(t)
in all the neurons receiving synaptic connections:
α(t) = t/τ2 exp (−t/τ) . (B.2)
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Table B.1: Neuron parameters of the CEA network model
gL [nS] C [pF] r [mV] i [mV] e [mV] vthr [mV]
CElon 2.4 86.3 -59.0 -59.0 0. -44.4
CEloff 3.1 119.6 -63.7 -63.7 0. -41.1
CEm 2.3 87.9 -61.8 -61.8 0. -43.0
The amplitude of the increase is controlled by a synaptic weight wij , the weight
of the synapse connecting presynaptic neuron i and postsynaptic neuron j. So
the overall excitatory (inhibitory) conductance of neuron j is given by
g(t) =
∑
ti,k<t
wijα (t− ti,k) , (B.3)
where ti,k denotes the k
th spike from neuron i. Neurons in different populations
are connected randomly, in which the connection probabilities are based on
cross-correlation analysis in Ciocchi (2010) and indicated in Fig. 5.1a and the
synaptic weight is denoted by wrec. In this model, there are no connections
within populations. In addition to the network-generated inhibitory input, all
three populations receive excitatory, poissonian background input, adjusted to
match baseline firing rates to experimentally observed rates during habituation
(CElon and CEloff: 5s−1, CEm: ≈ 8s−1, see (Ciocchi, 2010)). Moreover, the
CS−evoked phasic inputs to the CEA from the basolateral amygdala and sensory
thalamus are mimicked by additional excitatory spikes, the arrival times of which
are normally distributed (see inset in Fig.5.1a). Here, CS+ and CS− evoked
firing is modeled by 100 neurons each. These neurons are connected randomly
with the CElon and CEloff populations, with synaptic weights won, and woff
respectively.
The neuron parameters for each population are summarized in table B.1. gL,
C and r were obtained from fitting to recorded subthreshold dynamics, while
the firing threshold vthr was obtained from fitting mean output firing rates. For
the sake of simplicity, i was assumed equal to the resting potential and e set
to zero. Unless specified otherwise, the excitatory conductance amplitude ge is
set to 0.5 nS and the inhibitory gi to 0.02 nS. The synaptic time constants (see
equation B.2) are given by τi = 2.ms and τe = 0.2ms. All spiking neural network
simulations were performed in NEST version 2.8.0 (Gewaltig, 2007).
To adjust the background input for the three populations, a form of gradient
descent was implemented. The network was simulated for 5000ms, then the
background input was adjusted using the difference between mean firing rates
and target firing rates (5Hz) and the gradient, which can be computed semi-
analytically using a Fokker-Planck approximation. This is repeated until the
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mean firing rates are within 0.1Hz of the target rates. In Fig. 5.2a, the state of
the network is classified as bistable (gray area), if the resultant states are either
not balanced (CElon and CEloff rates are more than three standard deviations
apart), switching between two novel stable states occurs or the algorithm did
not converge after 100 iterations. It is classified as antiphasic (light blue area),
if, despite equal mean rates, the mean of the absolute value of the difference is
higher than 1Hz.
Plasticity
For Figs. 5.4 and 5.5, a mean rate approximation of the network responses was
used. This based on a Fokker-Planck approximation of the conductance-based
IAF neuron (as indicated by solid lines in Fig. 5.3a). For modeling synaptic
plasticity in the CEA, we followed theories on reward signaling in the fear
conditioning circuitry, and used a reward prediction error as the learning-signal
(McNally, 2011; Johansen, 2010). More precisely, the weight update was given
by:
∆wi = α(US − rCEm)xi (B.4)
where α is the learning rate, US is the US strength and xi is the activity of the
presynaptic input neuron. For the results presented here, only the synapses from
input to CElon underwent plasticity. Qualitatively, results did not change when
also subjecting input-CEloff synapses to plasticity.
From a functional perspective, this combination of local—that is, neuron-
specific—synaptic plasticity and the global, network-wide, modulation of tonic
inhibition can have the effect of producing more reliable responses at the expense
of discriminability of inputs. While tonic inhibition enhances network sensitivity
for all inputs, synaptic plasticity is input specific but therefore also more suscep-
tible to stochasticity in the input. Hence, noise-contaminated inputs can lead to
variability in the synaptic weights which can be detrimental to output reliability.
However, if these two modes of plasticity are employed in combination, a good
compromise between reliability and discrimination can be achieved, very similar
to the bias-variance-tradeoff in classification problems (see Fig.B.4)
Spillover
We assume tonic inhibitory conductance increases whenever there is high phasic
activity. This is reflected in the spillover term
soff = aon,offf(von − v¯on) and son = aoff,onf(voff − v¯off ) (B.5)
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where f(v) is a soft threshold function with f(0) = 0 and v¯i is a slow moving
average. This has the effect that spillover happens in the model whenever there
is higher than usual phasic input. The factors ai,j take into account different
susceptibility to spillover of the two populations. In the simulations, CElon is
more susceptible to spillover, i.e., aoff,on > aon,off .
In addition, there is a term mimicking GABA-reuptake which leads to a
decrease in tonic inhibition. It is simply assumed to be proportional to the sum
of tonic conductances r = α(gon + goff ). Taken together, modulation of tonic
conductance is governed by the equation
τg
dgon
dt
= −α(gon + goff ) + aoff,onf(voff − v¯off ). (B.6)
Finally, US input to the CEA innervates CEloff (see Fig.B.1). In this setup, US
input alone strongly excites CEloff, and CS input alone excites CElon, while
both excited together lead to small activation. As Fig.5.5 illustrates, such a rule
can lead to approximate temporal integration of reward-prediction error.
Multiple Populations
Finally, there is evidence emerging that the CEl comprises more than the two
discussed functional subpopulations. A third population of neurons, expressing
corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF), forms inhibitory connections on other CEl
neurons. Behaviorally, their activation is associated with increased flight behavior.
This is consistent with previous findings demonstrating a switch from passive to
active fear behavior mediated in the central amygdala (Gozzi, 2010).
The dynamics of the three population network—CElon, CEloff and CRF—
can be investigated in the network model. Asssuming that CRF exerts strong
inhibition on the CElon population, and, in turn, is inhibited by CElon, external
input of intermediate strength leads to strong activation of CElon, while strong
input leads to activation of the CRF population (see figure B.2). Notably,
the activation threshold for the two poulations is strongly influenced by tonic
background input.
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Figure B.1: Layout of the GABA spillover model: Additional nocioceptive
input to the CEloff populations can lead to spillover dynamics approximating
temporal integration of reward prediction error.
[tb]
Figure B.2: Multiple populations. a) Network layout including a third CEl
population. b) Network transfer function for strong background input (top) and
weak background input (bottom) to CRF.
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Figure B.3: Raster Plots: Raster plots and histograms for the three populations
before (top row) and after (bottom row) conditioning.
Figure B.4: Top row: cluster plots illustrating three different types, classified
by firing onset, delay and coefficient of variation, among the PKCδ+ and PKCδ−
neurons. Bottom row: example voltage traces during current injection.
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Figure B.5: Tonic inhibition and synaptic plasticity. a) Acquisition of
phasic responses to the CS+. b) Phasic response amplitude for different ∆goff .
The upper branch shows CS+ responses, the lower CS− responses. c) Post-
learning synaptic weights between input and CElon population. The lower goff ,
the less the synapses are modulated during fear learning. d) Response variability
for different ∆goff , quantified by response variance across testing trials over
mean response.

Appendix C
Methods BLA-mPFC
Model
The LA and ITCs: Kalman Filter
The LA in the model implements the Kalman filter model of conditioning
introduced in subsection 3.2.2. The total US prediction is given by (cf. equation
(6.4))
P (yt) = N (yt|wᵀxt − rITC , ν). (C.1)
with the association weights w = {w1, w2...} corresponding to the phasic stimuli
x = {x1, x2...} and a scalar variance ν. rITC = P (s2,t)f(wᵀITCxt) is a state-
dependent correction term mimicking ITC rates. The CS is represented by
an activation pattern xi = exp(−(i − m)2/s2), i ∈ 1, 2, ...12 with m = 6 for
CS+, m = 8 for CS−, and s = 2.5 for both, i.e., the representations slightly
overlap. The CS+ and CS− are presented alternatingly at every 10th timestep.
Furthermore, the xi inputs are polluted by an additive random noise term
sampled from an exponential distribution with mean 0.05.
The prior belief in the values of the association weights is formalized in a
multivariate normal distribution
P (w) = N (w|µ,C)) (C.2)
which is fully determined by the mean weights µ and the covariance matrix C.
The diagonal elements of C specify the amount of uncertainty associated with
the estimate of the corresponding weight, while the non-diagonal elements give
a measure for how strongly related the estimates of two different weights are.
After observing the true US value yt, the weight estimates can be updated
by applying Bayes’ theorem (for more details see subsection 3.2.2). This yields
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Table C.1: Priors and Parameters for LA and ITC.
µ cii (diag. elements of C) cij,i 6=j (non-diag. elem. of C) ν
LA 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.1
wi θ η α
ITC 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.005
the update equations for the mean and covariance
∆µ = [ν + xᵀCx]−1 (y − µᵀx + rITC)Cx
∆C = − [ν + xᵀCx]−1 CxxᵀC.
(C.3)
The ITC correction term is computed as rITC = P (s2,t)f(w
ᵀ
ITCxt), where f
is a logistic function f(x) = 1/(1 + exp ((x− θ)/η)). The update for the ITC
weights is given as delta rule (derived from minimizing the squared prediction
error):
∆wITC = w − αITC ∗ P (s2,t) ∗ (y − µᵀx + rITC) ∗ x. (C.4)
The BA: Expectation-Maximization
The BA performs state estimation. Its estimates are based on the contextual
information zi (zA ∈ {0, 1}, zB ∈ {0, 1}, etc.) and the reward prediction error
rt = yt −wᵀxt, which is transmitted from the LA after the US. Note that this
is based only on the LA prediction, and not the total prediction.
For the purpose of US-prediction, the pre-US estimate is highly relevant. It
depends solely on the context and the previous state and is given by:
P (sj,t|zt) ∝ P (zt|sj,t)
∑
i
P (sj,t|si,t−1)P (si,t−1). (C.5)
While the conditional probabilities P (zt|sj,t) are subject to learning, which is
explicated below, the state transition probabilities P (sj,t|si,t−1) have fixed values
(a 2× 2 table) in the model. It is this pre-US estimate P (s2,t) = 1−P (s1,t) that
controls the contribution of the ITCs to the total US-prediction in equation (C.1).
After presentation of the US the reward prediction error rt can be computed
and the post-US estimate is given by
P (sj,t|zt, rt) ∝ P (rt|sj,t)P (sj,t|zt). (C.6)
The likelihoods P (rt|sj,t), j = 1, 2, which this update is based on are, again for
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the sake of convenience, in the form of a normal distribution
P (rt|sj,t) = N (rt|ρj , λ−1j )) (C.7)
where ρj is the epected reward prediction error in state i and λj is the precision
(inverse of the variance), a measure for how much the reward prediction is
expected to fluctuate. For example, in partial conditioning with 50% pairing
probability, the reward prediction error would be expected to fluctuate between
plus and minus half the US strength, even after learning has converged. This
would be reflected in a low precision λj .
With the post-US state expectation computed according to equation C.6,
the updates of the conditional probabilities P (rt|sj,t) and P (zi,t|sj,t), i.e., the
maximization step, can be performed. Since both the context variables zj and the
state variables si are binary variables, the conditional probability pij = P (zi,t|sj,t)
is a 2 × ncont table of scalar values. The internal estimate for each of these
values is given by a beta-distribution B(pij |cij , c¯ij), where cij is the count of
occurrences of zi when in state sj and c¯ij is the count of non-occurences, i.e.,
c¯ij = nj−cij , where nj is the count of state j occurences. Hence, it is convenient
to keep the statistics cij and nj , which are updated as follows:
∆cij = zi,tP (sj,t),
∆nj = P (sj,t).
(C.8)
The conditional probabilities for the pre-US estimate are then given dividing the
count of co-occurences by the count of state occurrences, i.e., P (zi,t|P (sj,t) =
cij/nj .
For the dependence on reward prediction error, we need to update the mean
ρj and precision λj for each state j. The prior belief in these is captured in a
normal-gamma distribution
P (ρj , λj) = P (ρj |λj)P (λj) = N (ρj |ρ¯j(βjλj)−1)G(λj |1
2
λ¯j ,
1
2
νj). (C.9)
Given an estimate of state probabilities P (sj,t) the updates for the hyperparam-
eters ρ¯j , βj and λ¯j νj at timestep t are given by
∆ρ¯j =
P (sj,t)
βj + P (sj,t)
(rt − ρ¯j),
∆βj = P (sj,t),
∆λ¯j =
P (sj,t)βj
βj + P (sj,t)
(rt − ρ¯j)2.
∆νj = P (sj,t).
(C.10)
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Table C.2: Priors and Parameters for P (z|s) and P (r|s).
nj cAj cBj cCj ρ¯ β λ¯ ν
s1 100 50 50 50 0.0 1 2.5 20
s2 25 12.5 12.5 12.5 0.0 1 5.0 5
Both the context and RPE updates are performed only whenever either a US
is observed, or the LA-dependent US prediction for state 1 is higher than 1.
The conditional probabilities P (rt|sj,t) needed for the post-US state update are
finally obtained by marginalizing ρj and λj from the distribution (C.7) using
the distribution (C.9) with the updated hyperparameters. Integrating out the
precision yields a Student’s t-distribution as a marginal distribution
P (rt|sj) = St(rt|ρ¯j , νj
λ¯j
, νj). (C.11)
This procedure of alternating between computing state estimates based on pa-
rameter estimates and computing parameter updates based on state estimates is
very similar to the maximum-likelihood-based expectation-maximization algo-
rithm. It can also be interpreted as a variational Bayes approximation, where
the variational distribution factorizes between the parameters and the latent
state variables (see Bishop, 2006, Chapter 10).
The mPFC: Gibbs Sampling
The BA provides local state estimates P (sj,t). In the model, it is assumed that
the mPFC estimates the probability for the entire history of the process. That
means the goal is to infer the distribution
P (s1:t, x1:t, y1:t, z1:t) = P (s0)
t∏
t=1
P (xt, yt|st)P (zt|st)P (st|st−1). (C.12)
The struture of the distribution is summarized in graphical form in figure
C.1. The full probability distribution C.12 is determined by the conditional
probabilities P (xt, yt|st), P (zt|st) and the transition probabilities P (st|st−1),
which are assumed known. Further, we assume that the mPFC holds a record
of the past sensory inputs x1:t, y1:t and z1:t, which are presented in a binary
form. The likelihood function P (zi|sj) is again in the form of a ncontext × 2
matrix, while we additionally discretize x and y in nx and ny segments, such
that P (xi, yj |sk) can be presented by a nx × ny × 2 array.
The sampling procedure for estimation of the distribution (C.12) is as follows:
From an initial estimate P (s1:t), which is given by the BA state estimate, a state
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Figure C.1: Bayesian network diagram of the probability distribution
in equation (C.12). Each state st is depending on the previous state, and it
affects the next state as well as the observable variables xt, yt and zt. While zt
is conditionally independent from the other two given st, xt and yt are not.
history s1:t is sampled. Then, for each state estimate st′ , the probability
P (sj,t′ |s1:t′−1, st′+1:t) ∝ P (xt, yt|st)P (zt|st)
∑
i
P (si,t|sj,t−1)P (sj,t′−1) (C.13)
where the unnormalized likelihood functions P (xt, yt|st) and P (zt|st) can be
calculated simply by summing the co-occurences of states and sensory inputs in
the sample, i.e.,
P (xi, yj |sk) =
t∑
t′=1
xi,tyj,tsk,t/
t∑
t′=1
sk,t
P (zi|sj) =
t∑
t′=1
zi,tsj,t/
t∑
t′=1
sk,t.
(C.14)
Based on the new probability, st′ is resampled and the update step is repeated
for the next time step. As Figure 6.5 shows, one or two iterations (through all
timesteps) are enough for this sampling to converge and detect the time point of
transition from fear learning to extinction. For consolidation, 100 virtual trials
are sampled from the inferred distributions and replayed to the LA, BA and
ITC. Because this leads to a decrease in variance of the weights, the effects of
synaptic consolidation are mimicked.

Appendix D
Introduction to Bayesian
Learning
Many contemporary high-level models in cognitive neuroscience are expressed
in the framework of probability theory (Doya, 2006; Knill, 2004; Friston, 2010).
The distinct appeal of Bayesian inference in the cognitive sciences is due to a
number of reasons. Firstly, probability distributions can be thought of as repre-
senting subjective knowledge, in which the variance of the distribution captures
uncertainty. In addition, these distributions can be updated to incorporate new
information in a sequential and online manner. Bayes’ theorem provides the
uniquely optimal way to perform this update. Moreover, it has been shown
that many aspects of human reasoning and animal behaviour can be explained
elegantly and from first principles in this framework.
Frequentist vs. Subjectivist Interpretation of Probabilities
The common interpretation of probabilities alludes to expected relative frequen-
cies. For example, attributing a probability pHeads to a coin landing on the head
side is commonly interpreted as meaning that if the coin is tossed a very large
number (N) of times, we expect to observe heads roughly pHeads/N times, where
the match improves with higher values of N . This is a frequentist interpretation
of probability, and it is objectivist in the sense that we think of probability as
a property of a proposition about a factual event (in this case the proposition
“The coin lands heads up”).
An essential insight underlying the use of probability theory in the cognitive
sciences is that probability distributions can also represent subjective states of
knowledge. What we perceive as randomness in the environment is not necessarily
a consequence of certain events being intrinsically stochastic, but more often
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it is the result of our state of incomplete knowledge (see, e.g., Jaynes, 2003)
. From this perspective, the assignment of probabilities is a way to represent
subjective knowledge. Note that this subjectivist interpretation of probability
also underlies most of statistics. For example, confidence intervals usually do not
imply that the quantity in question fluctuates; rather, they indicate how precisely
the quantity can be inferred from the data. Analogously, Bayesian approaches in
cognitive science posit that subjective knowledge, often referred to as belief (e.g.,
Pearl, 1988), about properties of the environment is represented by a probability
distribution, quantifying the degree of belief in different propositions.
Example: Consider two coins A and B. Coin A has undergone lengthy
tests, all indicating it is a fair coin, i.e., the number of times it landed heads
up NHeads is roughly half of N , the total number of trials. As a result, we
assign pHeads as 1/2. Coin B, on the other hand, has not been tested at
all, and we have a strong suspicion it is not a fair coin, but we have no
indications as to which side is favored over the other. So we again assign
equal chances to both outcomes pHeads = pTails = 1/2. While for coin A
the assignment pHeads = 1/2 represents positive knowledge, in the case of
coin B it rather reflects lack of knowledge.
Obviously the subjective state of knowledge is very different for the two coins
above and our willingness to gamble on the outcome of a series of coin tosses
should depend on that. How can this difference be accounted for? The key to
understanding Bayesian learning lies in the insight that probabilities themselves
can be subject to uncertainty. In keeping with the notion of subjective probability,
we can thus assign a probability distribution over a probability (sometimes called
higher-order probability or metaprobability). This concept is of paramount
importance to the application of Bayesian methods in cognitive science, since,
probabilities corresponding to causal relations in the environment are themselves
often the subject of statistical inference. In real life, simple lottery-like situations
in which the probabilities of relevant outcomes are known in advance are rare
exceptions. In general, one needs to estimate probabilities based on prior
experience, necessarily involving a certain degree of uncertainty.
Example (continued): To represent our knowledge of coins A and
B we use probability distributions. PA,B(pHeads) denote the probability
distributions for coin A and coin B, respectively. Since we are very certain of
pHeads = 1/2 for coin A, the distribution PA(pHeads) is very narrow around
this value, while the distribution PB(pHeads) is much wider, reflecting our
belief that coin B could be biased to one side (see Figure D.1). PB(pHeads)
125
is symmetric, because we do not deem bias towards any one side more likely
than the other.
Bayes’ Theorem
Having established probability distributions as representations of subjective
knowledge, the key question now is: How should these distributions be updated
in light of new data? Or, in other words, how does learning happen in the
probabilistic framework? The answer lies in Bayes’ theorem, which was first
formulated by Thomas Bayes 1763 and became the namesake of this type of
learning models. It can be rendered as:
P (x|D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior
=
P (D|x)P (x)
P (D)
= α P (D|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Likelihood
P (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior
(D.1)
Here P (x|D) is the conditional probability of x given D. From an objectivist
interpretation of probability, this equation is a mere definition of conditional
probability, but, adopting the subjectivist interpretation, it provides an update
rule for subjective probability distributions. This means, we can interpret x as
the variable we wish to infer and in which we hold an initial belief represented
by P (x), and D as the data at our disposal. Then equation (D.1) constitutes a
recipe for updating the belief in x after having observed data D. The terminology
of Bayesian inference reflects this point: We obtain the posterior distribution
P (x|D) by multiplying the prior belief P (x) with the likelihood P (D|x), where
likelihood denotes the probability of observing data D assuming x was the
case. Note also, that the distribution P (D) in the denominator need not be
known explicitly. We can make use of the fact that as P (x|D) is a probability
distribution, the integral over x is always 1, i.e.,
∫
P (x|D) dx = 1. Since P (D)
does not depend on x, it can be treated like a normalizing factor α.
Bayes’ theorem is the only mathematically correct way to update probability
distributions given new data. Any update rule that violates formula (D.1) leads
to inconsistencies. For our purposes, this means learning according to Bayes’
theorem is optimal in the sense that it makes the best possible use of new
information. This makes it a natural starting point for normative models of
learning.
Example (continued): We toss coin B repeatedly and update PB(pHeads)
after each outcome di. Bayes’ theorem yields the sequential update rule
PB(pHeads|di) = αP (di|pHeads)PB(pHeads|di−1). For a coin toss, the like-
lihood of possible outcomes is straightforward: P (di = Heads|pHeads) =
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Figure D.1: Bayesian Inference on pHeads. a) Example distributions for
PA(pHeads) (grey) and PB(pHeads) (blue). The grey distribution is very narrow,
reflecting a strong and certain belief in pHeads = 0 b) Update of estimated
mean pHeads for both distributions if the underlying real probability is 0.6. Note
that PB changes much faster in light of new data, while PA remains almost
unchanged. c The variance of PB decreases as new data is incorporated. d The
subjective distributions after learning.
pHeads and P (di = Tails|pHeads) = 1− pHeads. So after the coin flip, we
multiply PB(pHeads) with either pHeads if the coin landed heads up, or with
1− pHeads otherwise and renormalize with α. Figure D.1 shows an example
prior and posterior distribution. The estimate of pHeads after the i
th trial is
given by the expectation value µi = EipHeads =
∫ 1
0
pHeadsPB(pHeads|di) dx.
Bayesian Updates
The example illustrates some aspects that are of general importance to Bayesian
learning. The update of the estimates µi+1 − µi per step depends on not only
di+1, but also the current belief PB(pHeads|di). Generally, the update step will
be smaller the better the new data fit prior expectations. Furthermore, the size
of the update step depends on the variance of PB(pHeads|di): The smaller the
variance, the smaller the update step. Applied to cognition, this implies that an
agent who is very certain of his own estimate will be very reluctant to change
it, even in the face of adverse evidence, while an uncertain agent weighs new
information more strongly.
Online Learning
In the example, the update is performed after each coin toss, so called online
learning. Equivalently, one could perform the update once after all trials are
completed. In this case, the data would be a sequence of outcomes, e.g., D =
{Heads,Heads, Tails,Heads, ..., Tails} and the likelihood would be given by a
binomial distribution. This procedure (called batch learning) yields the same
results as online learning in this example. More generally, whether online learning
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and batch learning are equivalent depends on the statistical properties of the
data D. Using the nomenclature D = {d0, ..dt} in which di denotes the new data
arriving at timepoint i, the datapoints di need to be conditionally independent
from each other given x, i.e., P (D|x) = P ({d1, ...dt}|x) = P (d1|x)...P (dt|x). In
normal language, this means that the datapoints we observe depend on each
other only via the quantity x we wish to infer. If x is fixed, the different outcomes
di are entirely independent. If this condition is not fulfilled, online learning
can lead to inconsistent results. It is, however, usually possible to formalize a
problem such that this condition is at least approximately fulfilled.
For a model of human or animal learning, the ability to incorporate new data
immediately upon observation is a vital condition. Animals, as well as humans,
obviously do not only update their knowledge at fixed times, but whenever
they perceive relevant sensory input. The Bayesian framework allows for online
learning under fairly weak conditions, which makes it a viable model of human
and animal learning.
Elements of Bayesian Learning
While Bayes’ Theorem uniquely defines the learning step, it should not be
overlooked that other elements of Bayesian learning remain unconstrained. Im-
portantly, the prior distribution and the likelihood in equation (D.1) are generally
unconstrained and depend on assumptions the designer of the model makes. This
can have big effects on the results of the model. The choice of prior distribution
affects the Bayesian update. If a lot of data are presented during learning,
this dependence on the prior will become negligible, but if only very few pieces
of data are presented, the effect can be relevant. This subjective component
has troubled some statisticians and led to attacks on the use of the Bayesian
paradigm in mathematical statistics. An important response to this criticism
was the development of more principled approaches for finding priors, e.g., the
maximum-entropy-principle. For this work it suffices to say that the subjective
component of Bayesian inference as brought in by choice of priors is much less
troubling to cognitive scientists than to mathematicians. For instance, different
priors have been suggested to account for individual differences in response to
certain tasks.
In addition, the likelihood P (D|x) is generally not as straightforward and
unambiguous as it is in the example. It incorporates the agent’s belief on how
the observable data D depends on the variable x. In more formal terms, the
likelihood is computed based on a statistical model of the relation between x and
D, and this statistical model is inherent to the agent. As a consequence, when
formulating a Bayesian model, the designer could often choose which internal
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model1 to endow the agent with.
In summary, it deserves emphasis that priors, as well as the internal model,
introduce free parameters to the model. To claim that Bayesian models are
always more constrained than classical associative learning models would be
overstating the merits of the Bayesian approach. However, both priors and
the internal model have concrete mental counterparts. Priors correspond to
the agent’s initial or naive beliefs, including his level of uncertainty, while the
internal model specifies the agent’s beliefs on the structure of the world.
1To avoid confusion, the term “internal model” is used when referring to the statistical
model the agent holds to compute the likelihood, as opposed to the overall model designed by
the researcher or engineer.
Bibliography
Abeles M. Corticonics: Neural Circuits of the Cerebral Cortex. 1991.
Alheid GF. Extended amygdala and basal forebrain. // Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2003.
985. 185–205.
Amano T, Duvarci S, Popa D, Pare´ D. The fear circuit revisited: contributions
of the basal amygdala nuclei to conditioned fear. // Journal of neuroscience.
2011. 31, 43. 15481–9.
Amano T, Unal CT, Pare´ D. Synaptic correlates of fear extinction in the
amygdala. // Nature neuroscience. 2010. 13, 4. 489–494.
Amari SI. Dynamics Of Pattern Formation in Lateral-Inhibition Type Neural
Fields // Biological Cybernetics. 1977. 27. 77–87.
Amir A, Amano T, Pare D. Physiological identification and infralimbic respon-
siveness of rat intercalated amygdala neurons. // Journal of neurophysiology.
2011. 105, 6. 3054–3066.
Amit DJ, Brunel N. Model of Global Spontaneous Activity and Local Structured
Activity During Delay Periods in the Cerebral Cortex. // Cerebral Cortex.
1997. May. 237–252.
Amorapanth P, Ledoux JE, Nader K. Different lateral amygdala outputs me-
diate reactions and actions elicited by a fear-arousing stimulus // Nature
neuroscience. 2000. 3, 1.
An B, Hong I, Choi S. Long-Term Neural Correlates of Reversible Fear Learning
in the Lateral Amygdala // Journal of Neuroscience. 2012. 32, 47. 16845–16856.
Anderson JR. The adaptive character of thought. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, 1990.
Asede D, Bosch D, Lu¨thi A, Ferraguti F, Ehrlich I. Sensory inputs to intercalated
cells provide fear-learning modulated inhibition to the basolateral amygdala
// Neuron. 2015. 86, 2. 541–554.
Bach DR, Dolan RJ. Knowing how much you don’t know: a neural organization
of uncertainty estimates // Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 2012. 13, August.
572–586.
Balleine BW, Delgado MR, Hikosaka O. The role of the dorsal striatum in
reward and decision-making // The Journal of Neuroscience. 2007. 27, 31.
8161–8165.
129
130 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Balleine BW, Killcross S. Parallel incentive processing : an integrated view of
amygdala function // Trends in Neurosciences. 2006. 29, 5.
Barker JM, Taylor JR, Chandler LJ. A unifying model of the role of the
infralimbic cortex in extinction and habits // Learn Mem. 2014. 21. 441–449.
Barlow DH. Anxiety and its disorders. The nature and treatment of anxiety and
panic. New York: Guilford Press, 2002. 2.
Basbaum AI, Fields HL. Endogenous pain control systems: brainstem spinal
pathways and endorphin circuitry. // Annual Review of Neuroscience. 1984. 7.
309–338.
Bayes T. An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. 1763.
Behbehani MM. Functional characteristics of the midbrain periaqueductal gray
// Progress in Neurobiology. 1995. 46, 6. 575–605.
Belova MA, Paton JJ, Morrison SE, Salzman CD. Expectation Modulates
Neural Responses to Pleasant and Aversive Stimuli in Primate Amygdala //
Neuron. 2007. 55, 6. 970–984.
Bishop CM. Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning. New York: Springer
Science+Business Media, 2006.
Bissie`re S, Humeau Y, Lu¨thi A. Dopamine gates LTP induction in lateral
amygdala by suppressing feedforward inhibition. // Nature neuroscience. 2003.
6, 6. 587–592.
Blanchard DC, Blanchard RJ. Defensive behaviors, fear, and anxiety // Hand-
book of Anxiety and Fear. 2008. 63–79.
Blechert J, Michael T, Vriends N, Margraf J, Wilhelm FH. Fear conditioning in
posttraumatic stress disorder: Evidence for delayed extinction of autonomic,
experiential, and behavioural responses // Behaviour Research and Therapy.
2007. 45, 9. 2019–2033.
Botta P, Demmou L, Kasugai Y, Markovic M, Xu C, Fadok JP, Lu T, Poe
MM, Xu L, Cook JM, Rudolph U, Sah P, Ferraguti F, Lu¨thi A. Regulating
anxiety with extrasynaptic inhibition // Nature Neuroscience. 2015. 18, 10.
1493–1500.
Bouton ME, King DA. Contextual control of the extinction of conditioned fear:
tests for the associative value of the context. // J Exp Psychol Anim Behav
Process. 1983. 9. 248–265.
Bouton ME. Context and behavioral processes in extinction. // Learning &
memory (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.). 2004. 11, 5. 485–494.
Bouton ME. Learning and Behavior. Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Asso-
ciates, 2007.
Brunel N, Hakim V. Fast global oscillations in networks of integrate-and-fire
neurons with low firing rates. // Neural computation. 1999. 11, 7. 1621–1671.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
Buesing L, Bill J, Nessler B, Maass W. Neural Dynamics as Sampling: A Model
for Stochastic Computation in Recurrent Networks of Spiking Neurons. // .
2011. 7, 11.
Burgos-Robles A, Vidal-Gonzalez I, Santini E, Quirk GJ. Consolidation of Fear
Extinction Requires NMDA Receptor-Dependent Bursting in the Ventromedial
Prefrontal Cortex // Neuron. 2007. 53, 6. 871–880.
Burkitt AN. A review of the integrate-and-fire neuron model: I. Homogeneous
synaptic input // Biological Cybernetics. 2006. 95, 1. 1–19.
Bush RR, Mosteller F. A model for stimulus generalization and discrimination.
// Psychological review. 1951. 58, 6. 413–423.
Busti D, Geracitano R, Whittle N, Dalezios Y, Manko M, Kaufmann W, Satzler
K, Singewald N, Capogna M, Ferraguti F Different Fear States Engage Distinct
Networks within the Intercalated Cell Clusters of the Amygdala // Journal of
Neuroscience. 2011. 31, 13. 5131–5144.
Campese V, McCue M, La´zaro-Mun˜oz G, LeDoux JE, Cain CK. Development
of an aversive Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer task in rat. // Frontiers in
behavioral neuroscience. 2013. 7, November. 176.
Carola V, D’Olimpio F, Brunamonti E, Mangia F, Renzi P. Evaluation of the
elevated plus-maze and open-field tests for the assessment of anxiety-related
behaviour in inbred mice // Behavioural Brain Research. 2002. 134, 1-2. 49–57.
Chance FS, Abbott LF, Reyes AD. Gain modulation from background synaptic
input // Neuron. 2002. 35, 4. 773–782.
Chater N, Oaksford M. Ten years of the rational analysis of cognition // Trends
in Cognitive Sciences. 1999. 3, 2. 57–65.
Ciocchi S, Herry C, Grenier F, Wolff SBE, Letzkus JJ, Vlachos I, Ehrlich I,
Sprengel R, Deisseroth K, Stadler MB., Mu¨ller C, Lu¨thi A. Encoding of
conditioned fear in central amygdala inhibitory circuits // Nature. 2010. 468,
7321. 277–282.
Collins DR, Pare´ D. Differential Fear Conditioning Induces Reciprocal Changes
in the Sensory Responses of Lateral Amygdala Neurons to the CS+ and CS-
// Learning & Memory. 2000. 7, 2. 97–103.
Cook M, Mineka S. Observational conditioning of fear to fear-relevant versus
fear-irrelevant stimuli in rhesus monkeys. // Journal of abnormal psychology.
1989. 98, 4. 448–459.
Corbit LH, Balleine BW. Double Dissociation of Basolateral and Central
Amygdala Lesions on the General and Outcome-Specific Forms of Pavlovian-
Instrumental Transfer // Journal of Neuroscience. 2005. 25, 4. 962–970.
Corcoran KA, Desmond TJ, Frey KA, Maren S. Hippocampal Inactivation
Disrupts the Acquisition and Contextual Encoding of Fear Extinction //
Journal of Neuroscience. 2005. 25, 39. 8978–8987.
132 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Corcoran KA, Maren S. Hippocampal inactivation disrupts contextual retrieval
of fear memory after extinction. // The Journal of neuroscience. 2001. 21, 5.
1720–1726.
Corcoran K. a., Quirk G. J. Activity in Prelimbic Cortex Is Necessary for the
Expression of Learned, But Not Innate, Fears // Journal of Neuroscience.
2007. 27, 4. 840–844.
Courtin J, Chaudun F, Rozeske RR, Karalis N, Gonzalez-Campo C, Wurtz
H, Abdi A, Baufreton J, Bienvenu TCM, Herry C. Prefrontal parvalbumin
interneurons shape neuronal activity to drive fear expression. // Nature. 2014.
505, 7481. 92–6.
Courville AC. A latent cause theory of classical conditioning. // Dissertation.
2006.
Courville AC, Daw ND, Touretzky DS. Bayesian theories of conditioning in a
changing world // Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2006. 10, 7. 294–300.
Courville AC, Daw ND., Touretzky DS, Gordon GJ. Model uncertainty in
classical conditioning // Advances in neural information processing systems.
2003. 16. 977–984.
D’Acremont M, Bossaerts P. Neurobiological studies of risk assessment: a
comparison of expected utility and mean-variance approaches. // Cognitive,
affective & behavioral neuroscience. 2008. 8, 4. 363–74.
Davis M. The role of the amygdala in fear and anxiety // Annu Rev Neurosci.
1992. 15. 353–375.
Davis M, Whalen PJ. The amygdala: vigilance and emotion. // Molecular
psychiatry. 2001. 6, 1. 13–34.
Davis M, Walker DL, Miles L, Grillon C. Phasic vs sustained fear in rats
and humans: role of the extended amygdala in fear vs anxiety. // Neuropsy-
chopharmacology. 2010. 35, 1. 105–35.
Daw ND, Courville AC, Dayan P. Semi-rational models of conditioning: The
case of trial order // The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive
science. 2012. 427–448.
Daw ND, Niv Y, Dayan P. Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal
and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. // Nature neuroscience.
2005. 8, 12. 1704–1711.
Dayan P, Kakade S, Montague PR. Learning and selective attention. // Nature
neuroscience. 2000. 3. 1218–1223.
Dayan P, Abbott LF. Theoretical Neuroscience: Computational and Mathemati-
cal Modeling of Neural Systems. 2005.
Dayan P, Berridge KC. Model-based and model-free Pavlovian reward learning:
revaluation, revision, and revelation. // Cognitive, affective & behavioral
neuroscience. 2014. 14, 2. 473–92.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 133
Dayan P, Kakade S. Explaining away in weight space // Advances in Neural
information processing systems 14. 2001. 451–457.
Denenberg VH. Open-Field Behavior in the Rat: What Does It Mean? // Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences. 1969. 159, 3 Experimental. 852–859.
Deneve S. Bayesian spiking neurons II: learning. // Neural computation. 2008a.
20, 1. 118–145.
Deneve S. Bayesian spiking neurons I: inference. // Neural computation. 2008b.
20, 1. 91–117.
Destexhe A, Rudolph M, Fellous JM, Sejnowski TJ. Fluctuating Synaptic
Conductances Recreate in Vivo -Like Activity in Neocortical Neurons. // .
2001. 107, 1. 13–24.
Di Scala G, Mana MJ, Jacobs WJ, Phillips AG. Evidence of Pavlovian condi-
tioned fear following electrical stimulation of the periaqueductal grey in the
rat // Physiology and Behavior. 1987. 40, 1. 55–63.
Shrout PE, Dohrenwend BP. Toward the development of a two-stage procedure
for case identification and classifcation in psychiatric epidemiology // Research
in Community & Mental Health. 1981. 2. 295–323.
Dong HW, Petrovich GD, Swanson LW. Topography of projections from amyg-
dala to bed nuclei of the stria terminalis // Brain Research Reviews. 2001. 38,
1-2. 192–246.
Dong YL, Fukazawa Y, Wang W, Kamasawa N, Shigemoto R. Differential
postsynaptic compartments in the laterocapsular division of the central nucleus
of amygdala for afferents from the parabrachial nucleus and the basolateral
nucleus in the rat // Journal of Comparative Neurology. 2010. 518, 23.
4771–4791.
Doya K, Ishii S, Pouget A, Rao RPN (eds) . The Bayesian Brain: Probabilistic
Approaches to Neural Coding. 2006.
Dunsmoor JE, Paz R. Fear generalization and anxiety: Behavioral and neural
mechanisms // Biological Psychiatry 2015. 78, 336–343.
Duvarci S, Popa D, Pare D. Central amygdala activity during fear conditioning
// J Neurosci. 2011. 31, 1. 289–294.
Duvarci S, Bauer EP, Pare´ D. The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis mediates
inter-individual variations in anxiety and fear. // The Journal of neuroscience :
the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience. 2009. 29, 33. 10357–10361.
Ehrlich I, Humeau Y, Grenier F, Ciocchi S, Herry C, Lu¨thi A. Amygdala
Inhibitory Circuits and the Control of Fear Memory // Neuron. 2009. 62, 6.
757–771.
Erb S, Salmaso N, Rodaros D, Stewart J. A role for the CRF-containing
pathway from central nucleus of the amygdala to bed nucleus of the stria
terminalis in the stress-induced reinstatement of cocaine seeking in rats //
Psychopharmacology. 2001. 158, 4. 360–365.
134 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Eysenck HJ. The conditioning model of neurosis // Behavioral and Brain
Sciences. 1979. 2. 155–199.
Fanselow MS. Contextual fear, gestalt memories, and the hippocampus. Be-
havioural Brain Research. Special issue: Pavlovian conditioning, behaviour
and the brain. // . 2000. 110, 1-2. 73–81.
Farrant M, Nusser Z. Variations on an inhibitory theme: phasic and tonic
activation of GABA(A) receptors. // Nature reviews. Neuroscience. 2005. 6,
3. 215–229.
Fendt M, Fanselow MS. The neuroanatomical and neurochemical basis of
conditioned fear // Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. 1999. 23, 5.
743–760.
Friston K. The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? // Nature Reviews
Neuroscience. 2010. 11, 2. 127–138.
Gallistel CR, Gibbon J. Time , Rate , and Conditioning. // . 2000. 107, 2.
289–344.
Gardiner CW. Handbook of Stochastic Methods for Physics, Chemistry and the
Natural Sciences. Berlin: Springer, 1997. 2.
Geracitano R, Fischer D, Kasugai Y, Ferraguti F, Capogna M. Functional
expression of the GABA(A) receptor α2 and α3 subunits at synapses between
intercalated medial paracapsular neurons of mouse amygdala. // Frontiers in
neural circuits. 2012. 6, May. 32.
Geracitano R, Kaufmann WA, Szabo G, Ferraguti F, Capogna M. Synaptic het-
erogeneity between mouse paracapsular intercalated neurons of the amygdala.
// The Journal of physiology. 2007. 585, Pt 1. 117–134.
Gerren RA, Weinberger NM Long term potentiation in the magnocellular medial
geniculate nucleus of the anesthetized cat // Brain Research. 1983. 265, 1.
138–142.
Gershman SJ, Blei DM, Niv Y. Context, learning, and extinction. // Psycho-
logical review. 2010. 117, 1. 197–209.
Gershman SJ, Niv Y. Exploring a latent cause theory of classical conditioning
// Learning & Behavior. 2012. 40. 255–268.
Gerstner W, Kistler WM. Spiking Neuron Models: Single Neurons, Populations,
Plasticity. 2002.
Gewaltig MO, Diesmann M. NEST (NEural Simulation Tool). // Scholarpedia.
2007. 2, 1430–1434.
Gewirtz JC, Davis M. Second-order fear conditioning prevented by blocking
NMDA receptors in amygdala. // Nature. 1997. 388, 6641. 471–474.
Gewirtz JC, Davis M. Using pavlovian higher-order conditioning paradigms
to investigate the neural substrates of emotional learning and memory. //
Learning & memory. 2000. 7, 5. 257–266.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
Gewirtz JC, McNish KA, Davis M. Lesions of the bed nucleus of the stria
terminalis block sensitization of the acoustic startle reflex produced by
repeated stress, but not fear- potentiated startle // Progress in Neuro-
Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry. 1998. 22, 4. 625–648.
Ghosh S, Chattarji S. Neuronal encoding of the switch from specific to generalized
fear // Nature Neuroscience. 2014. 18, 1. 112–120.
Glimcher PW. Decisions, Uncertainty and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeco-
nomics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
Glimcher PW. Understanding dopamine and reinforcement learning: The
dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis // Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences. 2011. 108, 42. 17569–17569.
Glover EM, Phifer JE, Crain DF, Norrholm SD, Davis M, Bradley B, Ressler
KJ, Jovanovic T. Tools for translational neuroscience: PTSD is associated
with heightened fear responses using acoustic startle but not skin conductance
measures // Depression and Anxiety. 2011. 28, 12. 1058–1066.
Goosens KA, Hobin JA, Maren S. Auditory-Evoked Spike Firing in the Lateral
Amygdala and Pavlovian Fear Conditioning // Neuron. 2003. 40, 5. 1013–1022.
Gozzi A, Jain A, Giovanelli A, Bertollini C, Crestan V, Schwarz AJ, Tsetsenis
Theodoros, Ragozzino Davide, Gross CT, Bifone A. A neural switch for active
and passive fear // Neuron. 2010. 67, 4. 656–666.
Grillon C, Morgan CA. Fear-potentiated startle conditioning to explicit and
contextual cues in Gulf War veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder. //
Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 1999. 108, 1. 134–142.
Grupe DW, Nitschke JB. Uncertainty and anticipation in anxiety: an integrated
neurobiological and psychological perspective. // Nature reviews. Neuroscience.
2013. 14, 7. 488–501.
Guttman N, Kalish HI. Discriminability and stimulus generalization // Journal
of experimental psychology. 1956. 51, 1. 79–88.
Hall CS, Ballachey EL. A study of the rats behaviour in a field: a contribution to
methods in comparative psychology // University of California Publications:
Psychology. 1932. 6. 1–12.
Hall G, Pearce JM. Latent inhibition of a CS during CS-US pairings. // Journal
of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 1979. 5, 1. 31–42.
Neuronal competition and selection during memory formation. // Science. 2007.
316, 457–460.
Hanson FB, Tuckwell HC. Diffusion Approximations For Neuronal Activity
Including Synaptic Reversal Potentials // J. Theoret. Neurobiol. 1983. 2.
127–153.
Haselgrove M, Aydin A, Pearce JM. A partial reinforcement extinction effect
despite equal rates of reinforcement during Pavlovian conditioning. // Journal
of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 2004. 30, 3. 240–250.
136 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Haubensak W, Kunwar PS, Cai H, Ciocchi S, Wall NR, Ponnusamy R, Biag J,
Dong HW, Deisseroth K, Callaway EM, Fanselow MS, Lu¨thi A, Anderson DJ.
Genetic dissection of an amygdala microcircuit that gates conditioned fear. //
Nature. 2010. 468, 7321. 270–276.
Haufler D, Nagy FZ, Pare D. Neuronal correlates of fear conditioning in the bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis. // Learning & memory (Cold Spring Harbor,
N.Y.). 2013. 20, 11. 633–41.
Heldt SA, Ressler KJ. Training-induced changes in the expression of GABAA-
associated genes in the amygdala after the acquisition and extinction of
Pavlovian fear // European Journal of Neuroscience. 2007. 26, 12. 3631–3644.
Herry C, Ciocchi S, Senn V, Demmou L, Mu¨ller C, Lu¨thi A. Switching on and
off fear by distinct neuronal circuits. // Nature. 2008. 454, 7204. 600–6.
Herry C, Ferraguti F, Singewald N, Letzkus JJ, Ehrlich I, Lu¨thi A. Neuronal
circuits of fear extinction // European Journal of Neuroscience. 2010. 31, 4.
599–612.
Hitchcock JM, Davis M. Efferent pathway of the amygdala involved in conditioned
fear as measured with the fear-potentiated startle paradigm. // Behavioral
neuroscience. 1991. 105, 6. 826–842.
Hobin JA, Goosens KA, Maren S. Context-dependent neuronal activity in the
lateral amygdala represents fear memories after extinction. // The Journal of
neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience. 2003. 23, 23.
8410–8416.
Hobin JA, Ji J, Maren S. Ventral hippocampal muscimol disrupts context-
specific fear memory retrieval after extinction in rats // Hippocampus. 2006.
16, 2. 174–182.
Holland PC Different Roles for Amygdala Central Nucleus and Substantia
Innominata in the Surprise-Induced Enhancement of Learning // Journal of
Neuroscience. 2006. 26, 14. 3791–3797.
Holland PC. Occasion setting with simultaneous compounds in rats // Journal
of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 1989. 15, 3. 183–193.
Holland PC, Gallagher M. Amygdala circuitry in attentional and representational
processes // Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 1999. 3, 2. 65–73.
Holmes NM, Marchand AR, Coutureau E. Pavlovian to instrumental transfer:
A neurobehavioural perspective // Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews.
2010. 34, 8. 1277–1295.
Hoover WB, Vertes RP. Anatomical analysis of afferent projections to the medial
prefrontal cortex in the rat // Brain Structure and Function. 2007. 212, 2.
149–179.
Huber D, Veinante P, Stoop R. Vasopressin and Oxytocin Excite Distinct
Neuronal Populations in the Central Amygdala // Science. 2005. 308, 5719.
245–248.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 137
Hugues S, Deschaux O, Garcia R. Postextinction infusion of a mitogen-activated
protein kinase inhibitor into the medial prefrontal cortex impairs memory
of the extinction of conditioned fear. // Learning & memory (Cold Spring
Harbor, N.Y.). 2004. 11, 5. 540–543.
Hull CL The provlem of stimulus equivalence in behavior theory // Psychological
review. 1939. 46. 9–30.
Hull CL Principles of Behavior. 1943.
Iwata J, LeDoux JE, Meeley MP, Arneric S, Reis DJ Intrinsic neurons in the
amygdaloid field projected to by the medial geniculate body mediate emotional
responses conditioned to acoustic stimuli // Brain Research. 1986. 383, 1-2.
195–214.
Izhikevich EM Dynamical Systems in Neuroscience: The Geometry of Excitability
and Bursting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.
Jasnow AM, Davis M, Huhman KL. Involvement of central amygdalar and
bed nucleus of the stria terminalis corticotropin-releasing factor in behavioral
responses to social defeat. // Behav Neurosci. 2004. 118, 5. 1052–1061.
Jaynes ET. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. 2003.
Jellestad FK, Markowska A, Bakke HK, Walther B. Behavioral effects after
ibotenic acid, 6-OHDA and electrolytic lesions in the central amygdala nucleus
of the rat // Physiology and Behavior. 1986. 37, 6. 855–862.
Jennings JH, Sparta DR, Stamatakis AM, Ung RL, Pleil KE, Kash TL, Stuber
GD. Distinct extended amygdala circuits for divergent motivational states //
Nature. 2013. 496, 7444. 224–228.
Jhamandas JH, Petrov T, Harris KH, Vu T, Krukoff TL Parabrachial nucleus
projection to the amygdala in the rat: Electrophysiological and anatomical
observations // Brain Research Bulletin. 1996. 39, 2. 115–126.
Johannesma PIM Diffusion models for the stochastic activity of neurons //
Proceedings of the School on Neural Networks Ravello. 1967. 116–144.
Johansen JP, Tarpley JW, LeDoux JE, Blair HT. Neural substrates for
expectation-modulated fear learning in the amygdala and periaqueductal
gray. // Nature neuroscience. 2010. 13, 8. 979–86.
Jolkkonen E, Pitka¨nen A. Intrinsic connections of the rat amygdaloid complex:
Projections originating in the central nucleus // Journal of Comparative
Neurology. 1998. 395, 1. 53–72.
Jones BF, Groenewegen HJ, Witter MP. Intrinsic connections of the cingulate
cortex in the rat suggest the existence of multiple functionally segregated
networks // Neuroscience. 2005. 133, 1. 193–207.
Jovanovic T, Kazama A, Bachevalier J, Davis M. Impaired safety signal learning
may be a biomarker of PTSD // Neuropharmacology. 2012. 62, 2. 695–704.
138 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ju¨ngling K, Seidenbecher T, Sosulina L, Lesting J, Sangha S, Clark SD, Okamura
N, Duangdao DM, Xu YL, Reinscheid RK, Pape HC. Neuropeptide S-Mediated
Control of Fear Expression and Extinction: Role of Intercalated GABAergic
Neurons in the Amygdala // Neuron. 2008. 59, 2. 298–310.
Kalman RE A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Problems //
Journal of Basic Engineering. 1960. 82, 1. 35.
Kamin LJ Predictability, Surprise, Attention and Conditioning // Punishment
and Aversive Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969. 279–296.
Kaneda M, Farrant M, Cull-Candy SG. Whole-cell and single-channel currents
activated by GABA and glycine in granule cells of the rat cerebellum. // The
Journal of physiology. 1995. 485, 2. 419–435.
Kappel D, Habenschuss S, Legenstein R, Maass W. Synaptic Sampling: A
Bayesian Approach to Neural Network Plasticity and Rewiring // Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems 28. 2015. 370–378.
Kim D, Pare´ D, Nair SS. Assignment of model amygdala neurons to the fear
memory trace depends on competitive synaptic interactions. // The Journal
of Neuroscience. 2013a. 33, 36. 14354–14358.
Kim JJ, Fanselow MS. Modality-specific retrograde amnesia of fear. // Science.
1992. 256, 5057. 675–677.
Kim J, Lee S, Park K, Hong I, Song B, Son G, Park H, Kim WR, Park E,
Choe HK, Kim H, Lee C, Sun W, Kim K, Shin KS, Choi S. Amygdala
depotentiation and fear extinction. // Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America. 2007. 104, 52. 20955–60.
Kim SY, Adhikari A, Lee SY, Marshel JH, Kim CK, Mallory CS, Lo M, Pak S,
Mattis J, Lim BK, Malenka RC, Warden MR, Neve R, Tye KM, Deisseroth
K. Diverging neural pathways assemble a behavioural state from separable
features in anxiety. // Nature. 2013b. 496, 7444. 219–23.
Knapska E, Maren S. Reciprocal patterns of c-Fos expression in the medial
prefrontal cortex and amygdala after extinction and renewal of conditioned
fear. // Learning & memory (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.). 2009. 16, 8. 486–493.
Knill DC, Pouget A. The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural
coding and computation // Trends in Neurosciences. 2004. 27, 12. 712–719.
Konorski J. Integrative Activity of the Brain. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1967.
Koo JW Selective Neurotoxic Lesions of Basolateral and Central Nuclei of the
Amygdala Produce Differential Effects on Fear Conditioning // Journal of
Neuroscience. 2004. 24, 35. 7654–7662.
Ko¨rding K. Decision Theory : What ’Should’ the Nervous System Do? //
Science. 2007. 318. 606–610.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
Kovacˇicˇ G, Tao L, Rangan AV, Cai D. Fokker-planck description of conductance-
based integrate-and-fire neuronal networks. // Physical Review E. 2009. 80, 2.
1–17.
Krettek JE, Price JL. A description of the amygdaloid complex in the rat and
cat with observations on intra-amygdaloid axonal connections. // The Journal
of comparative neurology. 1978. 178, 2. 255–280.
Kruschke JK. Bayesian approaches to associative learning: from passive to active
learning. // Learning & behavior : a Psychonomic Society publication. 2008.
36, 3. 210–226.
Kuhn A, Aertsen A, Rotter S. Higher-order statistics of input ensembles and
the response of simple model neurons. // Neural computation. 2003. 15, 1.
67–101.
Handley L, Mithani S. Effects of alpha-adrenoceptor agonists and antagonists in
a maze-exploration model of ’fear’-motivated behaviour // Naunyn Schmiede-
bergs Arch Pharmacol. 1984. 327, 1. 1–5.
Laplace PS. Essai philosophique sur les Probabilite´s // Œuvres comple`tes de
Laplace. 1814.
Laurent V, Westbrook RF. Inactivation of the infralimbic but not the prelimbic
cortex impairs consolidation and retrieval of fear extinction. // Learning &
memory. 2009. 16, 9. 520–529.
Laxmi TR, Stork O, Pape HC. Generalisation of conditioned fear and its
behavioural expression in mice // Behavioural Brain Research. 2003. 145, 1-2.
89–98.
LeDoux JE, Iwata J, Cicchetti P, Reis DJ. Different projections of the central
amygdaloid nucleus mediate autonomic and behavioral correlates of condi-
tioned fear. // Journal of neuroscience. 1988. 8, 7. 2517–2529.
LeDoux JE, Farb CR, Romanski LM Overlapping projections to the amygdala
and striatum from auditory processing areas of the thalamus and cortex //
Neuroscience Letters. 1991. 134, 1. 139–144.
LeDoux JE. Coming to terms with fear // PNAS. 2014. 111, 4. 2871–2878.
Ledoux JE. Emotion circuits in the brain. // Annu Rev Neurosci. 2000. 23.
155–184.
Ledoux JE, Cicchetti P, Xagoraris A, Romanski LM The Lateral Amygdaloid
Nucleus: Sensory Interface of amygdala in fear conditioning. // Journal of
neuroscience. 1990. 10, 4. 1062–1069
Lee Y, Davis M. Role of the hippocampus, the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis,
and the amygdala in the excitatory effect of corticotropin-releasing hormone
on the acoustic startle reflex. // Journal of neuroscience. 1997. 17, 16. 6434–46.
Lee Y, Fitz S, Johnson PL, Shekhar a. Repeated stimulation of CRF receptors
in the BNST of rats selectively induces social but not panic-like anxiety. //
Neuropsychopharmacology. 2008. 33, 11. 2586–2594.
140 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Li H, Penzo MA, Taniguchi H, Kopec CD, Huang ZJ, Li B. Experience-dependent
modification of a central amygdala fear circuit. // Nature neuroscience. 2013.
16, 3. 332–9.
Likhtik E, Pelletier JG, Paz R, Pare´ D. Prefrontal Control of the Amygdala //
Journal of Neuroscience. 2005. 25, 32. 7429–7437.
Likhtik E, Popa D, Apergis-Schoute J, Fidacaro GA, Pare´ D. Amygdala interca-
lated neurons are required for expression of fear extinction. // Nature. 2008.
454, 7204. 642–645.
Likhtik E, Stujenske JM, Topiwala MA, Harris AZ, Gordon JA. Prefrontal
entrainment of amygdala activity signals safety in learned fear and innate
anxiety. // Nature neuroscience. 2014. 17, 1. 106–13.
Lin HC, Mao SC, Gean PW. Block of γ-Aminobutyric Acid-A Receptor Inser-
tion in the Amygdala Impairs Extinction of Conditioned Fear // Biological
Psychiatry. 2009. 66, 7. 665–673.
Lissek S, Powers AS, McClure EB, Phelps EA, Woldehawariat G, Grillon C,
Pine DS. Classical fear conditioning in the anxiety disorders: A meta-analysis
// Behaviour Research and Therapy. 2005. 43, 11. 1391–1424.
Lopez de Armentia M, Sah P. Firing properties and connectivity of neurons in
the rat lateral central nucleus of the amygdala. // Journal of neurophysiology.
2004. 92, 3. 1285–1294.
Lubow RE. Latent Inhibition: Effects of Frequency of Nonreinforced Preexposure
of the Cs // Journal of Comparative and Phys. 1965. 60, 3. 454–457.
Ma WJ, Beck JM, Latham PE, Pouget A. Bayesian inference with probabilistic
population codes. // Nature Neuroscience. 2006. 9, 11. 1432–8.
Mackintosh NJ. A theory of attention: Variations in the associability of stimuli
with reinforcement. // Psychological Review. 1975. 82, 4. 276–298.
Marek R, Strobel C, Bredy TW, Sah P. The amygdala and medial prefrontal
cortex: partners in the fear circuit. // The Journal of physiology. 2013. 591,
Pt 10. 2381–91.
Maren S, Yap SA, Goosens KA. The amygdala is essential for the development
of neuronal plasticity in the medial geniculate nucleus during auditory fear
conditioning in rats. // The Journal of Neuroscience. 2001. 21, 6. RC135.
Marowsky A, Yanagawa Y, Obata K, Vogt KE. A specialized subclass of in-
terneurons mediates dopaminergic facilitation of amygdala function // Neuron.
2005. 48, 6. 1025–1037.
Marr D. Vision. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982.
McNally GP, Westbrook RF. Predicting danger: the nature, consequences, and
neural mechanisms of predictive fear learning // Learn Mem. 2006. 13, 3.
245–253.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 141
McNally GP, Johansen JP, Blair HT. Placing prediction into the fear circuit //
Trends in Neurosciences. 2011. 34, 6. 283–292.
McDonald AJ. Cell Types and Intrinsic Connections of the Amygdala //
The Amygdala: Neurobiological Aspects of Emotion, Memory and Mental
Dysfunction. New York: Wiley-Liss, 1992. 67–96.
McDonald AJ, Mascagni F, Guo L Projections of the medial and lateral prefrontal
cortices to the amygdala: A Phaseolus vulgaris leucoagglutinin study in the
rat // Neuroscience. 1996. 71, 1. 55–75.
Menard J, Treit D. Effects of centrally administered anxiolytic compounds in
animal models of anxiety // Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. 1999.
23, 4. 591–613.
Milad MR, Vidal-Gonzalez I, Quirk GJ. Electrical stimulation of medial pre-
frontal cortex reduces conditioned fear in a temporally specific manner. //
Behavioral neuroscience. 2004. 118, 2. 389–394.
Milad MRR, Quirk GJ. Neurons in medial prefrontal cortex signal memory for
fear extinction // Nature. 2002. 420, 6911. 70–74.
Milad MR, Orr SP, Lasko NB, Chang Y, Rauch SL, Pitman RK. Presence and
acquired origin of reduced recall for fear extinction in PTSD: Results of a twin
study // Journal of Psychiatric Research. 2008. 42, 7. 515–520.
Milad MR, Pitman RK, Ellis CB, Gold AL, Shin LM, Lasko NB, Zeidan MA,
Handwerger K, Orr SP, Rauch SL. Neurobiological Basis of Failure to Recall
Extinction Memory in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder // Biological Psychiatry.
2009. 66, 12. 1075–1082.
Millhouse OE. The Intercalated Cells of the Amygdala // Journal of Comparative
Neurology. 1986. 247. 246–271.
Mineka S, Zinbarg R. A contemporary learning theory perspective on the etiology
of anxiety disorders: it’s not what you thought it was. // The American
psychologist. 2006. 61, 1. 10–26.
Miserendino MJ, Sananes CB, Melia KR, Davis M. Blocking of acquisition but
not expression of conditioned fear-potentiated startle by NMDA antagonists
in the amygdala. // Nature. 1990. 345, 6277. 716–718.
Mitchell SJ, Silver RA. Shunting inhibition modulates neuronal gain during
synaptic excitation // Neuron. 2003. 38, 3. 433–445.
Muigg P, Hetzenauer Ad, Hauer G, Hauschild M, Gaburro S, Frank E, Landgraf
R, Singewald N. Impaired extinction of learned fear in rats selectively bred for
high anxiety - Evidence of altered neuronal processing in prefrontal-amygdala
pathways // European Journal of Neuroscience. 2008. 28, 11. 2299–2309.
Myers KM, Davis M. Mechanisms of fear extinction. // Molecular psychiatry.
2007. 12, 2. 120–150.
142 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Nader K, Majidishad P, Amorapanth P, LeDoux JE. Damage to the Lateral
and Central, but Not Other, Amygdaloid Nuclei Prevents the Acquisition of
Auditory Fear Conditioning // Learning & Memory. 2001. 8, 3. 156–163.
Nusser Z, Mody I. Selective modulation of tonic and phasic inhibitions in dentate
gyrus granule cells. // Journal of neurophysiology. 2002. 87, 5. 2624–2628.
Papoulis A Probability, random variables, and stochastic processes. Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 1991. 3.
Pare´ D, Royer S, Smith Y, Lang EJ. Contextual inhibitory gating of impulse
traffic in the intra-amygdaloid network // Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 2003. 985.
78–91.
Pare´ D, Smith Y. The intercalated cell masses project to the central and medial
nuclei of the amygdala in cats // Neuroscience. 1993. 57, 4. 1077–1090.
Pavlov I. Conditioned Reflexes. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1927.
Pearce JM, Bouton ME. Theories of associative learning in animals. // Annual
review of psychology. 2001. 52. 111–139.
Pearce JM, Hall G. A model for Pavlovian learning: variations in the effectiveness
of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. // Psychological review. 1980.
87, 6. 532–52.
Pearl J. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems // Morgan Kaufmann,
San Mateo, CA. 1988.
Pellow S, Chopin P, File SE, Briley M. Validation of open : closed arm entries
in an elevated plus-maze as a measure of anxiety in the rat // Journal of
Neuroscience Methods. 1985. 14, 3. 149–167.
Pellow S, File SE. Anxiolytic and anxiogenic drug effects on exploratory activity
in an elevated plus-maze: A novel test of anxiety in the rat // Pharmacology,
Biochemistry and Behavior. 1986. 24, 3. 525–529.
Penzo MA, Robert V, Li B. Fear Conditioning Potentiates Synaptic Transmission
onto Long-Range Projection Neurons in the Lateral Subdivision of Central
Amygdala // Journal of Neuroscience. 2014. 34, 7. 2432–2437.
Peri T, Ben-Shakhar G, Orr SP, Shalev AY. Psychophysiologic assessment of
aversive conditioning in posttraumatic stress disorder // Biological Psychiatry.
1999. 47, 6. 512–519.
Phillips RG, LeDoux JE. Differential contribution of amygdala and hippocampus
to cued and contextual fear conditioning. // Behavioral neuroscience. 1992.
106, 2. 274–85.
Pitka¨nen A, Sefanacci L, Farb CR, Go GG, LeDoux JE, Amaral DG . Intrinsic
connections of the rat amygdaloid complex: Projections originating in the
lateral nucleus // Journal of Comparative Neurology. 1995. 356, 1. 288–310.
Poggio T. Afterword: Marr’s Vision and Computational Neuroscience // David
Marr’s Vision. 2010. 362–367.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
Preuschoff K, Bossaerts P. Adding prediction risk to the theory of reward
learning // Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 2007. 1104. 135–
146.
Price JL, Amaral DG. An autoradiographic study of the projections of the
central nucleus of the monkey amygdala. // The journal of neuroscience. 1981.
1. 1242–1259.
Quirk GJ, Russo GK, Barron JL, Lebron K. The role of ventromedial prefrontal
cortex in the recovery of extinguished fear. // The Journal of neuroscience.
2000. 20, 16. 6225–6231.
Quirk GJ, Armony JL, LeDoux JE. Fear conditioning enhances different temporal
components of tone-evoked spike trains in auditory cortex and lateral amygdala
// Neuron. 1997. 19, 3. 613–624.
Quirk GJ, Repa JC, LeDoux JE. Fear conditioning enhances short-latency
auditory responses of lateral amygdala neurons: Parallel recordings in the
freely behaving rat // Neuron. 1995. 15, 5. 1029–1039.
Rabinak CA, Maren S. Associatuve Structure of Fear Memory After Basolateral
Amygdala Lesions in rates // Behav Neurosci. 2008. 122, 6. 1284–1294.
Rachman S. Fear and courage. // New York: Freeman, 1990. 2.
Redish AD, Jensen S, Johnson A, Kurth-Nelson Z. Reconciling reinforcement
learning models with behavioral extinction and renewal: implications for
addiction, relapse, and problem gambling. // Psychological review. 2007. 114,
3. 784–805.
Reijmers LG, Perkins BL, Matsuo N, Mayford M. Localization of a stable neural
correlate of associative memory. // Science (New York, N.Y.). 2007. 317, 5842.
1230–1233.
Repa JC, Muller J, Apergis J, Desrochers TM, Zhou Y, LeDoux JE. Two
different lateral amygdala cell populations contribute to the initiation and
storage of memory. // Nature neuroscience. 2001. 4, 7. 724–731.
Rescorla RA, Wagner AR. A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the
effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement // Classical Conditioning
II: Current Research and Theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972.
64–99.
Rescorla RA. Pavlovian conditioning. It’s not what you think it is. // The
American psychologist. 1988. 43, 3. 151–160.
Rescorla RA. Conditioned inhibition of fear resulting from negative CS-US
contingencies. // Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology. 1969.
67, 4. 504–509.
Rescorla AR. Effect of US habituation following conditioning // Journal of
Comparative and Physiological Psychology. 1973. 82. 137–143.
144 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rescorla RA, Heth CD. Reinstatement of Fear to an Extinguished Conditioned
Stimulus // Journal of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes.
1975. 104, 1. 88–96.
Resstel LBM, Alves FHF, Reis DG, Crestani CC, Correa FMA, Guimaraes
FS. Anxiolytic-like effects induced by acute reversible inactivation of the bed
nucleus of stria terminalis // Neuroscience. 2008. 154, 3. 869–876.
Richardson MJE. Effects of synaptic conductance on the voltage distribution
and firing rate of spiking neurons. // Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear,
and soft matter physics. 2004. 69, 5 Pt 1. 051918.
Rinzel J. Propagating Activity Patterns in Large-Scale Inhibitory Neuronal
Networks // Science. 1998. 279, 5355. 1351–1355.
Risken H. The Fokker-Planck Equation: Methods of Solution and Applications.
Heidelberg: Springer, 1996. 2.
Rizvi TA, Ennis M, Behbehani MM, Shipley MT. Connections between the central
nucleus of the amygdala and the midbrain periaqueductal gray: Topography
and reciprocity // Journal of Comparative Neurology. 1991. 303, 1. 121–131.
Rodrigues SM, Schafe GE, LeDoux JE. Intra-amygdala blockade of the NR2B
subunit of the NMDA receptor disrupts the acquisition but not the expression
of fear conditioning. // Journal of neuroscience. 2001. 21, 17. 6889–6896.
Rosenkranz JA, Grace AA. Dopamine-mediated modulation of odour-evoked
amygdala potentials during pavlovian conditioning // Nature. 2002. 417, 6886.
282–287.
Royer S, Martina M, Pare´ D. An inhibitory interface gates impulse traffic
between the input and output stations of the amygdala. // The Journal of
neuroscience. 1999. 19, 23. 10575–10583.
Russell S, Norvig P. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. 2009. 3.
Sah P, Faber ES, Lopez De Armentia M, Power J. The amygdaloid complex:
anatomy and physiology // Physiol Rev. 2003. 83, 3. 803–834.
Sahuque LL, Kullberg EF, Mcgeehan AJ, Kinder JR, Hicks MP, Blanton MG,
Janak PH, Foster Olive M. Anxiogenic and aversive effects of corticotropin-
releasing factor (CRF) in the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis in the rat:
Role of CRF receptor subtypes // Psychopharmacology. 2006. 186, 1. 122–132.
Samson RD, Pare´ D. Activity-Dependent Synaptic Plasticity in the Central
Nucleus of the Amygdala // J. Neurosci. 2005. 25, 7. 1847–1855.
Schiller D, Delgado MR. Overlapping neural systems mediating extinction,
reversal and regulation of fear // Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2010. 14, 6.
268–276.
Schultz W, Dayan P, Montague PR. A neural substrate of prediction and reward.
// Science. 1997. 275, June 1994. 1593–1599.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 145
Schultz W. Neural coding of basic reward terms of animal learning theory,
game theory, microeconomics and behavioural ecology // Current Opinion in
Neurobiology. 2004. 14, 2. 139–147.
Seidenbecher T, Remmes J, Daldrup T, Lesting J, Pape HC. Distinct state
anxiety after predictable and unpredictable fear training in mice // Behavioural
Brain Research. 2016. 304. 20–23.
Semyanov A, Walker MC, Kullmann DM, Silver RA. Tonically active GABAA
receptors: Modulating gain and maintaining the tone // Trends in Neuro-
sciences. 2004. 27, 5. 262–269.
Senn V, Wolff SBE, Herry C, Grenier F, Ehrlich I, Gru¨ndemann J, Fadok JP,
Mu¨ller C, Letzkus JJ, Lu¨thi A. Long-Range Connectivity Defines Behavioral
Specificity of Amygdala Neurons // Neuron. 2014. 81, 2. 428–437.
Shaban H, Humeau Y, Herry C, Cassasus G, Shigemoto R, Ciocchi S, Barbieri
S, van der Putten H, Kaupmann K, Bettler B, Lu¨thi A. Generalization of
amygdala LTP and conditioned fear in the absence of presynaptic inhibition.
// Nature neuroscience. 2006. 9, 8. 1028–35.
Shepard RN. Toward a universal law of generalization for psychological science.
// Science (New York, N.Y.). 1987. 237, 4820. 1317–1323.
Shimada S, Inagaki S, Narita N, Takagi H. Synaptic contacts between CGRP-
immunoreactive terminals and enkephalin-immunoreactive neurons in the
central amygdaloid nucleus of the rat // Neuroscience Letters. 1992. 134, 2.
243–246.
Siegert AJF. On the first passage time probability problem // Physical Review.
1951. 81, 4. 617–623.
Sierra-Mercado D, Corcoran KA, Lebro´n-Milad K, Quirk GJ. Inactivation of
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex reduces expression of conditioned fear and
impairs subsequent recall of extinction // European Journal of Neuroscience.
2006. 24, 6. 1751–1758.
Sierra-Mercado D, Padilla-Coreano N, Quirk GJ. Dissociable roles of prelimbic
and infralimbic cortices, ventral hippocampus, and basolateral amygdala in the
expression and extinction of conditioned fear. // Neuropsychopharmacology
: official publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology.
2011. 36, 2. 529–38.
Singer T, Critchley HD, Preuschoff K. A common role of insula in feelings,
empathy and uncertainty // Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2009. 13, 8. 334–340.
Smith MC, Coleman SR, Gormezano I. Classical conditioning of the rabbit’s
nictitating membrane response at backward, simultaneous, and forward CS-US
intervals. // Journal of comparative and physiological psychology. 1969. 69, 2.
226–231.
Sotres-Bayon F, Bush DEA, LeDoux JE. Emotional Perseveration: An Update
on Prefrontal-Amygala Interactions in Fear Extinction. // Learning & Memory.
2004. 11. 525–535.
146 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sotres-Bayon F, Cain CK, LeDoux JE. Brain Mechanisms of Fear Extinction:
Historical Perspectives on the Contribution of Prefrontal Cortex // Biological
Psychiatry. 2006. 60, 4. 329–336.
Spreizer S, Angelhuber M, Bahuguna J, Aertsen A, Kumar A Spatial architecture
generates bumps of activity and input-dependent dynamics in purely inhibitory
networks // in preparation. 2016.
Sullivan GM, Apergis J, Bush DEA, Johnson LR, Hou M, LeDoux JE Lesions
in the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis disrupt corticosterone and freezing
responses elicited by a contextual but not by a specific cue-conditioned fear
stimulus // Neuroscience. 2004. 128, 1. 7–14.
Sutton RS. Gain Adaptation Beats Least Squares? // Proceedings on the
Seventh Yale Workshop on Adaptive and Learning Systems. 1992. 161–166.
Sutton RS, Barto AG. Time-Derivative Models of Pavlovian Reinforcement //
Learning and Computational Neuroscience: Foundations of Adaptive Networks.
1990. Mowrer 1960. 497–537.
Sutton RS, Barto AG. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. 1998.
Tasan RO, Bukovac A, Peterschmitt YN, Sartori SB, Landgraf R, Singewald
N, Sperk G. Altered GABA transmission in a mouse model of increased trait
anxiety // Neuroscience. 2011. 183. 71–80.
Thorndike EL. Animal intelligence: an experimental study of the associative
processes in animals // Pyschological Monographs. 1898. 24, 8. entire issue.
Thurstone LL. The learning curve equation // Psychological Monographs. 1919.
26. 1–51.
Tolman EC, Brunswik E. The organism and the causal texture of the environment.
// Psychological Review. 1935. 42. 43–77.
Tovote P, Fadok JP, Lu¨thi A. Neuronal circuits for fear and anxiety // Nature
Reviews Neuroscience. 2015. 16, 6. 317–331.
Tronson NC, Corcoran KA, Jovasevic V, Radulovic J. Fear conditioning and
extinction: Emotional states encoded by distinct signaling pathways // Trends
in Neurosciences. 2012. 35, 3. 145–155.
Trouche S, Sasaki JM, Tu T, Reijmers LG. Fear Extinction Causes Target-
Specific Remodeling of Perisomatic Inhibitory Synapses // Neuron. 2013. 80,
4. 1054–1065.
Tuckwell HC. Synaptic Transmission in a Model for Stochastic Neural Activity
// J. theor. Biol. 1979. 77. 65–81.
Van Vreeswijk C, Abbott LF, Bard Ermentrout G. When inhibition not excitation
synchronizes neural firing // Journal of Computational Neuroscience. 1994. 1,
4. 313–321.
VanElzakker MB, Dahlgren MK, Davis FC, Dubois S, Shin LM. From Pavlov to
PTSD: The extinction of conditioned fear in rodents, humans, and anxiety
disorders // Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. 2014. 113. 3–18.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
Veening JG, Swanson LW, Sawchenko PE. The organization of projections from
the central nucleus of the amygdala to brainstem sites involved in central
autonomic regulation: A combined retrograde transport-immunohistochemical
study // Brain Research. 1984. 303, 2. 337–357.
Veinante P, Freund-Mercier MJ. Branching Patterns of Central Amygdaloid
Nucleus Efferents in the Rat // Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.
2003. 985. 552–553.
Veinante P, Freund-Mercier MJ. Distribution of oxytocin- and vasopressin-
binding sites in the rat extended amygdala: A histoautoradiographic study //
Journal of Comparative Neurology. 1997. 383, 3. 305–325.
Veinante P, Freund-Mercier MJ. Intrinsic and extrinsic connections of the rat
central extended amygdala: An in vivo electrophysiological study of the central
amygdaloid nucleus // Brain Research. 1998. 794, 2. 188–198.
Vertes RP. Differential Projections of the Infralimbic and Prelimbic Cortex in
the Rat // Synapse. 2004. 51, 1. 32–58.
Vidal-Gonzalez I, Vidal-Gonzalez B, Rauch SL, Quirk GJ. Microstimulation
reveals opposing influences of prelimbic and infralimbic cortex on the expression
of conditioned fear // Learning & Memory. 2006. 13, 6. 728–733.
Viviani D, Charlet A, van den Burg E, Robinet C, Hurni N, Abatis M, Magara
F, Stoop R. Oxytocin Selectively Gates Fear Responses Through Distinct
Outputs from the Central Amygdala // Science. 2011. 333, 6038. 104–107.
Vlachos I, Herry C, Lu¨thi A, Aertsen A, Kumar A. Context-dependent encoding
of fear and extinction memories in a large-scale network model of the basal
amygdala // PLoS Computational Biology. 2011. 7, 3.
Wagner AR, Logan FA, Haberlandt K. Stimulus Selection in Animal Discrimi-
nation Learning. // Journal of Experimental Psychology. 1968. 76, 2, Pt.1.
171–180.
Walker DL, Davis M. Double dissociation between the involvement of the bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis and the central nucleus of the amygdala in
startle increases produced by conditioned versus unconditioned fear. // The
Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience.
1997. 17, 23. 9375–9383.
Walker DL, Miles LA, Davis M. Selective participation of the bed nucleus of
the stria terminalis and CRF in sustained anxiety-like versus phasic fear-like
responses // Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry.
2009. 33, 8. 1291–1308.
Walker DL, Davis M. Quantifying fear potentiated startle using absolute versus
proportional increase scoring methods: Implications for the neurocircuitry of
fear and anxiety // Psychopharmacology. 2002. 164, 3. 318–328.
Walker DL, Toufexis DJ, Davis M. Role of the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis
versus the amygdala in fear, stress, and anxiety // European Journal of
Pharmacology. 2003. 463, 1-3. 199–216.
148 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Watabe AM, Ochiai T, Nagase M, Takahashi Y, Sato M, Kato F. Synaptic
potentiation in the nociceptive amygdala following fear learning in mice. //
Molecular brain. 2013. 6, 1. 11.
Watanabe Y, Ikegaya Y, Saito H, Abe K. Roles of GABAA, NMDA and
muscarinic receptors in induction of long-term potentiation in the medial and
lateral amygdala in vitro // Neuroscience Research. 1995. 21, 4. 317–322.
Watson JB, Rayner R. Conditioned Emotional Reactions // Classics in the
History of Psychology. 2002. 15, 1960. 1–7.
Wickens JR, Budd CS, Hyland BI, Arbuthnott GW. Striatal contributions to
reward and decision making: Making sense of regional variations in a reiterated
processing matrix // Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 2007.
1104. 192–212.
Widrow B, Hoff ME. Adaptive switching circuits // IRE WESCCON Convention
Record. 1960. 4. 96–104.
Wilensky AE, Schafe GE, LeDoux JE. Functional inactivation of the amygdala
before but not after auditory fear conditioning prevents memory formation.
// Journal of neuroscience. 1999. 19, 24. RC48.
Wilensky AE, Schafe GE, LeDoux JE. The amygdala modulates memory consol-
idation of fear-motivated inhibitory avoidance learning but not classical fear
conditioning. // Journal of neuroscience. 2000. 20, 18. 7059–7066.
Wolff SBE, Gru¨ndemann J, Tovote P, Krabbe S, Jacobson GA, Mu¨ller C, Herry
C, Ehrlich I, Friedrich RW, Letzkus JJ, Lu¨thi A. Amygdala interneuron
subtypes control fear learning through disinhibition. // Nature. 2014. 509,
7501. 453–8.
Yin H, Barnet RC, Miller RR. Second-order conditioning and Pavlovian con-
ditioned inhibition: operational similarities and differences. // Journal of
experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 1994. 20, 4. 419–428.
Yu AJ, Dayan P. Expected and unexpected uncertainty: ACh and NE in the
neocortex // Advances in neural information processing . . . . 2003. 15. 157–164.
Yu AJ, Dayan P. Uncertainty, neuromodulation, and attention // Neuron. 2005.
46, 4. 681–692.
Zhou Y, Won J, Karlsson MG, Zhou M, Rogerson T, Balaji J, Neve R, Poirazi
P, Silva AJ. CREB regulates excitability and the allocation of memory to
subsets of neurons in the amygdala. // Nature neuroscience. 2009. 12, 11.
1438–43.
Zimmerman JM, Rabinak CA, McLachlan IG, Maren S. The central nucleus of
the amygdala is essential for acquiring and expressing conditional fear after
overtraining. // Learning & memory (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.). 2007. 14, 9.
634–644.
Acknowledgements
“I will however say this, that it is an adventure that every human being
has to live through, learning to be anxious so as not to be ruined either
by never having been in anxiety or by sinking into it. Whoever has
learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.”
– Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 1844
Many people have contributed to my PhD studies becoming an unforgettable
adventure and I wish to express my gratitude for that. Firstly, I want to thank
my supervisors in Freiburg, Ad Aertsen and Arvind Kumar for giving me the
opportunity to work on this project and for allowing me a lot of freedom in
pursuing it. Their enthusiasm for computational neuroscience was a constant
source of motivation for me. I gained a lot from the courses, conferences and
events organized at the BCF, as well as summer schools and conferences I was
given the opportunity to attend, for which I would like to express thankfulness.
I will always be grateful to my colleagues at the BCF for the wonderful moments
and interesting discussions we had; in particular to Stojan Jovanovic´ and Marko
Filipovic´, for their friendship during our shared Freiburg experience.
I wish to thank Andreas Lu¨thi for giving me the opportunity to join and
present myself in the meetings of his lab and to all the members of the Lu¨thi lab
for critical feedback. The insights I gained from my labvisits in Basel shaped
this project tremendously. In particular, I would like to thank Milica Markovic´
and Paolo Botta for their patience in helping me understand the neurobiological
background, for many fruitful discussions and for sharing data.
Further, I would like to thank Pierre Veinante for giving me the opportunity to
gather hands-on experience with experimental work during my stint in Strasbourg
and get a glimpse of the excitement and frustration that comes with experimental
work.
Special thanks go to Marie-Claire Ung for proofreading parts of the French
re´sume´ and to my girlfriend Enru Lin for proofreading most of the main body
of this thesis. Without their help, this work would contain many more slovenly
expressions than it undoubtedly still does.
Herausragende Dankbarkeit gilt meinen Eltern, die mir zu jedem Zeitpunkt
Ru¨ckhalt gegeben haben und ohne deren immerwa¨hrende Unterstu¨tzung ich
dieses Abenteuer niemals ha¨tte bestreiten ko¨nnen.
149

